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For more than 20 years, Handicap International has been 
providing assistance to victims of landmines and other 
explosive devices, whilst pursuing the global objective 
of improving the situation of people with disabilities both 
in terms of access to care and services, and also with 
regard to their ability to exercise their rights in society. It 
was this constant presence in diffi cult environments that 
persuaded us of the need to focus our attention beyond 
immediate action in order to try and prevent the disabling 
situations that we were witnessing in our day-to-day 
work. That Handicap International should, from 1992, 
participate actively in the creation and development of 
the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) 
thus became evident: obtaining a total ban on landmines 
would mean preventing new victims, preventing further 
such dramatic disabling situations. We thus learnt to 
convince, whilst still endeavouring to assist. The great 
victory in 1997, the adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty, was 
proof that we were on the right road. We had fi nally got 
it, this convention that was to prevent the dissemination 
of landmines, develop mine-clearance and support the 
victims! 
We knew, however, that adoption of a new de jure norm is 
born of compromise.  Consequently, we had to accept that 
the defi nition of the offending weapon would be restrictive 
but vague, and that the duty to provide assistance to 
victims would be affi rmed, but somehow conditionned by 
the “each state Party in a position to do so” sentence in the 
text that the 123 countries were going to sign in December 
1997. And yet, in the true tradition of  NGOs, and more 
particularly of those linked to the « without borders» 
movement, Handicap International is fi ercely devoted to the 
recognition of the victims’ rights to assistance. Therefore, 
whilst participating fully in the ICBL’s efforts to obtain the 
universalization and correct application of the treaty, we 
felt it was also essential to take action towards developing 
assistance and the recognition of victims’ rights. We 
became part of the ICBL’s working group focusing on mine 
victims assistance, and attempted, whenever possible, to 
highlight the need to increase the funding allocated to 
this assistance, and also to place the issue of the right to 
reparation and compensation at the centre of the debate. 
On this last point in any case, the response from the 
decision-makers has been underwhelming… 
Whilst not at all discounting the treaty of Ottawa and the 
progress it represents, we wanted to explore the sources 
of the law and its evolution in order to identify aspects, 
within and beyond the treaty of Ottawa,  that could be 
useful to victims in their attempts to obtain recognition.
The deadly and often fratricidal confrontations of the 1990s 
convinced public opinion and, very often, political powers, 
that the end of a confl ict does not signify reconciliation: the 
victims expect to receive justice; for them it is an essential 
part in a healing process that may open up possibilities 
for renewed co-existence, if not total reconciliation. The 
International Criminal Tribunals, the International Criminal 
Court, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Justice 
and Peace Commissions… attempt to give a concrete 
expression to this demand. For mine victims, however, 
there is no special provision authorising them to claim 
reparation or compensation. Yet their wounds are all the 
more painful, and tainted with a hopeless feeling of guilt, 
because these victims themselves detonated the weapon 
that mutilated them. These wounds cannot heal unless the 
innocence of the victim, and consequently the existence of 
external responsibility, is acknowledged.
Foreword
by Nathalie Herlemont-Zoritchak1
1 Nathalie Herlemont-Zoritchak, doctor in Political Science, is head of the Strategic Policy service within Handicap International’s Executive Director’s offi ce. She has directed 











During a workshop organised in Lyon in 2001, with the 
help and expertise of academicians and professionals, 
we identified a number of ideas for developing the 
rights of landmine victims, both at a national and 
international level2. Among these possible ways forward, 
the introduction of  provisions and measures in favour 
of people with disabilities seemed evident to us. Indeed, 
landmine victims are generally people in disabling 
situations; assisting landmine victims and improving the 
situation of people with disabilities are thus very closely 
related. 
In this area, it must be said, there have been some 
encouraging developments over recent years. Disability 
issues are now included more frequently in political 
agendas, and the work being done to prepare the future 
United Nations Convention on the promotion and 
protection of the rights and dignity of persons with 
disabilities has had a significant mobilising effect. 
However, these aspects do not provide a response to 
certain dimensions of landmine accidents. Moreover, as 
landmine victims are often also civilian victims of wars, they 
are concerned by other provisions found in international 
law, in addition to the Treaty of Ottawa.
We did not want to create a framework exclusively for 
landmine victims, so we have adopted an approach that 
is at once global and specific, taking account of a double 
imperative: enabling victims to participate fully in society; 
meeting their needs by developing the specific measures 
required. The issue of the right to reparation and the 
right to compensation seemed to us to be a specific and 
overriding concern for victims of landmines and other 
devices with similar effects. The absence of special or 
adapted provision, and the absence even of a constructive 
debate on this question, convinced us to carry out an in-
depth study. 
The work that we are presenting today is not only a legal 
exploration of current or future possibilities, of difficulties 
and pitfalls, outrageous oversights. It should also be 
seen as an indignant protest against the nonchalance of 
States and the producers of lethal devices, little inclined to 
acknowledge and assume their responsibilities.  It should 
also be heard as an appeal to organisations and authorities 
specialised in the accompaniment of victims, particularly 
legal accompaniment, to take up this issue. Finally, it is a 
way of saying to victims that their determination is not in 
vain, that political intent constantly needs pointing in the 
right direction and that their demands contribute towards 
this. In December 2004, during the summit for a mine-
free world in Nairobi, the State parties to the Mine Ban 
treaty adopted an action plan in which they qualified victim 
assistance as an “obligation”. 
However, action on behalf of the victims does not end with 
the Treaty of Ottawa.
Because, today, other weapons with the same effects 
(unexploded cluster munitions, for example), not prohibited 
by the treaty, are being used widely; and because the 
right to reparation and the right to compensation are not 
yet recognised for victims of landmines and devices with 
similar effects.
Questions remain with regard to how such a law would 
be implemented. Yet the interest shown by the victims 
themselves, in particular during the debates organised in 
Nairobi, proves that this subject has already gone beyond 
the academic discussion stage. 
2 See  HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Pour le développement d’un droit des victimes de mines / Towards the development of the rights of landmine victims / Hacia el desarrollo de 











An incalculable amount of people are affected by 
landmines. The estimated number of landmine survivors 
worldwide is between 300,000 and 400,000. In 2003 
alone3, 8,065 new victims of mines and unexploded 
ordnance were recorded. Not included in this number are 
the unregistered victims and victims which suffer from 
landmines not because of a direct injury. Examples are 
family members of the injured or killed landmine victim 
who have to suffer from the consequences of losing a 
previously non disabled member of the work force, or 
face a psychological injury. Others have to cope with the 
serious social, economic and environmental implications 
of landmines: mined land, for example, prevents farmers 
from using it for agriculture. Landmines constitute non-
biodegradable and toxic garbage, which disturbs the 
ecosystem and reduces the soil productivity. 
In order to prevent future landmine victims, the 
international community has achieved a remarkable goal 
by adopting the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-
Personnel Mines and on their Destruction4. As the 
title suggests, the convention focuses on prohibiting the 
development, the production and the use of anti-personnel 
mines. It constitutes a major step forward in the fi ght 
against anti-personnel mines. However, the Convention 
has two weak points: States like the U.S., China, Russia 
or Pakistan, which are major landmine producers, are not 
party to  the Convention. Further, the interest of past and 
actual civil victims is taken into account only by Art. 6 Para. 
3 of the Convention, according to which “each State Party 
in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care 
and rehabilitation, and social and economic reintegration 
of mine victims”. This stipulation, affi rming an obligation 
to assist victims,  leaves it to a certain discretion of the 
states as to whether to help mine victims. The requirement 
to assist landmine victims was however reaffi rmed by the 
State Parties during the fi rst Review Conference of the 
convention in Nairobi in 20045.
Landmine victims might also rely on other provisions 
and sources to obtain appropriate assistance. A right to 
redress would give the landmine victims a secure basis for 
their needs. It has also a further implication: if the producer 
and/or the employer of landmines have to pay for the 
damage the landmines have caused, the production and 
the employment of the landmines becomes expensive and 
therefore unattractive. In this report Handicap International 
has undertaken a considerable effort to examine 
whether existing mechanisms provide for redress for 
landmine victims. The analysis studies different areas of 
international law: human rights, international humanitarian 
law, environmental law, as well as national laws in order to 
remind all effects of mines and to compile the potential legal 
means which could be claimed by landmine victims. As a 
second scope of the study, the research on compensation 
mechanisms for various harms and damages reveals that 
different models can be studied. Therefore a comparative 
analysis on the applicability of these different models in the 
area of landmine victims’ compensation appears relevant.
*Elke Schwager is currently writing a doctoral thesis on “Jus post bellum. Claims of landmine victims”
3 INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES (ICBL),  Landmine Monitor 2004. Washington: Human Rights Watch, 2004, p. 47-49.
4 Adopted in Ottawa on 18 September 1997, entry into force on 1 March 1999, 2056 UN Treaty Series, p. 211, C.N.163.2003.
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The question on redress for landmine victims belongs to 
the ongoing debate regarding claims for victims of war. 
The actual discussion started in the 1990s with claims 
concerning forced labour and the so called “comfort 
women” during the Second World War. Recent conflicts 
occupy courts as well; individuals harmed by the NATO 
bombing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia6 or by 
British troops during the military intervention against Iraq7, 
have filed claims before national courts. Within the system 
of the United Nations, the issue is subject to the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy 
and Reparation for Victims of [Gross] Violations of 
International Human Rights and [Serious] Violations 
of Humanitarian Law prepared by Special Rapporteurs 
for the Commission on Human Rights8. The point of 
view taken by the different courts and academics varies 
considerably. This confusion is sometimes the result of a 
lack of differentiation.
When considering a right to reparation for landmine 
victims under current law, it is important to distinguish 
between rights under international and national law, and 
between rights vis-à-vis a state or a non state actor. 
Further, a potential right for landmine victims has to be 
distinguished from the enforcement of the right i.e. the 
procedural capacity to exercise the right. The enforcement 
may take place in international or national proceedings.
Following this distinction, Handicap International examines 
first the international law to see whether there is a claim 
for individuals arising out of the general regime of state 
responsibility or special provisions. 
Under international law, a right for victims of violations of 
human rights or international humanitarian can no longer 
be denied access to justice by the established argument 
that the individual is not a subject of international law9. 
It was even in the area of international humanitarian 
law, where the individual was vested first with rights and 
obligations under international law10. The reason therefore 
is the need to protect an individual independently of the 
assistance of its state in situations of international armed 
conflict, where the state’s authority may be weak or even 
undergo changes11. 
The acknowledgement of individual rights does not 
automatically lead to a right to redress in case of a violation 
of the individual right. Indeed, the general principle under 
international law, that every breach of international law 
by a State entails its international responsibility12, is 
traditionally only valid on the inter-state level13. However, 
Art. 33 Para. 2 of the Draft Articles of the International 
Law Commission states that this principle, on which the 
Draft Articles are based, is “without prejudice to any right, 
arising from the international responsibility of a State, 
which may accrue directly to any person or entity other 
than a State.” The draft thereby accepts that an obligation 
to pay reparation may also exist towards individuals14. 
And indeed, the developments in the field of human rights 
make it difficult to explain why an individual should be 
the holder of a primary right, for example a human right, 
but not of the accompanying secondary right, the right to 
reparation15. The observation is also made by the judges 
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
who state: “Thus, in view of these developments, there 
does appear to be a right to compensation for victims 
under international law16”. If the landmine victim is a victim 
of a violation of a rule of international law of which he/she 
is the bearer, he/she might have a right to compensation. 
In the report Handicap International discuss further whether 
specific provisions, Art. 3 of the IV. Hague Convention 1907, Art. 
91 Additional Protocol I, Art. 75 Rome Statute, and stipulation 
of the UNCC17, the EECC18 and the regional human rights 
conventions provide for an individual right to compensation. 
The existence of a right to redress under international 
law does not imply the existence of an appropriate 
enforcement mechanism for this right. To recite the judges 
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: “The 
question then is not so much is there a right to compensation 
but how can that right be implemented19.” Indeed, neither Art. 
3 of the IV. Hague Convention 1907 nor Art. 91 Additional 
Protocol I foresee a mechanism by which the individual 
could enforce the rights it purported to grant. This has led 
some courts to reach the conclusion that in the absence 
of an enforcement mechanism there can be no subjective 
right20. This reasoning cannot be substantiated however, 
6 For a report on the decisions of Dutch courts see L. ZEGVELD, Remedies for victims of violations of international humanitarian law, IRRC 2003, p. 497 at p. 502, 504; in 
Germany see LG BONN, NJW 2004, 525 et seq.
7 High Court CO/2242/2004 Al –Skeini.
8 See the three versions prepared by T. VAN BOHVEN: E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 and E/CN.4/1997/104, the draft by its successor C. BASSIOUNI: E/
CN.4/2000/62, and the revised version prepared by Alejandro SALINAS: E/CN.4/2004/57.
9 R. MCCORQUODALE, “The Individual and the International Legal System”, in: International Law, M. EVANS (ed.), 2003, p. 300 et seq.
10 K. IPSEN, Völkerrecht, 5th ed. 2004, § 67 Note 3.
11 K. IPSEN,  Ibid, § 67 Note 4.
12 Article 1 of the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, adopted by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session 2001, Report 
of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.
IV.E.1, p. 43.
13 Article 33 para. 1 of the Draft articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, op.cit..
14 M. SASSÒLI, State Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, IRRC 2002, p. 401 at p. 418.
15 K. DOEHRING, „Handelt es sich bei dem Recht, das durch diplomatischen Schutz eingefordert wird, um ein solches, das dem die Protektion ausübenden Staat zusteht, oer 
geht es um die Erzwingung von Rechten des betroffenen Individuum?“ In: Der diplomatische Schutz im Völker- und Europarecht, G. Ress/ T. Stein (ed.), 1996, p. 13 at p. 
16.
16 Victims’ Compensation and Participation, Appendix to the Letter dated 2 November 2000 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council 
of 3 November 2000, UN Doc. S/2000/1063, pp. 11-12, para. 21.
17 United Nations Compensation Commission.
18 Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission.
19 Victims’ Compensation and Participation, op. cit., para. 22.
20 “X et al. v. the Government of Japan”, Tokyo High Court, Judgment of 8 February 2001, Japanese Annual of International Law, 2002, p. 142 at 143.
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as the bearing of a right has to be differentiated from the 
procedural capacity to enforce it21. Thus, a right under 
international law exists independently of the procedural 
capacity to enforce it under international law22. 
Consequently, the report examines the different existing 
mechanisms like the International Court of Justice, the 
International Criminal Court, the UNCC, EECC, and the 
regional courts for human rights to ascertain whether they 
can be used to enforce a victims’ right. One option is the 
possibility to enforce international rights before domestic 
courts. If civil proceedings under domestic laws are available 
for victims of violations of international humanitarian law 
or human rights law23, then they are suitable for landmine 
victims to claim redress. Civil proceedings can be initiated 
by the victim itself as he/she will enjoy procedural capacity 
before domestic courts. A case can be filed independently 
of the existence of a crime. Further, before a civil court, 
the victim is not dependent on the help of its home state, 
as is usually the case when enforcing its rights under 
international law. This subjection is disadvantageous for 
the victim, as its rights might be sacrificed due to political 
considerations. 
The report also examines remedies available under 
domestic law, concentrating on the issue of product liability. 
Further, landmine victims can generally seek reparation 
under the national ius delictum. A violation of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law usually constitutes 
a relevant violation under the ius delictum as well24. In 
the event of such violation, the landmine victim can claim 
damages from the state responsible for the use of the mine 
or the person laying the mine. However, if the landmine 
causing injury was used in compliance with the ius in bello, 
the international humanitarian law might be invoked as 
justification for the wrongdoing. It is debatable whether one 
can rely on this justification if the landmine explodes after 
the armed conflict has ended. Sometimes it is argued that 
in a time of war the national law system is suspended and 
that therefore no claims under domestic law can arise25. 
This view is unsustainable. There is no reason and no 
mechanism to explain why the domestic law system should 
cease to operate in time of an armed conflict. Potential 
rights under domestic law exist in parallel to potential rights 
under international law, which might have arisen from the 
conflict26. A right to reparation might also arise out of special 
laws enacted to regulate the consequences of an armed 
conflict. Claims under the ius delictum and product liability 
are available in most of the domestic legal orders. The great 
advantage of claims under domestic law is therefore that 
there is no need to create a new basis for claims. 
Claims under national law are enforced by individuals. 
Some national legal systems provide the possibility of 
group actions, appropriate for example in situations of 
mass production. In such group actions, the plaintiff 
seeks recovery for all members of the group he/she is 
representing27. The enforcement of potential claims under 
national law may be confronted by different obstacles, 
which are examined by the report. 
In its second part, the report of Handicap International 
describes steps which can be undertaken by the 
international community to set up appropriate 
mechanisms. It does so by reviewing existing national 
compensation funds for the victims of terrorism, the 
International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund (IOPC), and 
the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture. 
Even if none of these funds can offer an immediate pattern 
for a compensation mechanism to landmine victims, each 
single one gives a rather interesting viewpoint.
Existing victims of terrorism compensation mechanisms28 
are useful in both identifying and developing compensation 
mechanisms for landmine victims. However the simple 
transposition of the victims of terrorism compensation 
model to one for landmine victims does not address a 
number of problems, including for example the lack of 
national infrastructure capable of providing medical reports 
and certificates, proof of costs, and loss of earnings.
Regarding the IOPC, the system of no-fault liability 
which is its basis, seems appropriate when dealing with 
antipersonnel mines. It offers the advantage of avoiding 
situations of conflict (in the search for liability or fault) 
which could result in harming the victim even more or 
reducing his/her chances of obtaining compensation. And 
yet the IOPC proves to be adapted to a specific scope that 
does not really fit the concerns of landmines victims.
Studying the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of 
Torture, Handicap International assesses that victims of 
torture and victims of mines are faced with the same type 
of needs, medical and psychological care and sometimes 
socio-economic assistance, although methods for providing 
assistance may differ, as the type of trauma suffered is not 
comparable in the two cases. Unfortunately, an individual 
victim cannot obtain assistance from the Fund if she/he 
is not represented by an NGO; and the Fund itself faces 
difficulties to gather adequate contributions.
21 PCIJ, “Appeal from a Judgment of the Hungaro-Czechosloval Mixed Arbitral Tribunal (The Peter Pázmány University v. The State of Czechoslowakia)”, P.C.I.J. Series 
A/B, No. 61, 1933, p. 207 at p. 231; A. RANDELZHOFER, “The Legal Position of the Individual under Present International Law”, in A. RANDELZHOFER /C. TOMUSCHAT (eds.), State 
Responsibility and the Individual, 1999, p. 231 at p. 234. 
22 R. MCCORQUODALE, “The Individual and the International Legal System”, op. cit., p. 300 at p. 304.
23 The U.S., for example, authorizes foreign plaintiffs under the Alien Tort Claim Act to base their substantive claims on a violation of international law norms. The Torture 
Victim Protection Act creates liability under U.S. law where under „color of law of any foreign nation“ an individual is subject to torture or extra judicial killing. This remedy is 
open to any individual but excludes acts committed on behalf of the U.S. government as well as those committed by purely private actors. 
24 For Human rights violation see G. FISCHER, „Schadenersatzansprüche wegen Menschenrechtsverletzungen im Internationalen Privat- und Prozessrecht“, in: Festschrift für 
Walter Remmers, 1995, p. 447, at p. 450 et seq.
25 GERMAN FEDERAL SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE (BGH), “Distomo”, NJW 2003, p. 3488 et seq.; GERMAN HIGH COURT (LG Bonn), NJW 2004, 525 et seq.
26 BVerfGE 94, p. 315 at p. 329; B. HESS, „Kriegsentschädigungen aus kollisionsrechtlicher und rechtsvergleichender Sicht“, id p. 115 et seq.
27 P.H. LINDBLOM, “Group Actions and the Role of the Courts – A European Perspective”, FORUM Internationale, n°. 23, May 1996, p. 1 at p. 12.
28 The study describes the working of two compensation schemes: the Guarantee Fund for Victims of Acts of Terrorism and other Violations of the Law (France); the Criminal 











None of the existing funds examined in this report provides 
an ideal solution. However, a study of these different models 
might be useful for identifying and perhaps developing 
compensation mechanisms for landmine victims. It would 
seem necessary to discuss the compensation issue at 
a political level in order to establish whether or not such 
mechanisms should be included in the Mine Ban Treaty.
The varied and numerous observations made in the report 
show how tremendous are the efforts still needed to offer 
landmine victims proper reparation and compensation. 
They also stress a wide range of potentialities.
DEFINITIONS
In order to study the issue of reparation and compensation 
for victims, a number of global definitions need to be es-
tablished, and in particular “antipersonnel mine”, “antiper-
sonnel mine victim”, and “antipersonnel mine accident”, 
used by Handicap International.
An antipersonnel mine is a “device placed on or in the 
ground, or on another surface and designed to explode 
or splinter due to the presence, proximity, or contact of a 
person29”. The following categories of landmine should be 
distinguished: 
• Antipersonnel mines are designed to wound or kill peo-
ple, either by blast effect or splintering;
• Unexploded ordnance (UXO) scattered over the ground 
can be regarded as anti-personnel weaponry because it 
remains active, unstable, highly explosive, and can be 
activated by the contact of a person even after the end of 
the conflict30. The 1997 Ottawa Treaty31 only covers anti-
personnel mines. However, we would suggest that any 
compensation scheme be extended to UXO accidents.
Very often, the words “landmine” and “antipersonnel mine” 
are used without differentiation. 
According to Handicap International32, antipersonnel mine 
and UXO victims should include
• All persons who have been killed or injured by a land-
mine or an UXO, whatever the nature of the physical, 
psychological or sensorial damage caused;
• Family members of the killed, injured, or mutilated per-
sons;
• All persons who, because of action or negligence related 
to the use of landmines or UXO, have either collectively 
or individually been the object of economic and/or social 
injury, or suffered any other serious infringement of their 
fundamental rights, preventing them from carrying out 
their normal activities33.
Finally, it should be noted that the definition of a “victim” 
as given in the Landmine Victim Assistance World Report 
2001 includes “All persons who have been killed or 
injured” without specifying the status of the victim (civilian 
or combatant) 34.
Various other landmine victim definitions should also be 
taken into account, most notably those developed within 
the framework of the International Campaign to Ban 
Landmines (ICBL) and by specialised United Nations 
Agencies35. 
The definition of a landmine accident is that of a sudden 
delivery of chemical, physical, or thermal energy due to 
the explosion of an antipersonnel mine, causing individual 
or collective damage. 
Landmine accidents are recognised as such when they 
produce a victim, that is, a person who is killed or injured36, 
but should also include the less restrictive definition noted 
above.
This study is based on a broad definition of “victim”, which 
does not focus only on the survivors. It is therefore difficult to 
estimate the number of victims in the world. Data collected 
each year by the Landmine Monitor gives the number of 
survivors (estimated at around 300,000 according to the 
Landmine Monitor 2003) and the numbers of casualties 
and deaths due to landmines and unexploded ordnances 
each year (the number of people injured or killed by 
landmines is estimated at between 15,000 and 20,000 
each year, 8,065 were identified in 2003 according to the 
Landmine Monitor 200437). 
29 HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Landmine Victim Assistance World Report 2001, Lyon: HI, 2001, p.333.
30 Id., p.333.
31 Document No. 8, Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Ottawa, (September 
18, 1997). p.324 [Hereinafter Ottawa Convention].
32 HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Towards Real Assistance to Landmine Victims, Lyon: HI, 2000, 9p.
33 Id., p.3. This definition contrasts with a more restrictive one adopted by the Ottawa Convention, which defines a landmine victim as a person injured or killed as a direct 
result of a landmine accident. Compensation should however be payable on the basis of a more global definition of landmine victim. 
34 Should soldiers and combatants injured by landmines as part of a military operation be able to claim compensation if such a compensation fund was established? These 
combatants, injured in the course of their military activities, often receive compensation from their government. Moreover, the fight against mines is based on the deeply 
unfair and inhuman effects of mines on civilians. The question remains open to discussion. 
35 HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Towards Real Assistance to Landmine Victims: op. cit.
36 HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Landmine Victim Assistance World Report 2001, op. cit., p. 333.
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The obligation to make good any breach of the law that 
has caused harm to another person constitutes a basic 
principle of all judicial systems. However, the question 
that raises as regard to the application of this principle in 
favour of antipersonnel mines victims is to know whether 
they can be considered as victims of violations of law.
 
Reparations must, as far as possible, remove all 
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the state 
of affairs that would have existed had the act not been 
committed. However, when the illegal act has already 
produced irreversible effects, alternative reparations must 
be found, and this may take the form of an indemnity.
For this study, it has to be mentioned that the term 
“reparation” involved the engagement of a responsibility 
of an actor by a jurisdiction and directly addresses the 
individual or organisation that wrongs the victim. 
The term “compensation”, will be used in the study as 
a recognition of the loss endured by the victim without 
necessarily addressing the author of the wrongful act. It 
covers on the one hand, all reasonable accommodations 
that have to be guaranteed to victims in order to obtain 
equalization of opportunities. On the other hand, it can 
take the form of indemnities. 
Generally speaking, a certain number of criteria must be 
established in order to obtain reparation or other forms of 
compensation: 
- The existence of harm.
- The existence of a fault having caused the harm39.
- The establishment of a connection between the victim 
and the crime/violation that led to the injury. 
- In some countries, the recognition by a judicial institution 
that the person who committed the fault is responsible for 
the harm, whether or not the fault was intentional, is also 
a condition.
In the case of landmine victims, establishing a right to 
reparation implies that there has been a violation of 
existing law. That being the case, it is advisable to make a 
list of the different points of law that, if violated, might allow 
landmine victims to claim reparations.
Another worthwhile approach is to study previous legal 
submissions to fi nd out which national and international 
jurisdictions are disposed to recognize a victim’s right to 
reparation.
Lastly, we should examine current developments in inter-
national law and consider how these may help to further 
the rights of landmine victims.
1. Existing law: regimes of responsibility 
/ liability and areas of the law relating to 
damage or injury caused by landmines
A regime of responsibility / liability exists in all judicial 
systems. However, it does not include the same criteria 
from one judicial system to another and from one fi eld of 
law to another. 
38 Article 16 of the Draft Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law, United Nations, E/CN.4/2004/57.
39 The existence of fault constitutes a precondition for reparations in international law; in national law, however, this is not always the case. In administrative law, the existence 
of fault logically constitutes the common law of liability, but concerns about improving the situation of victims and the phenomenon of collective risk has led to a growing 
acceptance of the concept of no-fault liability. The latter for the most part has its origins in jurisprudence, but it has been increasingly recognized in laws enacted in France 
(as well as many other countries that have a civil code of law). This is the logic behind France’s creation of its guarantee Fund for victims of acts of terrorism. Despite the 
absence of fault, therefore, the government may be held liable for compensating a victim of landmines on its territory.
I- The right to reparation 
for landmine victims
“Adequate, effective, and prompt reparation shall be intended to promote justice 
by redressing gross violations of international human rights or serious violations of 
humanitarian law. Reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the violations 





















In all systems of law, both at national and international 
levels, actors have agreed multiple obligations. They 
consist on actions or omissions of different natures. If 
these obligations are not executed, the responsibility / 
liability of the actor in cause can be engaged. In other 
terms, the breach of an obligation is constituted when an 
act is not in conformity with what is required under the 
relevant judicial system.
The engagement of such a responsibility / liability has 
generally fundamental legal consequences: it may create 
other obligations, which are called secondary obligations. 
They may consist, on the one hand, in the obligation to 
cease the illegal act and to guarantee the non-repetition of 
the violation. On the other hand, secondary obligation for 
an unlawful act may consist in the reparation of the non-
execution of the primary obligation. Reparation should, as 
far as possible, remove all consequences of the illegal 
act and re-establish the state of affairs that would have 
existed had the act not been committed. This form of 
reparation is called restitutio in integrum. However, when 
the illegal act has already produced irreversible effects, 
alternative reparation must be found, and this may take 
the form of financial compensation.
Doctrine and State practice have differentiated kinds of 
responsibility / liability. They depend on the criteria that 
have to be invoked to create responsibility / liability. As 
a result, fault-based responsibility / liability is engaged 
when harm occurs and when the violation of law has to 
be linked with a fault of the perpetrator that has made the 
violation in cause. On the other side, strict responsibility / 
liability do not need the existence of a fault to be engaged. 
The victim of the injury has only to prove the existence 
of harm, a breach of law and the connexion between 
the harm suffered and the wrongful act. In other terms, 
according to this regime, a perpetrator is responsible / 
liable for the breach of an obligation without regard to fault 
as an additional factor. The rules of law may also provide 
for the engagement of strict responsibility / liability on the 
basis of harm or injury alone. This type of responsibility 
/ liability is most appropriate in case of ultra-hazardous 
activities, and activities entailing risk or having other 
similar characteristics.
We shall be looking at national and international law 
dealing with the use of antipersonnel mines. Under 
international law, reparation for damages due to the 
use of antipersonnel mines could be claimed against 
States as part of general international responsibility for 
wrongful acts. Moreover, some specific legal instruments 
could be used in order to engage responsibility. As 
specific fields of international law, it is the international 
humanitarian law and especially Additional Protocol I of 
the Geneva Conventions, Protocol II of the Convention 
on prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain 
conventional weapons which may be deemed to 
be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate 
effects (CCW), and the Convention on the prohibition 
of the use, stockpiling, production, and transfer of 
antipersonnel mines and on their destruction (the 
Ottawa Convention, also known as the Mine Ban Treaty) 
which are relevant. Other areas of international law 
which have to be taken into consideration as well are 
international environmental law and human rights law. 
Under national law, we shall examine tort law as well as 
product liability.
1.1. Responsibility of States for Wrongful Acts
According to Article 2 of the Draft articles on Responsibility 
of States for internationally wrongful acts40,
“There is an internationally wrongful act of a State 
when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is 
attributable to the State under international law; and (b) 
constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State.”
Under Article 31 of the Draft, the responsible State is 
under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury 
caused by the wrongful act. 
However, it has to be mentioned that these Draft 
articles have no binding force. Their legal value remains 
recommendatory. 
In the case of antipersonnel mine victims, establishing a 
right to reparation implies that there would be a violation 
of existing law.
In the hypothetical case of a legal use of antipersonnel 
mines (i.e. before the Ottawa Convention came into effect 
for States Parties, or – in the case of States that have not 
signed on to this Convention – when their use conforms 
to the other standards, such as international humanitarian 
law, environmental law, human rights law etc.), the State 
could not be held liable. The non-compliance with an 
international obligation prohibiting the concrete use of 
antipersonnel mines entails the responsibility of States. 
General international law recognises State responsibility 
for the use or the laying out of landmines. That is the case 
for any action from an official member of the regular army 
of one State.
As regards armed rebel groups, States cannot, at first, be 
liable for their acts. However, “the conduct of a person or 
a group of persons shall be considered an act of a State 
under international law if the person or group of persons is 
in fact acting on the instruction of, or under the direction or 
control of that State in carrying out the conduct”41. Thus, 
the mines laid out by armed groups can, by this disposition, 
be attributed to a State. 
However, the illegal conduct of persons, other than 
officials, in practice, cannot easily engage the international 
responsibility of a State and this, even if this act is 
40 Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its Fifty-third session (2001), Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 
10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1
41 Article 8 of the Draft Articles “Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts”, Report of the International Law Commission, fifty-third session, (2001). The Draft 
Articles have been reaffirmed in a declaration of the United Nations General Assembly.
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considered as internationally illegal. In other terms, if the 
link between one State and a person (or a group of persons) 
is not proven, the first would not be liable for the conduct 
of the last. Concerning armed rebel groups, States are 
obliged only to protect civilians from the dangers resulting 
from the conduct of such groups42 (e.g. by clearing mines 
from the zones under their control and keeping civilians 
out of such areas).
The responsibility of States under international law 
presents a great weakness. Indeed, in case of a general 
prohibition of landmines, a claim for a wrongful act of 
a State could only be made by another State. In other 
terms, victims of landmines cannot invoke directly state 
responsibility in order to claim reparation for the harm they 
suffered. 
In order to avoid the denial of justice which would result 
from such a situation, the national State of the injured 
person shall take up the latter’s defence and act on his 
behalf. Following this espousal of the individual’s claim 
the latter is transformed into a matter between States. The 
State is then said to be exercising diplomatic protection 
in favour of its national. Once again, the possibility for 
a state to engage international responsibility of another 
state is only relevant in case of a prohibition of landmines 
in general or of the concrete use in question. Diplomatic 
protection can be a mean for reparation in favor of victims. 
However, in this procedure, such a reparation remains to 
the willingness of States, and it is said that it is the State 
which is considered as being violated in its own right.
That is why, various conventions and points of law are 
relevant for this study in order to list aspects of law linked to 
the use of landmines. They present proper characteristics. 
As a result, besides the general regime there are some 
special rules in some instruments, as for example the 
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions.
1.2. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Con-
ventions
Humanitarian law is founded on the idea that the individual 
is unique and entitled to respect, and that the life and 
dignity of the individual are precious and inalienable, 
even during time of war. It therefore tends to balance the 
protection of civilians and military necessity. This principle 
was established in the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 
11 December 1868: “The necessities of war ought to yield 
to the requirements of humanity.”
Additional Protocol I (1977) codifies and advances the 
fundamental principles of international humanitarian law 
regarding warfare. 
Parties engaged in international armed conflict have to 
respect the principle of proportionality, make a distinction 
between the civilian population and combatants, and not 
use weapons and methods of warfare of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. The question 
of responsibility of a party to an armed conflict and the 
liability to pay compensation is addressed by article 91 of 
Additional Protocol I:
“A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the 
Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, 
be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible 
for all acts committed by persons forming part of armed 
forces.” 
It is arguable whether the article, which is based on 
Article 3 of the IV. Hague Convention of 1907, provides 
for compensation to the State and to individual victims43. 
If the use of antipersonnel landmines constitutes a 
violation of the Geneva Conventions or its Additional 
Protocol I, antipersonnel mines victims could then claim 
compensation pursuant to this article. Therefore, we shall 
examine whether the use of antipersonnel landmines 
constitutes a violation of the Geneva conventions or its 
Additional Protocol I. 
Article 51 para. 2 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions stipulates: “The civilian population as such, 
as well as individual civilians, shall not be the object of 
attack. Acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population are 
prohibited.” 
Article 51 para. 4 concretises the rule of distinction 
between civilians and combatants. It stipulates that:
“Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate 
attacks are: 
(a) those which are not directed at a specific military 
objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means of combat 
which cannot be directed at a specific military objective; 
or 
(c) those which employ a method or means of combat 
the effects of which cannot be limited as required by this 
Protocol
and consequently, in each of such case, are of a nature 
to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects 
without distinction.”
There are situations where antipersonnel mines were 
intentionally and systematically laid or dropped, with no 
clear military objective, in areas frequented by villagers 
and other such civilians. These seem to be attacks on 
civilians, forbidden under art. 51 para. 4 lit. a Additional 
Protocol I, even if the effects of some of these mines are 
only felt years later. However, it is quite difficult to prove 
42 This general principle for the protection of civilians in time of war is an obligation for all parties to the conflict. This principle is a custom of international humanitarian law. 
43 L.ZEGVELD, Remedies for victims of violations of international humanitarian law, IRRC 2003, p. 497 at p. 506; F. KALSHOVEN, State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed 








that laying mines constitutes an attack on civilians. In a 
period of armed conflict, explosions that affect civilians 
tend to be seen as collateral damage in most cases.
If actual intent cannot be proven, the lack of a clear and 
legitimate military objective44 should serve to define such 
antipersonnel mines use as an indiscriminate attack on 
civilians in breach of art. 51 para. 4 Additional Protocol I.  
A more difficult case would be where a military objective 
might be present, but the landmine use exceeded what was 
necessary for that military objective, such as the mining of 
an entire village or farming area near a waterhole when 
the military objective is to avoid the enemy supplying. In 
this type of situation, the method of combat was not limited 
to a specific military objective and so could be deemed an 
indiscriminate attack . 
Because of their long lasting effects, antipersonnel 
landmines without any self neutralisation mechanism 
could be regarded as a weapon which effects cannot be 
limited according to art. 51 para. 4 lit. c Additional Protocol 
I. Such an interpretation would be in accordance with the 
idea expressed in Art. 1 of the Hague Convention VIII 
of 1907. The latter Convention prohibits the laying of 
unanchored automatic submarine contact mines unless 
they become harmless one hour after leaving their user’s 
control and the laying of anchored mines unless they 
self-neutralize should their anchorage be disrupted. It is 
reasonable to suppose that the spirit of the text is aimed at 
ensuring that, by drifting, such weapons do not represent 
a danger to non-combatants or prove impossible to find 
once the conflict is over. Antipersonnel mines may also 
be displaced by climatic changes and natural disasters. 
Furthermore, if the antipersonnel landmines are remotely 
delivered, their location cannot be controlled and marked. 
As a result, they pose a degree of threat similar to that of 
drifting underwater mines. The same could be said about 
manually delivered mines for which the location cannot be 
guaranteed.
Article 35 para. 2 of Additional Protocol I contains another 
fundamental principle of international humanitarian law, 
seen as customary international law45. It states that: 
“It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and 
material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.” 
The rule, valid for combatants as well as civilians, 
does not list the types of weapon of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering. This generic 
prohibition raises a fundamental question: At what point 
can we say that a weapon causes superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering? Two interpretations are possible. 
The first interpretation takes the phrase to refer to injuries 
that are gratuitous in relation to the military advantage 
sought, thus applying an utilitarian concept. A second 
interpretation considers the gratuitous injuries in relation 
to the level of injury that, if sustained by the victim, 
would put him/her out of action. This second concept is 
more medical and focuses on the harm sustained by the 
victim. It appears that, so far, the utilitarian concept has 
been favoured in interpretations of this Article. A weapon 
causes superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering under 
both concepts if there is a weapon which while achieving 
the same military advantage causes less harm.
Antipersonnel mines containing unusual materials such 
as plastic splitters cause more harm than antipersonnel 
landmines containing ordinary materials. Therefore, they 
could be considered as weapons causing superfluous 
injury or unnecessary suffering. An antipersonnel landmine 
containing plastic splitters is also forbidden under Protocol 
I of the CCW, which prohibits the use of any weapon the 
primary effect of which is to injure by fragments which 
in the human body escape detection by X-rays. Another 
example for a type of mine causing superfluous injury or 
unnecessary suffering is an antipersonnel mine containing 
more than the 30 gram explosive necessary to injure 
heavily a combatant.
If the use of an antipersonnel landmine is forbidden 
under international humanitarian law, victims have a 
right to compensation according to Art. 3 of the IV Hague 
Convention and Art. 91 Additional Protocol I. However, the 
question is to which forum victims can bring their claims. 
The problem is that a breach of international humanitarian 
law does not automatically give rise to a right of action for 
individual victims.
1.3. Protocols II and V of the CCW 
Protocol II of the Convention on prohibitions or 
restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons 
which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to 
have indiscriminate effects (CCW) restricts the use of 
mines, booby traps, and other such devices, and prohibits 
the use of certain types of mines. Its main clauses are 
intended to ensure that mines will only be used against 
military objectives, never indiscriminately, and that a certain 
number of precautions will be taken to protect civilians. 
Protocol II applies to international conflicts and, since its 
revision in 1996, to non-international armed conflicts.
In particular, the revised Protocol II stipulates that the 
deployment of all landmines, booby traps, and other 
such devices must be registered, that remotely delivered 
antipersonnel mines must be equipped with self-
destruct and self-deactivation mechanisms, and that all 
antipersonnel mines must be detectable; it prohibits the 
use of mines, booby traps, and other such devices that 
explode when detected with magnetic equipment.
44 Disallowing as a legitimate military objective, for example, using terror as a means of forcing civilians to flee their property and thereby gaining these civilian areas for 
occupation.
45 Advisory Opinion of  International Court of Justice, legality of the use by a state of nuclear weapons in armed conflicts, 8 July 1996. 
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Furthermore, the modified Protocol II establishes a 
framework intended to facilitate the removal of munitions. 
Article 3(2) stipulates that each side in a conflict is 
responsible for all the mines and booby traps it has used. 
All information concerning mined areas must be registered 
and retained. After the cessation of active hostilities, 
the parties involved in the conflict are obliged to take all 
necessary measures to protect civilians from the effects 
of minefields, mined zones, mines, booby traps, and other 
such devices in the zones under their control. All mined or 
booby-trapped zones must be cleared without delay after 
the cessation of active hostilities. These obligations were 
reaffirmed with Protocol V on explosive remnants of 
war signed by the States on November 28, 2003, which 
states an obligation for the States to clear their territory of 
all explosive remnants of war that threaten civilians after 
the conflict and to share information about the location of 
unexploded ordnances in order to improve the efficiency 
of the marking and the mine clearance. Protocol V also 
invites the Parties “in a position to do so [to] provide 
assistance for the care and rehabilitation and social and 
economic reintegration of victims of explosive remnants 
of war”. 
However, Protocol II has a number of weaknesses.
   
First of all, the definition of antipersonnel mines creates 
a deliberate legal vagueness, which excludes from the 
ruling all devices that are “principally designed” for a 
purpose other than as antipersonnel devices, regardless 
of the antipersonnel effects they might have.
Furthermore, the text of the modified Convention seems to 
justify the use of so-called “intelligent” mines (programmable 
mines equipped with self-destruct and self-deactivation 
mechanisms, mines deployed by remote methods, and the 
like), thus promoting a new generation of mines.
Finally, the Convention does not define any mechanisms for 
control, surveillance, or sanctions in the case of violations. 
The CCW does not contain any clause concerning the 
question of responsibility in case of a violation of a 
stipulation of the convention and its protocols. Therefore, 
the general regime of state responsibility applies.
1.4. The Mine Ban Treaty
The Mine Ban Treaty prohibits the production, stockpiling, 
use, and transfer of antipersonnel mines. In Article 2(1), it 
defines the antipersonnel mine as:
“a mine designed to be exploded by the presence, 
proximity or contact of a person and that will incapacitate, 
injure or kill one or more persons.”
The total ban of the use of antipersonnel mines constitutes 
a big progress in the battle against antipersonnel mines as 
the treaty was ratified by 144 States, as of 31st December 
2004.
However, the Mine Ban Treaty contains some weaknesses.  
Article 2 (1) specifies: 
“Mines designed to be detonated by the presence, 
proximity or contact of a vehicle as opposed to a person, 
that are equipped with anti-handling devices, are not 
considered anti-personnel mines as a result of being so 
equipped”.
Yet such devices do in fact function as antipersonnel mines. 
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) 
emphasizes this fact, and also expresses its concerns 
that Claymore mines (directional fragmentation mines) 
are not all prohibited by the Ottawa Convention, despite 
the fact that they can easily be adapted for use with trip 
wires, making them equivalent to antipersonnel mines. 
In addition, the Ottawa Convention does not address the 
issue of bomblets, although unexploded bomblets have 
the same effect as antipersonnel mines46. 
Moreover, the only procedure envisaged by the Convention 
for dealing with the non-observance of its articles by a 
State Party is for other States to lodge a complaint. The 
States Parties must then decide, via a two-thirds majority, 
on a response to any violation of the Convention after 
consultation with the UN General Secretary. The main 
problem with this mechanism is that it has never been 
implemented; States are reluctant to use it because of 
diplomatic pressures and the fear that they themselves 
might run afoul of the Convention at some point.
In addition, although the Convention does require States 
to present an annual report on its application (Article 7), it 
does not require this to be drawn up by an independent 
authority, and there is no body of experts to evaluate 
these annual reports. Although NGOs and individuals may 
condemn violations of the Convention, they have no voice 
in the assembly of States Parties. The onus is entirely 
upon the States. If a State takes no action in the case of a 
violation of the Convention – by, for example, a company 
that produces mines – there is no recourse available 
except against the State itself (the obligation to exercise 
due diligence). The Convention makes no provision for a 
system that would allow direct, non-State control over the 
use of anti-personnel mines. However, during the Nairobi 
Summit in December 2004, the States parties reaffirmed 
the need to call armed non-state actors to account for 
violations of the convention47. 
 
Finally, the Convention does not make direct provision 
for compensation in the case of a violation. The Article 
that comes closest to this idea is the one dealing with 
assistance for victims (Article 6, Paragraph 3), which 
allows for assistance with the care and rehabilitation 
of antipersonnel mines victims as well as their social 
and economic reintegration and programmes to raise 
awareness of the dangers of antipersonnel mines. The 
ICBL working group on victims assistance interpreted 
46 HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Cluster munitions systems: situation and inventory, Lyon: HI (August 2003), 64 p.








this article in a sense of a real obligation from the States, 
to finance and support victims assistance as a whole. If 
the volontary solidarity remains the basis of the actual 
mechanism, in adopting the Nairobi Action Plan 2005-
2009, the State Parties admitted the obligation contained 
in this article48.
1.5. International environmental law
Landmines can have serious consequences for the 
environment. They prejudice economic development 
by disrupting the biosphere’s life support systems and 
diminishing the capacity of the environment to supply the 
raw materials and natural resources. This is also true as 
regard to UXO. 
The consequences are multiple: 
- Mines and UXO deny access to natural resources. In 
poor countries landmines have denied land to farmers, 
pastoral communities and returning refugees and 
internal displaced persons. There is a loss of vast tracts 
of arable land from safe use for decades, and disruption 
of transportation and agricultural markets. 
- Mines have covered large tracts of the earth’s surface 
with non-biodegradable and toxic garbage. They 
cause irreversible damage to ecosystems, including 
prolonged direct damage to soil through shattering 
and displacement, destruction of soil structure, and 
increased vulnerability of soil to water and wind erosion. 
In Vietnam, for example, landmines have reduced the 
soil productivity in rice yield by 50%49. 
- Mines and UXO deplete biological diversity by destroying 
flora and fauna, and killing wildlife50.
- Moreover, the loss in productivity of farmlands and 
the displacement of communities have generated 
exploitations of new fragile and marginal environments 
and speed the depletion of resources and destruction of 
biological diversity.
Unfortunately, the retrieval of landmines also has a 
detrimental effect on the environment. In the process of 
clearing Iraqi minefields, bomb disposal units ploughed up 
large areas of the desert, tearing up and damaging fragile 
and slow-growing vegetation and destroying habitat for 
numerous animal species51. Moreover, the substances 
used for the retrieval of landmines have also noxious 
effects on soil structure and on water table that could be 
contaminated. 
According to the Institute of International Law52, dealing 
with “Responsibility and liability under international law 
for environmental damage”, environmental law creates 
different obligations. 
Indeed, according to article 1 of this report:
“the breach of an obligation of environmental protection 
established under international law engages responsibility 
of the state (state responsibility) entailing as a 
consequence the obligation to re-establish the original 
position or to pay compensation”.
In the field of antipersonnel mines in link with environment, 
the obligation to re-establish the original position could 
consist in mine clearance in order to restore the ecosystem 
of the location. 
Moreover, “the rules of international law may also 
provide for the engagement of the strict responsibility 
of the state on the basis of harm or injury alone. This 
type of responsibility is most appropriate in case of 
ultra-hazardous activities and activities entailing risk or 
having other similar characteristics” (Article 4). The strict 
responsibility of the state on the basis of harm or injury 
alone would mean that no fault of the state has to be 
proved to engage its responsibility; the use of landmines 
could be seen as damage to environment by itself.
 
Existing conventions concerning international 
environmental law create obligations to states. The States 
parties to these different conventions have to respect 
these norms dealing with responsibility for damages 
caused to environment. As a result, one could imagine 
making a link between effects on environment generated 
by landmines and by hazardous and noxious substances 
dealt in different conventions. Thus, these specific 
environmental conventions could by extension apply to 
the use of landmines and explosive remnants of war. 
By this way, a general mechanism of responsibility and 
reparation could be established in order to help victims of 
landmines in terms of environment. A State whose territory 
was mined by another State could therefore conceivably 
go before an international authority to claim reparation for 
a breach of international environmental law.
Finally, some instruments of international environmental 
law have especially developed strict responsibility of 
operators. Applied to landmines, operators could be seen 
as all persons who are in relation to the exploitation, at 
any stage, of landmines. More precisely, they could be 
producers and users. Thus, these operators can be held 
responsible for damages caused to environment, without 
any fault to be proven53. However, these mechanisms 
48 Ibid. Action n°36 “States Parties in a position to do so will act upon their obligation under Article 6 (3) to promptly assist those States Parties with clearly demonstrated 
needs for external support for care, rehabilitation and reintegration of mine victims...”
49 ABDHESH GANGWAR, “Impact of War and Landmines on Environment”, Centre for Environment Education, (20th April 2003) 
50 Bears in Croatia, clouded leopards, snow leopard and royal Bengal tiger in India, elephants in Africa and Sri Lanka, silver black mountain gorillas in Rwanda, snow leopard 
in Afghanistan. In Libya, gazelles have disappeared from sites that were mined during World War II. Reference note supra.
51 Conference “Landmines - Challenges to Humanity and Environment”, 20 April 2003 organized by Indian Institute of Peace, Disarmament and Environmental Protection, 
Nagpur, India and Global Green Peace, Srinagar, Jammu & Kashmir, India at Srinagar, India.
52 Session of Strasbourg, 1997
53 That is the case for example in the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, under article 9.
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can only be made before national courts. No international 
jurisdiction can engage the responsibility of individuals. 
This approach aims to transpose effects due to landmines 
to specific effects due to other substances that are dealt 
with into international conventions on environment. Some 
of these texts cannot be applied to damages caused by 
landmines, even by extension of their dispositions. That 
is the case of the UN Convention on the law of the sea. 
Indeed, although it has been recognised that the use of 
landmines has noxious effects on rivers and water table 
in the sense that TNT and RDX54 are lethal to mammals, 
aquatic micro-organisms, and fish, it has not been proved 
that landmines affect marine environment.
Concerning damages to environment, article 3 of the 
Convention on Biological Diversity55 stipulates: “States 
have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign 
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure 
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not 
cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.” The 
Convention enounces in its article 14 that “the Conference 
of the Parties shall examine, on the basis of studies to 
be carried out, the issue of liability and redress, including 
restoration and compensation, for damage to biological 
diversity, except where such liability is a purely internal 
matter”. According to these dispositions, states have the 
obligation to ensure that activities carried out under their 
jurisdiction are not harmful to other state’s environment56. 
This obligation has been first affirmed by the “Trail 
smelter” arbitration57. It has also been emphasized by the 
International Court of Justice which has stated that “the 
general obligation of States to ensure that activities within 
their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of 
other States or of areas beyond national control is now 
part of the corpus of international law relating to the 
environment58”.
Therefore, they would not be allowed to use landmines 
in a way that could have effects outside their territory. 
As demonstrated above the use of landmines depletes 
biological diversity and destroys fauna and flora. Military 
strategists stress that landmines are placed near borders 
with a defensive purpose. However, we can emphasize 
that these military actions, using landmines near borders, 
can have effects on the environment of the other state and 
would thus be prohibited under this convention.  The terms 
of the article 14 do not create any obligation for States 
to give reparation. It only entails a recommendation to 
examine this issue of reparation. 
Moreover, by this Convention, states are invited to 
establish thematic reports concerning the implementation 
of their obligations59. An example is given in the “Thematic 
report on mountain ecosystems”60. By this way, states 
have to notify different threats and causes of damages 
to mountains ecosystems. According to India, ‘inter-state 
bounder disputes” as well as wars, are parts of them. As a 
result, the use of landmines, as weapons used in conflicts 
and borders disputes, could be also part of causes of 
damages to environment. 
The 1972 Stockholm Declaration concerns human 
environment. It is part of soft law and thus creates no 
responsibility to states. By its nature, it cannot bind States. 
It may however be seen as one of the cornerstones of 
modern international environmental law. Principle 24 of 
this declaration demands international cooperation in order 
to “control, prevent, reduce, and eliminate” environmental 
damage, and Principle 21 holds States responsible for 
ensuring that activities carried out under their jurisdiction 
and control do not cause environmental damage in other 
States. These two Principles, reiterated in 1992 in the Rio 
Declaration (Principles 7 and 2, respectively), may be 
invoked in matters concerning the production and use of 
antipersonnel mines61.
Other more general principles of international environmental 
law may also apply, such as the principle of preventative 
action, which requires a State to take measures to protect 
the environment before damage occurs62. Furthermore, 
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration, known as “the ‘Polluter 
Pays’ Principle”, obliges the polluter to bear the cost of 
measures deemed necessary by the public authorities to 
restore the environment to an ‘acceptable’ state63.
With regard to the particular situations of armed conflict, 
the use of landmines is much more relevant than in 
time of peace. Indeed, effects of war, and especially of 
landmines, on humans and their environment continue 
even after the coming of peace. “Today, some battlefields 
of the First and Second World Wars, to give only two 
examples, remain unfit to cultivation or dangerous to the 
population because of the unexploded devices (especially 
54 TNT means “Trinitrotoluene” and RDX “research Department Explosives”.
55 Convention on Biological Diversity, adopted at the Earth Summit of Rio of Janeiro in 1992.
56 For more information, see the Environmental Committee’s Report of the OECD Council, Responsibility and liability in relation to transfrontier pollution (1984).
57 Trail smelter arbitration, (Canada v. United States), 11th March 1941.
58 Advisory opinion of the ICJ, Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, (8th July 1996).
59 This scheme can be related to this of the Ottawa Convention. Indeed, this Convention on landmines institutes the same obligation to make annual reports in order to control 
the effective implementation of the dispositions.
60 Indian thematic report concerning this is issue available on the Biodiversity Convention site: http://www.biodiv.org/doc/world/in/in-nr-me-en.pdf
61 Tara ASHTAKALA, “Producer liability. A report for Landmine Monitor 2000”, document distributed at the Responsibility and Compensation symposium, Geneva, 8-9 February 
2002, pp. 1 and 2.
62 Philippe SANDS, Principles of International Environmental Law, 1995, Chapter 6, quoted by Ashtakala, Tara, op. cit., p. 2.
63 “National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that 








mines) still embedded in the soil64”. International law has 
to ensure the protection of environment against damages 
resulting from military activities. Indeed, principle 24 of 
the Rio Declaration affirms that: “Warfare is inherently 
destructive of sustainable development. States shall 
therefore respect international law providing protection for 
the environment in time of armed conflict and cooperate 
in its further development, as necessary.”
Some rules of international humanitarian law deal with 
the protection of environment in time of armed conflict. 
However, these dispositions included in the Additional 
Protocol I are not part of customary international law. As 
a result, they can only bind States part to this Additional 
Protocol.
Article 35 (3) of the Geneva Conventions’ Additional 
Protocol I of 12 August 1949 is relevant to the field of 
damage caused by landmines to environment. It enounces 
that “it is prohibited to employ methods or means of 
warfare which are intended, or may be expected, to 
cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the 
natural environment”. This article is controversial and its 
application depends on the interpretation of the terms. 
However, the Committee on Disarmament aimed to clarify 
its dispositions65. 
Article 55 of the same Protocol concerns especially the 
“protection of the natural environment”. It stipulates: 
“Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural 
environment against widespread, long-term and severe 
damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use 
of methods or means of warfare which are intended or 
may be expected to cause such damage to the natural 
environment and thereby to prejudice the health or 
survival of the population”. Thus, this article has an 
anthropocentric approach, in the sense that it aims to 
protect human survival. 
As previously mentioned, not all damages to environment 
are considered as illegal under international humanitarian 
law. In other terms, damages to environment which are 
not “widespread, long term and severe” are tolerated 
under this article.
However, one can, once more, assume that effects of 
antipersonnel mines can be seen as creating “widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment”. 
Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that antipersonnel 
mines, which have a considerable destructive impact 
on the environment, go beyond the limits accepted by 
international humanitarian law. 
Dispositions of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva 
Conventions could prohibit the use of antipersonnel 
mines because of damages caused to environment, 
Moreover, after the 1991 Gulf War, numerous States 
expressed support for the creation of a new convention 
on the protection of environment during a period of armed 
conflict. With the same prospect, the Council of Europe 
made its recommendation 149566.
As landmines have noxious effects on environment, 
international environmental law can be applied to their 
use. Consequently, if the use of landmines by a State 
is inconsistent with its obligation under international 
environmental law, victims of this violation may claim for 
reparation.
1.6. International Human Rights Law
When antipersonnel mines are deployed close to 
populated areas (e.g, in fields, along roads, or around 
watering places), thus posing a significant threat to the 
lives of individuals and communities, their use might be 
contrary to certain human rights such as the right to life 
and bodily security, the right to food, the right to access 
to safe drinking water, the right to choose one’s place of 
residence, and others. These rights are protected by legal 
instruments as, for example, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (adopted on December, 10th 1948) and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(adopted on December, 16th 1966). Unlike international 
humanitarian law, these may be invoked in any situation, 
be it war or peacetime. However, in time of war or other 
public emergency, derogations from some rights are 
permitted. The articles which are valid in time of war as 
well, as for example the right not arbitrarily to be deprived 
of one’s life, are interpreted according to the lex specialis 
in this context, the international humanitarian law.  
Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
states that an individual whose fundamental rights are 
violated can apply to the courts in his or her own country. 
Individuals could conceivably cite the violation of their 
fundamental rights in order to try to obtain reparations 
for harm caused by antipersonnel mines so long as the 
State in question has implemented the international treaty 
in such a way so as to give rise to an actionable right in 
the domestic court. The same grounds might form the 
basis for a claim before a regional human rights court (e.g. 
the European Court of Human Rights; Inter-American 
64 Antoine BOUVIER, “Protection of the natural environment in time of armed conflict”[Translation: Handicap International], International Review of the Red Cross n° 792, 
(31/12/1991) p.599-611,. 
65 It is the understanding of “the Committee that, for the purposes of this Convention, the terms “widespread”, “long-lasting” and “severe” shall be interpreted as follows:
a) “widespread”: encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometres;
b) “long-lasting”: lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season;
c) “severe”: involving serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural economic resources or other assets.”
Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Vol. I, United Nations General Assembly, 31st session, supplement No. 27, A/31/27, p. 91.
66 Recommendation 1495: Environmental impact of the war in Yugoslavia on Southeast Europe, adopted by the Assembly of the Council of Europe on 24 January 2001 (5th 
sitting). http://assembly.coe.int. It advocates for the establishment of a convention on the prevention of environment damages resulting of the use of military force. According 
to this recommendation, joint discussions with the OSCE should be engaged, on drawing up a convention on the prevention of environmental damage as a result of military 
force and crisis-defusing measures aimed, in particular, to ensure compliance with Articles 55 and 56 of Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949.
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commission/court67) for reparations from a State68. 
According to Art. 41 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and Art. 63 para.1 sent. 2 of the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the courts can rule that 
compensation shall be paid to the victim of a violation of 
human rights.
1.7. National law
At national level, certain theories of liability may be invoked 
to establish landmine producers’ liability to the victims69. 
These bases for liability would apply equally to landmine 
producers and their component suppliers.
By viewing landmines as a product manufactured for profit, 
the relevant substantive laws regarding potential liability 
are relatively straightforward. Landmine producers made 
business decisions to enter the competitive landmine 
market where they designed, manufactured and marketed 
their products in the hopes of generating financial profits. 
Under the law, those landmine producers are no different 
than producers of any other product, although landmine 
producers may have certain defences available to them 
that are discussed further below. In terms of the bases for 
liability, however, they are no different.
Under U.S law for example, products liability can be based 
on either negligence or strict liability. Negligence places 
blame on a defendant for failing to act with ordinary care, 
whereas strict liability focuses on the plaintiff’s injuries 
rather than the defendant’s behaviour.
Negligence is an age-old concept that can be defined as 
conduct which falls below the standard established by law 
for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of 
harm. A defendant will be held liable for his negligence 
if his failure to act with ordinary care causes injury to 
another. Regardless of their intended use, landmines 
are products and landmine producers have breached 
their duty of care if, through their landmine design or 
manufacture, the producers could have reduced the risk 
of injury to civilians. This would be especially true in the 
instance of post-conflict civilians who are injured long after 
the hostilities when a simple and relatively inexpensive 
self-destruct or self-defusing mechanism could have 
prevented the injury.  
Understandably, this argument appears morally disputable 
because no distinction should be made between types of 
landmines and that doing so tacitly undermines the wider 
struggle against landmines in general. Any effort to use 
this negligence argument would require an acceptance 
that securing compensation for victims today takes priority 
over the longer term concept of banning landmines, 
and the belief that the wider struggle will not in fact be 
undermined by securing compensation for victims in this 
manner.
The theory of strict liability may be more acceptable and 
could even be more effective in pursuing compensation 
for the victims. Strict liability, unlike negligence, does not 
look to place blame on the defendant. Rather, it focuses 
on the plaintiff’s injuries and places the cost of the injury 
on the person most able to absorb the loss. Strict liability is 
divided into two separate concepts: products defects, and 
abnormally dangerous products.
Defective product strict liability is based on the idea that 
a producer of a defective product is in the best position to 
either insure against the loss or to spread the loss among 
all consumers of the product. This liability attaches even if 
the producer has acted with reasonable care. The public 
policy behind this theory is directly applicable to the case 
of landmines, including: the substantial cost of injury to 
a victim as compared with the ability to insure the risk of 
injury by the producer; the public interest in discouraging 
producers from marketing defective products; the inability 
to prove negligence because of the secretive nature of the 
manufacturing process; and the inability of the plaintiffs to 
investigate thoroughly the safety of a particular product.
In terms of viewing landmine production and use as an 
abnormally dangerous activity, the definition includes six 
factors: 
1) the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to 
the person, land or property of others;
2) the likelihood that the harm that results from it will be 
great; 
3) the inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of 
reasonable care; 
4) the extent to which the activity is not a matter of 
common usage; 
5) the inappropriateness of the activity to the place where 
it is carried out; and 
6) the extent to which its value to the community is 
outweighed by its dangerous attributes. 
The production of landmines meets every condition under 
this definition.  
The problem with strict liability is that many landmine 
producers produce only component parts of landmines. 
Should a component part maker be held strictly liable even 
67 Inter-American system has heard right to life cases for indigenous groups affected by environmental damage – similar arguments could be made for mine devastation.
68 See part 2.2: enforcement at regional level. 








though its particular part may not have been defective or 
its contribution may not be abnormally dangerous? Case 
law and other legal guides suggest that the knowledge of 
the component maker can be a factor – did the component 
maker know the component would be used in a landmine 
– and the component maker may be liable if it participated 
in the integration of its component into the landmine. 
Otherwise, the strict liability approach could offer a good 
way of establishing producers’ liability, and, unlike the 
negligence approach, could do so without having to make 
any distinction between the types of landmines involved. 
Other, but less promising, theories of liability that might be 
used include negligent entrustment or intentional torts. A 
defendant can be held liable under a negligent entrustment 
theory if he supplies a product that is highly dangerous, 
has specific knowledge of the buyer’s dangerous intent 
or is witness to the buyer’s conduct that clearly shows 
the buyer’s unsuitability to use the product, and, with this 
knowledge, then displays a reckless disregard for the 
safety of the buyer or others whom the buyer may injure. 
In the case of landmines, this theory would at best apply 
where the producers sold the landmines to users who 
were likely to transfer the landmines to irregular forces, 
terrorists or criminals. Intentional tort claims, of course, 
require intent. It would be necessary for landmine victims 
to prove that the producers actually intended to cause 
their injuries and, although theoretically possible involving 
transferred intent or for certain types of intentional torts, 
this approach probably would not be applicable for most 
landmine victim situations. 
The creation of national solidarity Funds for mine victims 
in the countries affected by antipersonnel mines is another 
idea worth promoting. This fund could, for example, be 
modelled on the Guarantee Fund for Victims of Acts of 
Terrorism (FGTI) instituted in France by the law of 6 July 
1990, or the Fund set up by a Quebec law in 1972 to 
provide compensation for victims of criminal acts. Certain 
other countries have adopted compensation procedures 
for crime victims (29 countries have established such 
mechanisms70). Colombia, for example, has established a 
system for awarding financial compensation to victims of 
a terrorist or guerrilla action, an act of war, or a massacre. 
There is, however, no evidence that landmine victims have 
benefited from it71. 
2. Enforcement
The preceding chapter looks at avenues that might allow 
individuals, whether or not through the intermediary of 
their States, to obtain a right to reparation if they have 
been harmed by landmines. As we have seen, some of 
these avenues remain very problematic when it comes to 
using them effectively. 
It is far from certain that, if legal proceedings were launched 
against States or landmine producers, these actions would 
be followed by concrete results. Nevertheless, some legal 
cases are worth studying and may serve as precedents 
regarding this issue.
Indeed, with the aim to enforce existing laws giving right to 
reparation for landmines victims, some jurisdictions made 
them competent in hearing claims related to this issue. 
These jurisdictions are both at international and regional 
levels. 
Moreover, the example of national cases, as class actions, 
can be significant.
2.1. At international level 
Given that, at international level, there are no legal 
institutions with general jurisdiction, the effective 
application of international law often generates complex 
problems. The simplest way of persuading States to 
respect their international obligations is thus through 
bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Failing this, it is 
possible to take a case to the International Court of 
Justice, but only if all the States involved recognize its 
jurisdiction. In the absence of any means of international 
compulsion, if a State refuses to cooperate, it is hard to 
envisage a solution that could be applied in practice. 
2.1.1. The International Court of Justice (ICJ)
The International Court of Justice has sole power to rule 
on the interpretation of international law. If it recognized 
that States had a duty to make reparations to landmine 
victims, this would represent a great step forward for 
victims’ rights. To the present day, the Court has never 
given a ruling on this issue.
The ICJ has a double brief: to settle, in accordance with 
international law, legal disagreements submitted to it by 
the States, and to give advice on legal questions posed 
by those specialized bodies and institutions of the United 
Nations (UN) that are entitled to do so.
It has no powers of compulsion, but its rulings and 
precedents may be considered a source of law.
Insofar as only the bodies of the UN are entitled to request 
advice, it is important to determine which body might most 
legitimately solicit this advice, or the request will be refused 
by the ICJ. To solicit advice, specialized bodies must prove 
a link between the request and their own area of expertise; 
in other words, if the advice is solicited by the WHO (World 
Health Organisation), the WHO has to prove that the issue 
of landmines is directly linked to its mandate (in this case, 
the right to health). Of possible relevance, the ICJ has, 
in the past, rejected a request from the WHO for advice 
70 See the site of the Office for Victims of Crime: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/intdir/intdir.htm for more information.
71 On the subject of national and international compensation Funds, see the second part of the study.
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on the legality of using nuclear weapons in light of their 
effects on health. The ICJ decided that the issue was not 
within the area of expertise conferred on the WHO by its 
mandate72. The advice was subsequently solicited by the 
General Assembly, whose wider mandate gives it greater 
legitimacy before the ICJ, which then agreed to rule on the 
issue. If advice were to be solicited on reparations due to 
landmine victims, the request should therefore be made 
by the General Assembly. 
It is very unlikely that the ICJ will state that there is 
a general obligation for states to pay reparation to 
antipersonnel mine victims. The Ottawa Treaty is only 
binding on its member States and has no retrospective 
effect. 
That being so, there is another type of legal proceeding 
that might lead the ICJ to pronounce on the question of 
reparation for landmine victims. If State A wishes to obtain 
reparations from State B for harm caused by landmines 
laid on its territory by State B, it can make a deposition 
to the ICJ. The jurisdiction of the ICJ is subject to one 
essential condition, however: both States must recognize 
the jurisdiction of the ICJ and agree to bring their dispute 
before this jurisdiction. Moreover, such proceedings 
have certain limitations: since the Court has no power to 
compel, it cannot force States to obey its rulings, nor can 
it apply sanctions if they choose not to.
Ultimately, settlement of the dispute is made from 
one State to the other; victims are not consulted, and 
reparations, if made, go to the State and not to individual 
victims unless such measures have been provided for 
within the framework of a treaty between the two States. 
For example, at the end of the Second World War, 
Japan signed a peace agreement with the Allies. In this 
treaty, the funds allocated were to be used, in part, to 
compensate individuals who had been prisoners of war 
in Japan73.
The Court has rendered two decisions on the use of 
maritime mines, both within a context of inter-State 
relations.
In the “Corfu Channel Case”, two British warships were 
damaged and members of the crew were killed when the 
ships struck anchored maritime mines in the Northern 
Corfu Channel. The People’s Republic of Albania must 
have been aware of the minefield, but did not notify its 
existence to the British ships. The Court ruled74 that the 
Hague Convention VIII of 1907 relating to the laying of 
unanchored automatic submarine contact mines is only 
applicable in time of war. However, the omission of Albania, 
which occurred in time of peace, violated “elementary 
considerations of humanity, the principle of the freedom of 
maritime communication, and every State’s obligation not 
to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary 
to the rights of other States”.  
In the case “Nicaragua v. the United States of America. 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
Nicaragua”75, the ICJ examined the allegations of 
Nicaragua that the mining of Nicaraguan ports or waters 
was carried out by United States military personnel or 
persons of the nationality of Latin American countries in 
the pay of the United States. 
After examining the facts, the ICJ “established that, on a 
date in late 1983 or early 1984, the President of the United 
States authorized a United States Government agency to 
lay mines in Nicaraguan ports, that in early 1984 mines 
were laid in or close to the ports of El Bluff, Corinto and 
Puerto Sandino, either in Nicaraguan internal waters or in 
its territorial sea or both, by persons in the pay and acting 
on the instructions of that agency, under the supervision 
and with the logistic support of United States agents; that 
neither before the laying of the mines, nor subsequently, 
did the United States Government issue any public and 
official warning to international shipping of the existence 
and location of the mines; and that personal and material 
injury was caused by the explosion of the mines, which 
also created risks causing a rise in marine insurance 
rates.”
The ICJ decided “that, by laying mines in the internal or 
territorial waters of the Republic of Nicaragua during the 
first months of 1984, the United States of America had 
acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its 
obligations under customary international law not to use 
force against another State, not to intervene in its affairs, 
not to violate its sovereignty and not to interrupt peaceful 
maritime commerce.” 
The ICJ stated further “that the United States of America, 
by failing to make known the existence and location of the 
mines laid by it, […] has acted in breach of its obligations 
under customary international law in this respect;” and
“that the United States of America was under an obligation 
to make reparation to the Republic of Nicaragua for all 
injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations 
under customary international law enumerated above.”
The ICJ recognized that the use of mines was, in the 
present case, contrary to international law, and that the 
United States had failed in its duty to mark out the mines. 
The ICJ demanded reparations for the harm suffered.
However, the importance of this decision in matters of 
jurisprudence should not be overestimated:
- This ruling applies in a context of conflicts between two 
countries and is based on the recognition that there had 
been an illegal use of force. Consequently, it is not the 
use of mines per se that was condemned by the ICJ. 
- Moreover, if a country wanted the ICJ to recognize 
the illegal nature of the use of mines on its territory by 
another State, it would need the other State to agree to 
72 Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Request for Advisory Opinion Submitted by the World Health Organisation), November 1995.
73 Article 16 of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty between Japan and the Allies, and the 1956 agreement between Japan and the Netherlands.
74 I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 4, at p. 22.








bring the case and to recognize the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ. It is worth pointing out that, in the affair mentioned 
above, the United States did not admit the competence 
of the Court and did not follow the decision.
- Reparations must be granted from one State to another, 
without consulting victims and with no guarantee that 
they will receive individual compensation. Mine victims’ 
rights are therefore not necessarily enhanced.
2.1.2. Mixed claims commissions
In some settings, quasi judicial bodies have been set up 
ad hoc to compensate war victims. This is the case for 
instance of the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission 
or the United Nations Compensation Commission 
(UNCC) concerning the first Gulf war. These bodies do 
not work similarly which generates injustices between 
victims. For instance, a victim can get compensation from 
the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission only if there has 
been a violation of international humanitarian law. Such 
an approach generates significant inequalities between 
victims; for the same kind of prejudice, in one case the 
cause will be attributed to a violation of humanitarian 
law, whereas in the other the prejudice will be due to 
permissible collateral damages. Thus, for example, in  a 
ruling on 28th April 200476, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Commission 
had to deliver a judgement on a complaint lodged by 
Ethiopia accusing Eritrea of having used anti-personnel 
mines indiscriminately, deliberately even, against civilian 
Ethiopians. In its decision, the Commission began by 
determining what legal basis to apply in determining 
whether or not the use here of anti-personnel mines was 
a violation of the law.
It considered that, in as much as neither of the two 
parties had signed the mine-ban treaty or Protocol II of 
the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) at the 
time of the events, only customary law applied. It further 
considered that the Treaty of Ottawa and most of the 
provisions in Protocol II of the CCW were too recent and 
State practice with regard to these two legal instruments 
too sporadic and diverse to constitute customary law. 
Only certain provisions of Protocol II of the CCW relative 
to mine-fields, the prohibition of the indiscriminate use 
of mines and the protection of civilian populations are 
constituents of customary law.
Once the legal basis had been established, the 
Commission delivered its judgement on the question of 
whether the use of anti-personnel mines by Eritrea was 
effectively contrary to international customary law. In the 
case in point, it considered that the mines had been placed 
in front of the Eritrean armed forces’ fixed positions and 
were thus used defensively in conformity with international 
customary law. Insofar as the damages suffered by the 
civilians occurred after the retreat of the Eritrean troops 
during the Ethiopian offensive, the court considered that 
it was understandable for the Eritrean forces not to have 
been able to decontaminate the zone before leaving.
Thus, on the question of Eritrea’s responsibility, which, 
if engaged, would entitle victims to compensation, the 
Commission judged that, “the evidence indicates that 
Eritrea made extensive use of anti-personnel landmines, 
but it does not demonstrate that there was a pattern to 
their unlawful use. For liability, the Commission would 
have to conclude that landmines were used in ways that 
intentionally targeted civilians or were indiscriminate. The 
available evidence suggests, however, that landmines 
were extensively used as part of the defence of Eritrea’s 
trenches and field fortifications. Thus, declarations citing 
the presence of anti-personnel mines also frequently refer 
to the presence of Eritrean trenches in the area/kushet 
concerned. In principle, the defensive use of minefields to 
protect trenches would be a lawful use under customary 
international law.”
Although it is regrettable that civilian victims are unable 
to obtain compensation for the prejudice caused by the 
mines, this judgement is not completely devoid of interest. 
First of all, the Commission mentioned the importance 
of the Treaty of Ottawa (paragraph 51). Furthermore, in 
carefully examining the circumstances in which the mines 
had been used and abandoned by the Eritrean forces, 
the Commission does not consider that the use of anti-
personnel mines outside of the framework of the Treaty of 
Ottawa is always legal, but rather that it is worth analysing 
on a case by case basis. Consequently, it is possible that 
in different circumstances of mine use, the Commission 
may consider that compensation should be paid.
What is important to note is that these ad hoc mechanisms 
have been set up as part of the settlement of international 
disputes – in these cases, political and arbitral negotiations 
have led to an agreed set of terms for the mandate of the 
Commission77. 
In other cases, such as the Swiss Banks litigations in the 
US, claims commissions were established pursuant to 
court sanctioned settlement negotiations78. 
Given the specificity of the negotiations, it is 
understandable that there are differences in approach 
– e.g., in what issues were subject to the dispute, in what 
money was available for compensation, etc. What one 
must advocate for, therefore, is consistent principles of 
law, not necessarily a consistent result in all cases (in 
terms of quantum or nature of reparations).
The UNCC has adopted a more flexible approach 
which entitles landmine and ERW victims to seek for 
compensation. The UNCC was created in 1991 as a 
subsidiary organ of the UN Security Council. Its mandate 
is to process claims and pay compensation for losses 
and damage suffered as a direct result of Iraq’s unlawful 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. This is a particular 
situation in the sense that because Iraq committed a 
76 Judgement by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Compensation Commission of 28th April 2004 : “ Partial Award, Central Front Ethiopia’s Claim 2 between the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia and the State of Eritrea”. Translation Handicap International.
77 That is the case for the creation of the United Nations Compensation Committee, created by the way of the Security council resolution 692, dated on the 20th May 1991.
78 On the 22nd November 2000, judge Korman, chief judge of the United States District Court, in the Swiss Banks settlement, approved the restitution plan for Holocaust 
victims. Funds are allocated by the way of different associations.
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crime of aggression (or illegitimate recourse to force) 
and had been beaten, it had to support the war losses. 
Compensations are funded through Iraqi oil revenue. 
The UNCC compensates individuals, corporations, 
governments, and international organisations. It receives 
a large variety of claims classified in six categories 
according to the nature and the amount of the losses and 
damages and the nature of the claimants. Individuals who 
seek compensation have to submit their claims through 
their government.
A victim can receive compensation for an injury regardless 
of its direct cause and even if it is not considered as a 
violation of law, as long as the prejudice is linked with 
the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Thus, landmine and ERW 
victims have received compensation (even including 
trauma caused by witnessing a child being killed by a 
landmine) as part of the category D3 claims79. Decisions 
on compensation being not opened to the public, it is 
difficult to evaluate the amount of the allocated financial 
compensation.
According to a UN report, there were several million mines 
and other pieces of unexploded ordnance in Kuwait at the 
end of the occupation. That report stated that “the most 
lasting environmental problem facing Kuwait will be that of 
mines and other unexploded ordnance”80. Environmental 
damage can also be compensated by the UNCC. However, 
no claim has been submitted for the compensation of 
pollution of the territory by landmines and UXO. 
The deadline for filing the claims in cases of damages and 
loss resulting from injuries sustained as a result of landmine 
and ordnance explosions has even been extended to 
take into account the long-term threat of these weapons, 
whereas filing deadlines for all other claims have expired. 
Landmine and ERW victims can make a claim before the 
Commission up to one year after the damage occurred81. 
It is important to note that the right to compensation is 
not based on landmine use itself, but rather on the act 
of aggression perpetrated by Iraq. There are no judicial 
proceedings and no punitive procedures. The question 
of the liability for the use of landmine is not even raised 
since Iraq is responsible for all damages and loss due to 
military actions committed by either side.  Therefore if the 
damage occurred during the period of the invasion, the 
work of the commission focuses only on the estimation of 
the compensation due. 
Thus, compensation bodies set up after armed conflicts 
can lead to a compensation for landmine victims. However 
the exceptional and ad hoc aspect of these mechanisms 
does not allow for harmonisation of the procedures and 
can generate inequalities between landmine victims.
2.2.  At regional level
Regional jurisdictions concerning the protection of 
human rights have known a great development since 
few decades. Numerous States agree to see their 
responsibility engaged before a regional court for acts 
they have committed in violation of human rights. 
As said, effects caused by landmines can be considered 
as violations of fundamental rights. Thus, victims of 
landmines could make requests before these regional 
courts in order to obtain reparation for the violation of their 
human rights.
That can be the case before the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights. This latter has jurisdiction to engage 
the responsibility of one of the 21 member States of the 
American Convention on Human Rights in case of 
violation of rights protected by this text. An action brought 
by a landmine victim could be based on the violation of 
one of his/her fundamental rights such as right to life, right 
to have his/her physical integrity respected included in 
articles 4 and 5 of the Convention, or on article 22 that 
protects freedom of movement and residence. Moreover, 
12 States parties to the Organisation of American States 
(OAS) have ratified the Additional Protocol on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights82. Among these rights are the 
right to a healthy environment and the right to food.
If one of these rights is considered as violated, the State 
liable can be under an obligation to reparation83.
Nevertheless, no individual recourse can be made 
directly before the Inter-American Court. This limitation 
is a great weakness for victims. Only member States 
of the Inter-American Commission as well as the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights have this ability. 
This latter is an autonomous organ representing the 
OAS. It is authorized to examine complaints or petitions 
regarding specific cases of human rights violations from 
“any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental 
entity legally recognized in one or more member states 
of the Organisation.” As a result, a petition lodged before 
the Commission cannot directly give right to reparation. 
The Commission is not assimilated to a jurisdiction; it can 
only make some recommendations. It cannot pretend to 
engage the responsibility of one State unless it brings 
an action before the Court. This latter is the only organ 
to have jurisdiction to impose reparation of a violation 
79 Category “D” claims are individual claims for damages above US$100,000 each.
80 Report to the Secretary-General by a United Nations mission, led by Mr. Abdulrahim A. Farah, former Under-Secretary-General, Assessing the Scope and Nature of 
Damage Inflicted on Kuwait’s Infrastructure During the Iraqi Occupation of the Country from 2 August 1990 to 27 February 1991 (S/22535, dated 22 April 1991), (the Farah 
Report);para. 538.
81 UNCC Governing Council decision S/AC.26/1992/12 on 25th September 1992, “Claims for which established filing deadlines are extended”.
82 Protocol of San Salvador, (San Salvador, 17th November 1988), entered into force on 16th November 1999
83 According to article 63 of the Inter-American Convention, “if the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by the Convention, the Court 
shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or 








of a right protected by the Convention. Such an action 
brought before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
if achieved, could lead to circumvent the non-ratification of 
the Ottawa Convention by the United States for instance. 
Landmine victims could, through the Commission, make 
an action against this State or another member of the 
American Convention but non-signatory of the Ottawa 
Treaty, in order to engage its responsibility. However, the 
claim is only possible if there is effectively a violation of 
their human rights. In times of an armed conflict, they are 
interpreted according to international humanitarian law. 
However, a major hindrance for such an engagement of 
responsibility is still the difficult link to establish between 
the State in cause and the prejudice due to the landmine. 
As a result, in addition to the lack of individual recourse 
available before the Court, victims of landmines are 
confronted to the difficulty of landmines traceability.
The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights entered 
into force on 25th January 2004 by the mean of the 
Protocol to the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. It has jurisdiction to guarantee the application of 
the Charter as well as any other relevant human rights 
instrument ratified by the States concerned. If the Court 
finds that there has been a violation of a human or 
people’s right, “it shall make appropriate orders to remedy 
the violation, including the payment of fair compensation 
or reparation”84.
The referral to the Court is opened to members States and to 
African inter-governmental organisations. Requests made 
by individuals as well as non-governmental organisations 
are also possible but submitted to some conditions85. 
By now, 15 member States of the Organisation of African 
Unity have ratified the Protocol instituting the African 
Court. 
The institution of this recent regional jurisdiction can benefit 
in the future to landmine victims in the African continent. 
However, the optional jurisdiction of the African Court 
both for individual and non-governmental organisations’ 
requests remains a great weakness. These requests 
are still submitted to the willingness of member States. 
One can nevertheless see some reparation possibilities 
in favour of landmine victims in actions brought before 
the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights. Indeed, 
requests lodged by the numerous NGOs with observer 
status before the Commission can lead to an efficient 
mean in order to engage the responsibility of the African 
Charter members States. But, once again, concerning 
landmines, the problem of their difficult traceability can 
be seen as a real obstacle for victims in order to summon 
States.
The European Court of Human Rights is an important 
jurisdiction acting for the protection of human rights at 
regional level. Both landmine and cluster munitions victims 
can see, by this mean, relevant actions in order to engage 
the responsibility of members States to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. To date, 45 States have ratified 
the Protocol N°11 to the Convention. This latter amends 
the Convention and establishes the European’s Court 
obligatory jurisdiction for individual requests claiming for 
a violation of human rights. Indeed, under article 34 of 
the Convention, “the Court may receive applications from 
any person, non-governmental organisation or group of 
individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one 
of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the 
Convention or the protocols thereto.” Court’s decisions 
are binding all member States. If the Court concludes to a 
breach of the Convention or of any of its protocols, and if 
the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned 
allows only partial reparation to be made, it shall, if 
necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party. This 
just satisfaction includes generally costs and expenses 
award as well as, if appropriate, compensation for material 
and/or moral damage. As a result, any landmine victims 
are able to launch a case before the European Court if 
they can claim for a violation of a right from any State 
under the jurisdiction of the Court. The problem raising 
is that limitations are held for an individual claim to be 
entitled to proceed. Indeed, the risk of a potential violation 
of rights cannot, by itself, lead to entitle a claim to be made 
before the Court; one has to prove the damage occurred. 
That means that the person bringing a case before the 
European Court must be a victim. 
According to the Landmine Monitor Report 2003, the 
Federation of Russia and Georgia, both members of the 
Council of Europe and therefore under the jurisdiction 
of the European Court of Human Rights, are still using 
antipersonnel mines. However, the prosecution of a 
State remains dependent on the difficult traceability of 
landmines. As said, the link between the use of landmine 
and its State user is difficult to make.
One could also advocate for a claim before the European 
Court against the use of cluster munitions by members 
States. Indeed it has been acknowledged that since 1991, 
Great Britain as well as the Netherlands have used cluster 
munitions systems. Moreover, 10 members States of the 
Council of Europe produce this type of arms86. Individual 
requests for damages due to cluster munitions explosion 
84 Article 27 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
85 Concerning the firsts, their right of recourse before the African Court must have been officially accepted by the State against which the violation is alleged. By now, 
Burkina Faso only has made a declaration allowing such an individual right. Non governmental organisations can make a request before the Court only if they are entitled 
with observer status before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. For the list of Non Governmental Organisations with observer status before the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, see: http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/directory_ngo_en.html.
86 HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Cluster Munition Systems, Annex 4, (August 2003).
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can be based on fundamental rights as right to life (article 
2 of the European Convention) or right to physical integrity 
(included in article 8). Moreover, responsibility of States 
can be engaged for a violation of other protected rights. 
Concerning cluster munitions, that can be the case of 
right of freedom of movement (article 2 of Protocol 4 to 
the European Convention, signed in 1963). Moreover, 
jurisprudence of the Court concerning international 
environment law can be advocated in favour of reparation 
for cluster munitions victims. Indeed, the Court has enlarged 
the right to the protection of life to the environmental 
scope87. The right to a healthy environment seems by 
now indirectly protected by the Court jurisprudence. The 
presence of unexploded ordnance creates risks for the 
population living around the contaminated area. Finally, 
it is now clear that individuals do have a human right to 
effective access to information88. As a result, victims of 
cluster munitions could bring a claim before the Court if 
it is proved that they had not been beforehand informed 
of the risks due to the contaminated environment in which 
they were living. 
At date, although it can be acknowledged a certain 
activism from these regional jurisdictions, no violation has 
been invoked in relation to the use of antipersonnel mines 
or cluster munitions. 
2.3. At national level
In order to estimate landmine victims’ possibilities of 
claims at national level, the issue of jurisdiction has first 
to be studied. 
Some examples of recourses have to be analysed such 
as class actions and associational representations which 
are interesting as regards victims’ claims against States 
or producers.
However, causation as well as defences are obstacles 
with which victims can be confronted.
2.3.1. Jurisdiction
• Court’s jurisdiction
The first problem at the national level is establishing that 
the courts have jurisdiction to decide a case brought by 
landmine victims. U.S. courts, for example, will only exert 
jurisdiction over a defendant that has some “minimum 
contacts” within that court’s normal territory for jurisdiction. 
This applies to any type of entity including individuals, 
corporations, and even governments. The usual 
conditions to establish minimum contacts are: domicile; 
actual presence; conducting business in the territory; or 
if the claimed injury occurred in the territory. Ultimately, 
courts that are asked to exert their jurisdiction over a 
defendant will consider whether subjecting that defendant 
to the court’s jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.
So the type and circumstances of landmine producers 
affect whether or not a U.S. court would be willing to exert 
its jurisdiction over a case brought by landmine victims 
against landmine producers. From a U.S. perspective, 
landmine producers fall into four categories: U.S. 
corporations; foreign corporations; the U.S. government; 
and foreign governments.  Courts in the U.S. could exert 
their jurisdiction over the U.S. corporations and U.S. 
government, and to some extent over foreign governments 
and foreign corporations (as long as those corporations 
are doing business in the U.S., even if that business does 
not involve landmine production). 
Nevertheless, another method for establishing jurisdiction 
over foreign defendants is the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA) which grants U.S. courts jurisdiction as long as 
the injury claim also involves a violation of the “law of 
nations”. For the application of the ATCA, courts have 
interpreted the “law of nations” to mean generally the laws 
dealing with the relationship among nations rather than 
individuals. This approach would allow U.S. jurisdiction 
over any type of foreign defendants without any need 
to prove minimum contacts, but the landmine victims’ 
claims in the case, in addition to their claims regarding 
their personal injuries, would need to argue that either the 
landmines themselves or landmine use was a violation of 
international law. 
• Universal jurisdiction
Another jurisdictional aspect concerns national enforcement 
of the universal jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction aimed 
at the national implementation of states’ obligations to 
bring to justice persons responsible for crimes under 
international law, such as genocide, crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, torture, extrajudicial executions and 
‘’disappearances’’.
The principle of universal jurisdiction can be seen as part 
of customary international law89. 
However, the study of national laws related to the 
application of universal jurisdiction involves some limits:
- First of all, it is very unlikely that a State would recog-
nize the use of landmine as a crime90. This interpreta-
tion is not commonly admitted and states would rather 
use their universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes that 
are commonly recognized as such. 
 As mentioned in an Amnesty International report on 
universal jurisdiction, the states practise of universal 
87 ECHR decision, Oneryildiz v. Turkey, (18th June 2002).
88 Ibid.
89 It is mentioned in the Geneva Conventions, in the preambul of the International Criminal Court Statute and in different General Assembly resolutions. As a result, a state 
can legislate in favor of the universal jurisdiction of its national Courts. Moreover, even if national law of one state does not include universal jurisdiction, the Courts can apply 
it in the name of customary international law. 








jurisdiction do not allow to clearly define the kind of 
crimes that could be prosecuted91.  
- Then, most of states require an element of connexion 
(such as territoriality, personality) to enforce the 
application of the universal jurisdiction in their courts. 
Belgium, which is considered as the pioneer country in 
term of application of the universal jurisdiction, enacted 
in 1993 a law to implement universal jurisdiction which 
does not require any elements of connexion (universal 
jurisdiction in abstentia), but repealed it on 1st August 
2003, so that now an element of territoriality has to be 
established in Belgian courts as well92. 
- The main limit of universal jurisdiction is the immunity 
which protects any persons with official functions. This 
principle was reaffirmed by the ICJ in a decision dated 
14 February  200293. 
- Finally, admitting that despite all the limits mentioned, a 
state would consider prosecuting a person responsible 
for the use of landmines in civilian areas under its 
universal jurisdiction law, it would aim at punishing the 
crime and not at providing reparation to the victims.
2.3.2. Collective claims
• Class actions
A class action would allow one or several landmine 
victims to represent other similarly-situated landmine 
victims without each victim having to take an active role 
in the litigation. By this way, victims would avoid important 
costs of claims made individually. Under U.S. law, there 
are a variety of types of class actions, depending in part 
on whether they are commenced in federal or U.S. State 
courts.
In general, however, successfully bringing a class action 
can be difficult and certain requirements must be met. 
First, there must be a sufficient number of class members 
so that it would be impracticable to simply join several in 
an individual lawsuit. Secondly, common questions of law 
or fact must exist. Further, the class member who acts 
as the representative must have the same interests and 
suffer the same injuries as the rest of the class members, 
and the representative must fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class. Finally, in the type of 
class action most appropriate for landmine victims, the 
common questions of law or fact must predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual class members, 
the class action must be superior to all other methods 
of litigation, and there can be no undue management 
difficulties in bringing the class action.
Some of these requirements could be problematic since 
the situations of landmine victims from different States and 
regions of the world vary greatly, and the sheer number 
of victims with vastly differing languages and access to 
communications would raise enormous management 
difficulties. The only reasonable approach would be to 
divide the victims into multiple subclasses based on 
geographic areas where damages occurred. This would 
focus the common questions of law or fact and likely 
cause them to predominate over questions affecting 
individual members; it would enhance the potential for 
one or several victims to have the same interest and injury 
as other class members and to represent the class fairly 
and adequately; and it would ease the management and 
communications difficulties. 
Example of a class action case regarding landmines brought 
against a state94
In 2000, a group of 200 Kenyan nationals, victims of 
accidents caused by mines and unexploded ordnance, 
formed a class and brought a case in the British court 
against the British government. In the 1990s, the British 
army had carried out military exercises on Kenyan soil with 
the agreement of the Kenyan authorities. During these 
exercises, landmines were scattered over the territory and 
the contaminated zones were not subsequently cleared. 
Here, the plaintiffs did not base their case on the Ottawa 
Treaty but on issues of environmental pollution and 
damage caused to the community. No verdict was declared 
because the case was settled out of court. The British 
authorities agreed to pay $7 million in compensation to 
victims but did not accept liability. 
This example is encouraging as well as interesting. The 
fault of the State in this particular case, although not reco-
gnized, is blatant, inasmuch as the mines were used for 
military training and not in the context of a war. It is a ques-
tion, really, of fault by omission: the training zones were 
not cleared, leading to the contamination of Kenyan soil.
Such an example should not lead to disregard class ac-
tions limits as regards victims’ rights. Thanks to this collec-
tive claim mechanism, some victims are able to exercise 
their rights and to obtain reparation. But the conclusion of 
this procedure is often dealt by way of a transaction, which 
makes it very dependant on the negotiations abilities of 
the victims and their representative. Moreover if the tran-
91 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Universal Jurisdiction - the duty of states to enact and enforce legislation (September 2001), http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/pages/
legal_memorandum.
92 From now, Belgian courts will only have jurisdiction over international crimes if the accused is Belgian or has his primary residence in Belgium; if the victim is Belgian or 
has lived in Belgium for at least three years at the time the crimes were committed. 
93 ICJ, case n°121, (14 February 2002), Case concerning the arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium).
94 BBC News, Kenya herders accept UK pay-out, 22/10/02- ANANOVA, MoD to compensate for landmine maimings 10/04/02. See also the website of lawyers Leigh, Day and 
Co. : www.leighday.co.uk
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saction can represent a precedent for future cases it might 
not appear as strong as a court decision. Furthermore, 
the risk of a shift towards  commercialised justice remains 
high with this type of action. 
• Associational representation
In US law, a possible alternative to class actions for 
landmine victims might be for a non-governmental 
organisation (NGO), in which the victims are members, 
to bring the lawsuit on their behalf.  Such associational 
representation is allowed when: the individual members 
of the NGO would otherwise have standing to bring suit 
by themselves; the interests at stake are germane to the 
NGO’s purpose; and, neither the claim asserted nor the 
relief requested requires participation by the members in 
the lawsuit.  
For landmine victims, this would mean forming an NGO 
with the express purpose of seeking funding to assist 
landmine victims, but it also would mean that the victims 
could not seek individual monetary compensation because 
they cannot directly participate in the lawsuit under this 
approach.  Rather, the NGO would seek funding for 
regional or global trust funds in support of other NGOs 
and agencies that, in turn, would provide care and support 
for landmine victims95.
As collective procedure, this form of reparation can lead 
to bar one of the class actions limits: to extend victims 
support beyond the claim, and to keep future victims able 
to benefit precedent collective initiatives by the mean of 
instituted funds. 
2.3.3. Specific obstacles in national law
At national level, victims can face some obstacles to the 
enforcement of claims. On the one hand, these difficulties 
can be linked to causation between the landmine and the 
injury suffered and on the other hand, to arguments that 
can be used by the defence.
• Causation
In US law, it might seem obvious that a victim’s injury was 
caused by the explosion of a landmine, and indeed this 
can be shown to establish “general” causation, proving 
that the landmine is capable of causing such an injury. 
But “specific” causation also must be proved and, in the 
case of landmines, this is much more difficult. Specific 
causation requires proof that the individual landmine 
victim’s injury was actually caused by a landmine from 
a specific landmine producer. Typically, landmine victims 
will not be able to prove the source of the landmine that 
caused their injury.
There are two solutions to this problem. First, the victims 
could argue that proof of general causation is sufficient. 
A recent and successful example of this argument in 
the U.S. courts involved a case against the producers 
of Agent Orange, a defoliant chemical used by the U.S. 
military that has been linked to several serious illnesses. 
In that case, the Court found that although none of those 
victims could prove which producer’s chemicals caused 
the harm, each of the producer’s chemicals could have 
caused the harm. All of the defendant producers were 
found liable and their respective shares of the liability were 
set at relative levels equal to their respective shares of the 
Agent Orange market. Landmine victims could assert the 
same argument in their case since they also could prove 
general causation but would find it virtually impossible to 
prove specific causation.
The second argument would assert an “enterprise liability 
theory.” This theory originated in the U.S. in 1972 with 
a case involving blasting caps, which are often used at 
construction sites96. Thirteen children who had been 
injured in twelve distinct situations in ten different U.S. 
States brought suit against the blasting cap producers. 
Since the victims could not prove which blasting cap that 
caused their injuries came from which producer, the court 
allowed the victims to name every blasting cap producer 
as a defendant since that list comprised the entire blasting 
cap industry. Even though no specific causation could 
be proven, and even though all of the defendants had 
adhered to the current safety standards of their industry, 
all were found liable97.
Landmine victims, under this approach, would need to 
name all known landmine producers and then assert that 
if none of the producers could prove that they were not 
the maker of the particular landmines in question, they 
must be held liable for the victims’ injuries in proportion to 
their share of the landmine market. If successfully argued, 
this approach would hold all landmine producers liable 
for a proportionate share of the victims’ injuries unless a 
particular producer could avoid some liability by proving 
that their landmines could not have been a cause of the 
injuries (e.g., the producer’s landmine were sold but never 
used, or were only used in a geographic area other than 
that where the victims were injured).
• Defences
Another obstacles to claims outcome at national level deal 
with arguments used by the Defence. 
For the U.S. government and foreign governments, the 
most obvious and strongest defences would be based 
on concepts of governmental immunity. These are 
well established under U.S. law and only very narrow 
95 Examples of these types of cases have involved special interest organisations such as environmental groups (e.g., the Sierra Club) or labour unions. In the instance of 
landmine victims, it would be necessary for the NGO to have victims as its members, but that NGO would not need to have all landmine victims as its members in order to 
represent them.   
96 Hall v. E.I.DuPont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
97 Another important U.S. case successfully using enterprise liability theory involved claims by cancer victims whose mothers, while pregnant, had ingested the prescription 
medication DES (diethylstilbestrol). Again, studies later revealed that DES was the general cause of the victims’ cancer but no one DES producer could be proved to have 
supplied the DES that caused any individual victim’s cancer. The court found that since the victims could not prove specific causation, justice required that the burden of 
proof shift to the producers to prove that any particular producer was not the source of the DES that caused the injury to any particular victim. In the end, the court found the 









exceptions to such defences are available. For example, 
immunity for the U.S. government would be very difficult to 
avoid unless the landmine victims could successfully argue 
that the U.S. government’s use or export of landmines 
had violated the victims’ civil rights, in which case the 
Federal Tort Claim Act (FTCA) mandates that the U.S. 
government be treated just as any private individual. Such 
an argument would not likely succeed, however.  
Immunity for foreign governments in United States also 
would be problematic since the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity Act (FSIA) provides only seven enumerated 
exceptions and only one of those might apply for landmine 
cases. Foreign governments are not protected by the 
FSIA for injuries or losses based “upon an act outside 
the territory of the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and 
causes a direct effect in the United States.” In a landmine 
case, the victims or their families would need to establish 
that at least some of their injuries or losses occurred in 
the United States (which might include injuries such as 
emotional distress). As with U.S. governmental immunity, 
the arguments to avoid foreign governmental immunity 
would be difficult to raise successfully. 
This leaves the landmine producing U.S. and foreign 
corporations subject to U.S. court jurisdiction. This is not a 
significant reduction from the entire universe of landmine 
producers since most governments contract with private 
corporations to produce their landmines. In the U.S., 
virtually all landmines have been produced this way, and 
current estimates place the number of U.S. landmines at 
nine to ten million or more of the 60 to 80 million uncleared 
landmines located in dozens of countries. During its time 
from the 1960s to the mid-1980s as a leading world 
producer of landmines, the U.S. exported landmines to 
more than 30 countries. 
These private landmine producers probably would not 
raise any of the conventional defences for personal injury 
cases such as: consent; assumption of risk; or contributory 
negligence. The fact situations of most landmine cases 
would not support these defences, and the defendant 
landmine producers would not want to raise defences that 
require placing any blame on the victims.
Another defences likely to be raised, however, would be 
the statute of limitations. Typically, a tort case such as one 
that a landmine victim might bring must be brought within 
two to three years of the injury. This time limit varies for 
different jurisdictions within the U.S., and other factors can 
affect its length, but in most events it is a relatively short 
period of time. 
Nevertheless, “equitable tolling” principals can bar a 
defendant from raising the statute of limitations defence 
under certain circumstances where there was fraud, 
concealment, deception or other misconduct by the 
defendant. The essence of equitable tolling is that the 
statute of limitations does not run against victims who 
are unaware that they have a legal cause of action. A 
recent example of equitable tolling involved a lawsuit 
brought in the U.S. by Holocaust victims to recover their 
assets decades after those assets were stolen, based on 
concealment by those defendants.  In the case of landmine 
victims, the stronger equitable tolling argument would be 
based on the victims’ lack of knowledge regarding their 
legal claims, and on their lack of access to U.S. courts. 
Finally, another equitable tolling argument against the 
statute of limitations defence could be the “continuing 
violation doctrine” which states that the limitations period 
does not begin until the offence is complete. In the 
instance of landmines, an argument could be made that 
the offence will not be complete until all or a substantial 
amount of the landmines are removed or detonated. Since 
this is unlikely to occur for many years, landmine victims 
would be free to pursue their claims without being barred 
by time limitations.
Another remaining defence is the “government contractor 
defence.” This would be available only to corporations 
that contracted with the U.S. government to produce 
landmines. Based on the current understanding of 
the landmine industry, this would include only U.S. 
corporations (also meaning that any landmine producing 
foreign corporations over which U.S. courts might exert 
jurisdiction would have few remaining viable defences). 
The government contractor defence essentially is an 
extension of the sovereign immunity defence available to 
the U.S. government. The policy behind the government 
contractor defence is to shield private entities from liability 
for products intended for use in armed conflict, thereby 
encouraging private entities to contract with the U.S. 
government for what are in essence government activities 
which, if conducted by the government, would otherwise 
be protected by sovereign immunity.
Required elements of the government contractor defence 
are: 1) the U.S. government approved reasonably 
precise specifications; 2) the product conformed to those 
specifications; and 3) the producer warned the U.S. 
government about dangers in the use of the product that 
were known to the producer but not the U.S. government. 
This defence would absolutely shield U.S. landmine 
producers from liability unless the victims could show that 
at least one of the elements is missing. 
U.S. landmine producers almost certainly could prove 
the first element and, even allowing for some defectively 
produced landmines, the second element. The third 
element, however, provides room for argument as well 
as controversy. If the victims could show that the U.S. 
producers did not fully warn the U.S. government of the 
dangers of landmines, then the producers could not use 
the government contractor defence even if the landmines 
were produced to meet approved specifications. The 
landmine victims would need to show that had the U.S. 
government been aware when the landmines were 
produced that technology existed that could have reduced 
their danger, it would have changed the specifications to 
include that technology. 
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This is where the controversy begins. First of all, in terms 
of landmines, the only technology that might have reduced 
their danger involved self-destruct technology. This mean, 
if it does not reduce the landmine capacity to harm at 
the moment of the explosion, can at least permit a faster 
neutralisation and then reduce its long term threat. This 
technology was available as early as 1964 but it likely 
would be impossible to prove that producers did not warn 
the U.S. government about the dangers of landmines 
without the technology. The only evidence of this failure to 
warn might reasonably be drawn from the U.S. experience 
in Vietnam where landmines caused 33 percent of all U.S. 
casualties and 90 percent of all mine and booby-trap 
components used against U.S. troop were of U.S. origin. If 
the U.S. government had been warned by producers about 
landmines without self-destruct technology, it is not logical 
(or moral) that the U.S. government would have ordered 
and continued to use landmines that were causing so many 
casualties to their own troops, not to mention endangering 
so many civilians for decades after the conflict.
The existence of self-destruct technology prior to 
production of the majority of landmines made by U.S. 
producers now littering the world can be proven even if 
the failure of the producers to warn the U.S. government 
can only be inferred. Another related approach does not 
require proof that the producer failed to warn, but rather 
that the producer used its own discretion in producing the 
product, in this case ignoring even the possibility of any 
“safer alternative,” and that the U.S. government then 
merely accepted the producers’ decisions.
Another, and somewhat less controversial, exception to 
the government contractor defence concerns the cost of 
changing the product compared with the cost of unintended 
injury from the product. In other words, if the financial 
burden of changing the landmine – whether through self-
destruct technology or otherwise – is less than the cost 
of unintended injuries caused by the landmine, then the 
producer will be found negligent for failing to make the 
reasonable alterations and the government contractor 
defence will not be available. However, the evaluation of 
the unintended injury cost would not be easy to make. 
Whether any of these arguments would be sufficient to 
overcome the government contractor defence is uncertain. 
At the very least, if the victims’ lawsuit could progress to 
the point that the U.S. landmine producers must argue 
whether or not they warned the U.S. government about 
landmine dangers or could have applied some technology 
to make them less dangerous to post-conflict civilians, the 
victims’ case might effectively be won. 
The greater controversy, however, is that this legal 
approach does not conform with the position that no 
landmines, regardless of self-destruct technology, are 
safe for civilians or should be legal. In truth, such a case 
does not in any way address the issue of the legality of 
landmines under international law, nor could a ruling 
under U.S. law in favour of landmine victims be reasonably 
used in support of legitimising the use of self-destructing 
landmines. In fact, the international law arguments against 
landmines would have no force in such a case under U.S. 
law except if they were necessary for gaining jurisdiction 
through the Alien Tort Claims Act approach (as discussed 
above under, “Jurisdiction”).
Unfortunately, the theory needed under U.S. law to 
overcome the absolute shield of the government 
contractor defence requires arguing that on the whole, 
at least in terms of post-conflict civilians, U.S. produced 
landmines with self-destruct mechanisms would have 
been less dangerous. This does not mean that any type 
of landmine is safe or acceptable, but only that the U.S. 
producers failed to adequately warn the U.S. government, 
or improperly used their own discretion in producing 
landmines, and so cannot shield themselves from liability.
The enforcement of landmine victims’ rights is thus 
conceivable before international, regional and national 
jurisdictions. However, obstacles to these legal actions 
have been exposed. They may affect the effectiveness of 
a right to reparation for landmine victims. Developments of 
general international law could be an interesting track for 
the development of victims’ rights.
3. Developments in international law: 
implications for landmine victims
Recently, the international community became aware 
of the necessary reparation of damages suffered by 
victims. The establishment of the International Criminal 
Court is an important contribution regarding this issue. 
There are as well interesting works and studies made by 
the UN Human Rights Commission. Nonetheless, these 
developments in international law raise the problem of 
their difficult applicability to the specificity of antipersonnel 
mines victims. 
3.1. The International Criminal Court (ICC)
The adoption of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court in July 1998 marks an important 
development in victims’ rights at international level. It 
makes it possible for victims of crimes within the Court’s 
jurisdiction to associate in a court action with the public 
prosecutor, the result being that they can participate in all 
stages of the trial and obtain reparations.
The International Criminal Court is competent to rule on 
the most serious crimes and, consequently, ICC trials 
see the involvement of victims who have often suffered 
terrible wrongs. For the first time in human history, an 
international court has the power to order one individual 
to pay reparations to another individual. Under Article 75, 
paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute, the Court may order 
a convicted person to pay money for compensation, 
restitution or rehabilitation.
In accordance with Article 79 of the Rome Statute, the 
first Session of the Assembly of States Parties that took 








benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court and their families (Resolution 6). The purpose of the 
Fund is to fully incorporate a reparative function into the 
overall mandate of the Court. The Trust Fund will work in 
tandem with the Court’s reparation function under Article 
75 of the Statute. Sometimes this will be money that the 
court orders an offender to pay as reparation. According 
to article 75(2) of the Rome statute, “the Court may make 
an order directly against a convicted person specifying 
appropriate reparations to, or in respect of, victims, 
including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation”. The 
funds can be allocated either to individuals or collectively 
to a group.  Collective awards are not necessarily money 
to a collectivity – they can also be symbolic awards, 
memorials etc... The Fund may make payments directly to 
victims or to other bodies, such as an aid organisation. 
A convict might not have the necessary funds to pay the 
compensation sum imposed by the Court; in this case, the 
Board of Directors of the Trust Fund may decide to use its 
voluntary contributions for the benefit of the recipient of 
the Court’s award98.
The question remains whether or not landmine victims 
come within the jurisdiction of the Court, and would 
therefore be likely to receive reparations by means of a 
trial in the ICC, or through the Trust Fund. Chapter 2 of 
the ICC’s Statute lists the various crimes that come within 
the Court’s jurisdiction. The next step is therefore to find 
out if landmine victims can be put in the same category as 
victims of these crimes.
• Genocide99 
The use of mines cannot be categorized as genocide 
unless it is considered as part of a deliberate intention 
to destroy an entire national, ethnic, racial, or religious 
group. Mines may, in fact, be employed with the intention 
of destroying an ethnic group. When they are made to 
look like toys or tins of tomatoes, for example, and then 
dropped in a village, the use of mines may be evidence 
of an intention to eliminate an ethnic group or community. 
Even if the Rome Statute does not refer specifically to 
antipersonnel mines, the means used to commit these 
crimes are not really important. The key thing is the result, 
i.e. the crime. The Rome Statute, for example, describes 
‘killing members of a group’ as genocide, without 
specifying the means that might be used.
Nevertheless, the indiscriminate nature of landmine 
injuries probably rules out a charge of genocide, because 
the proof of the “intentional willing” remains absent.
• Crimes against humanity100
In theory, the Court may not consider landmine victims to 
be victims of a crime against humanity either, inasmuch 
as this crime is committed “in the context of a generalized 
or systematic attack launched against any civilian 
population”. Once again, the indiscriminate character of 
the mine make the notion of “generalized or systematic 
attack” uncertain.
However, if the mines are deliberately deployed close to 
villages, or if armed groups knowingly force civilians to 
gather up or detonate mines as it happened in Burma 
in 2002101, might not this precise situation constitute 
a crime against humanity? Indeed, Article 7(1k) of the 
Court’s statute defines crimes against humanity as “other 
inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing 
great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health”.
Nevertheless, “Attack directed against any civilian 
population” means a course of conduct involving the 
multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 
1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in 
furtherance of a State or organisational policy to commit 
such attack”102.
Consequently, still using the Burmese case of forced 
de-mining as an example, proof would be needed that 
the casualties to which villagers fall victim are part of a 
deliberate policy aimed at harming a target population, 
and therefore that it is no longer a question of accident but 
rather of a criminal act. 
Moreover, some authors can consider that damages to 
another State’s environment caused by landmines can 
fall under the definition of such a crime. Indeed, according 
to Professor Doug Rokke, “A nation’s military personnel 
cannot willfully contaminate any other nation, cause harm 
to persons and the environment and then ignore the 
consequences of their actions. To do so is a crime against 
humanity”103.
• War crimes104
As mentioned earlier, it is very difficult to prove that the 
use of mines in wartime constitutes a violation of the 
Geneva Conventions on the protection of civilians. 
Among the definitions of war crimes that figure in the ICC 
Statute, there is Article 8 paragraph 2b: “Intentionally 
launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack 
98 External voluntary contributions to the Fund must first be approved by the Board of Directors of the Trust Fund, which will refuse those contributions that are incompatible 
with the objectives and activities of the aid Fund, or those where allocating the sum in the way that the donor demands would lead to a manifestly inequitable distribution of 
the available funds among the different groups of victims.
99 Article 6 of the Court Statute.
100 Article 7 of the Court Statute.
101 As mentioned in:  INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO BAN LANDMINES, Landmine Monitor Report: Toward a Mine-Free World(2003), op. cit., p. 567, forced mine clearing have been 
reported in Burma.
102 Article 7.2.1 of the Court Statute.
103 Professor Doug Rokke, ex-director of the Pentagon’s depleted uranium project is a former professor of environmental science at Jacksonville University and onetime US 
army colonel who was tasked by the US department of defence with the post-first Gulf war depleted uranium desert clean-up.
104 Article 8 of the Court Statute.
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will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or 
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and 
severe damage to the natural environment which would 
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
overall military advantage anticipated”.
Does laying a landmine constitute such an attack? If 
so, it has never been recognized, although such an 
interpretation remains possible and largely legitimated by 
the high proportion of landmine civilian victims105. The user 
of a mine with no self-destruct mechanism knows very 
well that the mine will have an effect over the long term, 
even after the end of a conflict. In laying such a mine, he 
has consciously exposed civilians to danger once peace 
has been restored. Furthermore, even if the mine has a 
limited life thanks to a self-destruct mechanism, there is 
no guarantee that it will only cause losses in enemy ranks; 
‘collateral damage’ (the loss of civilian lives) may always 
be considered as exceeding the expected returns in terms 
of military strategy. 
This being so, might the laying of antipersonnel mines be 
seen as a war crime? Can one prosecute a person who 
commits an act in wartime for the peacetime effects of 
that act? 
Still using the Burmese example of forced mine clearing: 
does the fact of knowingly using a civilian to detonate a 
mine not constitute a war crime? This, however, would 
mean condemning the atrocity of forced mine clearing, 
and not the use of mines. The Court’s position could only 
permit such advancement of interpretation. 
• The crime of aggression
The crime of aggression figures in the statute of the 
ICC. However, “the Court shall exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in 
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime 
and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall 
exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a 
provision shall be consistent with the relevant provisions 
of the Charter of the United Nations106”. 
Even if the States Parties have yet to find a definition of 
the crime of aggression that satisfies everyone, the illegal 
use of force probably does constitute such a crime. 
 
Indeed, in the Nicaragua case107, the illegal use of force 
has been recognised as a crime of aggression. 
That would not be automatically the case of the use of 
landmines since it is the circumstances and not the mean 
which has been retained. In the sub-mentioned case, 
mines have been effectively used, but it is not this element 
which lead the Court to qualify American acts as a crime 
of aggression. 
Concentrating on the victim, it can be established that 
landmine victims can seek reparations through the ICC 
for one of the crimes mentioned above. However, one has 
to accept that, even if the Court did recognize that the use 
of a mine constituted a crime within its jurisdiction, the 
difficulty would be in proving the link between the victim 
and the mine user.
3.2. Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims 
of Gross Violations of International Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law
Since the beginning of the 90’s the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission has been working on the issue of 
reparation and compensation for victims. Two experts 
assisted with the drawing up of a draft document, which 
is currently being reviewed by States and civil society 
organisations for their comments. 
The UN Convention against Torture does not define 
the terms reparation, compensation and rehabilitation; 
it does not even contain any strict definition of the term 
‘victim’. Two UN documents tend to bar this weakness: the 
Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims 
of Crime and Abuse of Power and the Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of gross Violations of International Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law (hereafter referred to as 
the “ Draft Principles”).
One of the specificities of the Draft Principles is that 
they take as a starting point the needs and wishes of the 
victims themselves. As highlighted by the International 
Rehabilitation Council for Torture Victims108, the Draft 
Principles approach the right to remedy from the victim’s 
perspective. 
Although initially intended to compensate for a recognised 
gap in the UN Convention against Torture, the Draft 
Principles in fact go beyond this in focusing not only 
on violations that constitute acts of torture, but also on 
any gross violation of human rights and international 
humanitarian law. It is therefore interesting to study these 
draft Principles in the perspective of landmine victims. 
First of all it is important to notice that although the 
previous Draft Principles109 was directed at “violations of 
international human rights and humanitarian right”, the 
document was amended in October 2003110 to restrict 
the scope of the document to “gross violations of human 
rights and serious violations of humanitarian law”. These 
amendments to the text constitute a real step backward as 
far as landmine victims are concerned.  
105 According to the landmine Monitor 2003, op. cit., (p39-40), 85% of landmine victims are civilians. 
106 Article 5.2 of the Court Statute.
107 ICJ decision, Military and paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (“Nicaragua v. United States”), 27th June 1986.
108 http://www.irct.org
109 UN doc E/CN.4/2000/62.








In the amended Draft Principles111, “a victim is a person or 
a collective group of persons who suffered harm, including 
physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic 
loss, or impairment of their fundamental legal rights”. A 
“victim” may also be “a legal personality, the representative 
of a victim, a dependant, a member of the immediate 
family or household of the direct victim, as well as a 
person who, in intervening to assist a victim or prevent the 
occurrence of further violations, suffered physical, mental, 
or economic harm”.
A victim as defined above is “one who suffers harm as a 
result of acts or omissions that constitute a gross violation 
of international human rights, or serious violations of 
humanitarian law.” 
Whereas landmine victims could fit in the definition of 
victims as stated in the previous draft, the reference to 
“gross violations” may have constituted a significant bar. 
As it was mentioned previously, it is not yet admitted in 
the current jurisprudence whether the general use of a 
landmine constitutes a grave breach of humanitarian 
law. However, the specific use of several landmines can 
be in breach of international human rights. Further, in the 
Preamble of the draft Principles, it is considered that “gross 
violations of civil, political, economic, social and cultural 
rights includes the protection of life, physical integrity 
and other aspects essential to the human person and to 
human dignity”. A landmine victim could be considered as 
a victim of a gross violation of human rights.  
The Draft Principles list a certain number of obligations on 
States, among which are the obligation to respect, ensure 
respect for and enforce international human rights and 
humanitarian law. These obligations are given in chapters 
1 and 2. Articles 4 and 5 of chapter 3, however, focus more 
specifically on those gross violations of human rights and 
international humanitarian law that constitute crimes under 
international law. Because of their gravity, these violations 
require states to prosecute the alleged perpetrators and 
provide for universal jurisdiction. Statutes of limitation 
are not applicable. Regarding landmine victims, it is 
very unlikely for the time being and for the reasons 
already mentioned, that states will acknowledge the use 
of landmines as constituting a crime under international 
law. However, victims of landmines may still be entitled 
to claim certain rights, which include the right of access 
to justice, the right to reparation for harm suffered and 
other appropriate remedies, and the right of access to all 
information relevant to the violations (article 12).
 1. The right of access to justice
It must be possible to exercise this right within the 
framework of existing domestic law and in accordance 
with international law. States must therefore ensure 
that violations of international law (Human rights and 
humanitarian law) can be prosecuted under national 
jurisdiction. 
For the victims of landmine, it would mean that the 
violation of human rights (the use of landmine) they have 
suffered from  is recognized as such in domestic law. 
Article 13 states that the State also has an obligation to 
“make available all appropriate diplomatic and legal means 
to ensure that victims can exercise their rights to remedy 
and reparation for violations of international human rights 
or humanitarian law”. The mention of diplomatic means 
could be interpreted as assistance from the victim’s home 
State in obtaining compensation from another State liable 
for the harm he or she has suffered. Obviously, these 
diplomatic means are highly political and it is very unlikely, 
for example, that the Vietnamese government makes 
diplomatic means available to its citizen for obtaining 
reparation from the United States for the damage caused 
by the landmines laid by the US army in the 70s. Thus the 
use of diplomatic means may be discretionary according 
to which States are involved. Article 14 mentions that, in 
addition to individual access to justice, access should also 
be made available for groups of victim to make a collective 
claim. As it was mentioned previously, collective access 
to justice and reparation could prove to be a very useful 
approach for landmine victims. 
 2. Victims’ right to reparation
It is stated in chapter IX of the Draft Principles that 
“reparation should be proportional to the gravity of the 
violations and the harm suffered”. However, this raises 
the question of the correlation between the gravity of 
the violations and the extent of the harm suffered. No 
information indicates how the gravity of the violations will 
be assessed. It is likely that, in accordance with previous 
articles in the Draft Principles, a violation will be considered 
as “gross” when it constitutes a crime under international 
law. Does this mean that reparation will be calculated 
partly on the basis of whether or not the violation is gross? 
How will the gravity of those violations, not considered to 
be crimes under international law, be assessed? 
In the case of landmine victims, the violation (use of 
landmines) does not necessarily constitute a crime 
under international law and some may argue that it does 
not constitute a gross violation either, and yet the harm 
suffered can be of extreme gravity (loss of one or several 
limbs, death of a family member). It is difficult, therefore, to 
imagine how the amount of reparation could be calculated. 
Furthermore, it would seem both difficult and unrealistic to 
talk about proportional reparation. 
  
“In accordance with its domestic laws and international 
legal obligations, a State shall provide reparation to 
victims for its acts or omissions constituting gross 
violations of international human rights and serious 
violations of humanitarian law norms” (article 16). This 
article would seem to be particularly relevant to landmine 
victims. Indeed, although the State may not be held liable 
for a wrongful act (the use of landmine), damage caused 
111 Articles 8 and 9.
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by landmines is also due to an omission: the omission to 
clear the areas polluted by landmines after the end of the 
conflict, the omission to identify and close off access to 
polluted areas, the omission to warn and inform civilians 
about the danger and the location of landmines. Neither 
should it be forgotten that States are liable for acts 
committed by previous governments. 
Article 16 also refers to a case in which the violation is 
not attributable to the State. In such a case, “the party 
responsible for the violation should provide reparation to 
the victim or to the State, if the State has already provided 
reparation to the victim”. As outlined in article 3(b), a 
State is obliged to “investigate violations […] and, where 
appropriate, take action against the alleged perpetrators 
in accordance with domestic and international law”, this 
would mean that a State could, on behalf of a victim, 
claim compensation from the party held liable for the 
damage, whatever this party’s nationality. In a case 
where the liable party is unable or unwilling to meet its 
obligations, the victims’ home State should endeavour 
to provide them with reparation via the establishment of 
a national compensation/reparation Fund. In the case 
of harm caused by landmines, liability is often difficult to 
demonstrate: the liable party may be a rebel group, which 
has no legal status and may have disappeared since the 
wrongful act was committed, or a foreign state or identity 
that will not easily admit its liability112. 
If a foreign entity, in particular a State, is held liable, the 
claim for reparation takes on a very diplomatic aspect. The 
two States could bring the case before the International 
Court of Justice, but we have already seen the limits of this 
procedure113. The victims may be able to obtain reparation 
from his or her home State, but this would most likely be 
after diplomatic channels had failed, and would therefore 
be a lengthy process. Moreover, since the violation will 
not be considered a crime under international law, it is 
unlikely that the same means be made available to victims 
for claiming compensation. This is all the more so as, 
according to Chapter III, only crimes under international 
law require universal jurisdiction.
The establishment of a national Fund raises the issue of 
the financial resources available. If the State is not willing 
or not able to provide the funding, and this would certainly 
be the case in most of the countries where landmines 
victims are to be found, not only will the wrongful act 
remain unpunished but reparation will not be guaranteed 
either114. 
Chapter X of the Draft Principles refers to different kinds 
of reparation: 
• Restitution
“Restitution should, whenever possible, restore the victim 
to the original situation before the violations of international 
human rights or humanitarian law occurred” (article 22).
In the case of landmine victims, especially in the case 
of communities affected by landmines, restitution could 
mean clearance of the polluted area and the ability to 
return to the living or working area. However, restitution 
is not possible for physical injuries which resulted in 
permanent disability. 
• Compensation
“Compensation should be provided for any economically 
assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to 
the violation and the circumstances of each case, resulting 
from gross violations of international human rights and 
serious violations of humanitarian law” (article 22).
Each example listed in this article is relevant to the kind of 
damages suffered by landmine victims: 
- Physical or mental harm, including pain, suffering and 
emotional distress, 
- Lost opportunities, including employment, education and 
social benefits, 
- Material damages and loss of earnings, including loss of 
earning potential;
- Harm to reputation or dignity,  
- Costs required for legal or expert assistance, medicines 
and medical services, and psychological and social 
services.
• Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation is defined in a broad approach in article 23: 
it covers not only physical and psychological rehabilitation 
but also access to legal and social services. 
Collective or community care-management of physical 
rehabilitation for landmine victims is often the best 
adapted. This highlights the appropriateness of collective 
procedures for reparation.
• Satisfaction and guarantee of non-repetition
Satisfaction is defined in the Draft Principles via a series of 
enumerations (apology, including public acknowledgement, 
commemorations and tributes to the victims, official 
declarations…). Such measures have a very symbolic 
value but are of great significance to the victims. Article 24 
also mentions judicial or administrative sanctions against 
parties responsible for the violations as part of satisfaction. 
This is unlikely to happen in the case of reparation to 
landmine victims since liability for the wrongful act is 
difficult to prove. Nonetheless, the fact of admitting publicly 
that the use of landmines constitutes a gross violation of 
human rights or international humanitarian law, that the 
State’s omission to clear an area and to protect civilians 
constitutes a violation as well, will lead to an evolution in 
the jurisprudence. It is only through this kind of generalised 
recognition and statement that, in the long term, the use 
of landmines will be legally considered a gross violation of 
international law and custom.
As regards the guarantees of non-repetition, for 
landmine victims, this would mean the clearance of 
112 Judgment of the International Court of Justice: Nicaragua v. the United States of America, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua. 27/06/86).
113 See part 2.1.1 of this study.








contaminated areas, and for the States that continue 
producing landmines, or importing and exporting them, 
this could mean an end to production and all forms of the 
commercialisation of landmines.
The question of the scope of the Draft Principles remains 
to be seen. In the Preamble of the amended draft, it is 
emphasized “that the principle and guideline do not 
create new substantive international or domestic legal 
obligations but identifies mechanisms, modalities, 
procedures and methods for the implementation of existing 
legal obligations under international human rights and 
international humanitarian law which are complementary 
though different as to their norms”. It is very likely that this 
new clarification, along with the restriction of the scope of 
the text now referring only to “gross” respectively “serious” 
violations”, may be due to the comments made by some of 
the States arguing that many of the principles had no basis 
in custom or in treaty115. Will the principles and guidelines 
be legally binding on the States or will they remain 
simple objectives? If they do become legally binding, 
what recourse would there be in the event of a State not 
complying with its obligations to provide reparation? All 
these questions are not settled yet; the role, the nature 
and the statute of this text is still a fundamental issue. 
If the text is adopted by the General Assembly, even if 
does not acquire a legally binding status; it may still be an 
important reference for landmine victims.
4. Conclusions
Landmine victims could claim reparation for the 
prejudice they have suffered before competent national 
courts. These actions by individual victims depend on the 
procedural and material law conditions of each State.
The example of class actions in the United States is also 
an interesting idea. If all the conditions are met, landmine 
victims could group together  as a class and make a claim 
in order to engage the liability of the landmine manufacturer 
that caused the injuries they have suffered.
In order to facilitate such legal actions, the liability of the 
arms manufacturers should be more apparent. One of 
the main problems consists in establishing a causal link. 
This difficulty could be resolved by improving landmine 
traceability. 
Judicial action at national level should be taken by 
competent lawyers in this field. These lawyers should 
provide victims with judicial assistance and knowledge of 
the extent of their rights. 
Moreover, if the use of a landmine constitutes a war 
crime, universal jurisdiction to prosecute this crime could 
be engaged. However, States may exercise international 
jurisdiction only if a certain territorial link exists. This 
condition should be softened.
Claims against States for violation of human rights 
can be filed by individuals or by their representatives 
in certain regional human rights courts.  
Defending victims’ rights requires increased direct and 
indirect judicial assistance. In addition to the mechanisms 
that already exist116, further assistance could be provided 
by non-governmental human rights organisations or 
any other relevant bodies in order to make claims more 
effective and efficient. 
NGOs also have an important role to play in providing 
judicial assistance to victims; ensuring respect for 
procedural rules and rights and providing assistance in 
the constitution of the claim.   
The aim is to inform victims of the range of possibilities for 
legal remedy and thus of compensation/reparation from 
jurisdictions they are not always familiar with. 
NGOs should also be able to represent victims directly 
before regional courts in order to obtain reparation for 
damages due to landmines. In other words, NGOs could 
act as the victims’ representatives. 
The jurisdiction of international courts may be a 
means of engaging the responsibility of actors who 
violate international humanitarian law and international 
law on human rights. The engagement of international 
responsibility as well as individual criminal responsibility 
may be a means of improving victims’ rights. States 
parties to the Ottawa Treaty could exercise their diplomatic 
protection on behalf of one of their nationals before the 
International Court of Justice in order to obtain reparation 
for prejudice suffered caused by the non-execution of an 
obligation by another State party. 
The legality of the use of landmines could also be 
challenged by engaging individual criminal responsibility 
before the International Criminal Court. This international 
body has already created an important precedent with 
regard to incrimination in cases of rape. Organisations and 
associations for the defence of human rights obtained this 
incrimination through their persistent pleading before the 
ICC. This could also be the case for the use of landmines. 
In other words, if these organisations were more active 
with regard to the ICC, it could be possible to incriminate 
the use of landmines within the framework of actions taken 
against individuals. 
115 United States Mission –Geneva Press Releases 2003 “General Comments of the United States on Basic Principles and Guideline on the Right to a Remedy for Victims 
of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law”.  
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II. Compensation Fund 
for mine victims
Despite changes in international law, mine victims have still 
not obtained real judicial recognition as an identifi ed group. 
There have been some encouraging developments over 
recent years in the fi eld of the rights of disabled people, 
and it is fully recognized that assisting landmine victims 
and improving the situation of people with disabilities are 
very closely related. However these aspects do not provide 
a response to certain dimensions of landmines harms. 
Given that, for the time being, the question of reparation 
for mine victims seems diffi cult to implement, it is worth 
examining whether the creation of a compensation fund 
could fi ll this gap. 
Different systems could be envisaged for giving mine 
victims access to compensation: through national 
compensation mechanisms or through the creation of an 
international compensation Fund. 
Examples of existing funds providing compensation for 
other kinds of injury and damage are interesting models to 
study. This document analyses three of them:
- Two national compensation funds for the victims of 
terrorism 
- The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 
- The United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of 
Torture
First of all, we need to identify which mine victims could 
obtain compensation from a hypothetical fund and what 
their needs would be in terms of compensation in order 
to then analyse the different models of compensation 
mechanism and the extent to which they could be applied 
to the area of mine victims.
  
1. What kind of compensation for mine 
victims and for what kind of injury and 
damage? 
Mines victims are faced with three different kinds of 
damage and injury: 
1. Physical injury requiring expenditure on health and care 
over the long term and may lead to death. 
2. Injury to economic interest, including loss of earnings 
arising from the incapacity to work; loss of income when a 
fi eld can no longer be used for agricultural purposes; loss 
of income for a victim’s family. 
3. Psychological and emotional injuries due to the trauma 
caused by the death of a family member or the constant 
threat of landmines. 
Antipersonnel mine and UXO victims should get financial 
compensation for the harm suffered. This part of the 
study focuses on this particular aspect of compensation. 
As victims of mine accidents often suffer from permanent 
disability, they need special provisions in their daily life. 
The person’s defi ciencies and limited capacity to allow 
him/her to participate fully within the society should be 
compensated. The victims should have:
•  the right to an adapted daily environment; 
•  the right to use normal means of transport and 
communication;
• the right of access to technical aids and to essential 
human assistance.
• the concern for the needs and burden of the families and 
assistants.
 
This should be implemented through public policy related 






















According to the type of compensation fund and the kind 
of damages and injury suffered, compensation could also 
be claimed collectively instead of individually. 
1.1. Physical injuries
Landmine injuries or trauma are all body lesions suffered by 
an individual caused by the explosion of an antipersonnel 
mine or UXO. The damage can affect the head, the 
abdomen, the throat, the back, or the limbs. When victims 
survive long enough to reach the hospital, they usually 
suffer from one of the three following types of injury117:
Type 1 (30%): Caused by stepping on a mine buried in the 
ground. The subsequent lesions result in the amputation 
of the foot or the leg with serious injuries to the other leg, 
the genital organs, and the arms. This type of injury is 
usually the most serious, and is often accompanied by 
burns.
Type 2 (50%): Caused by splinter mines. Deep wounds 
from the penetration of metallic splinters causing lesions 
all over the body, damaging the skin, the organs, and the 
bones. The multiplicity of deep injuries is life-threatening.
Type 3 (5%): Caused by an explosion during handling by 
deminers, children, or mine setters, which usually causes 
the mutilation of the upper limbs, and serious injuries to 
the face that can result in deafness and blindness. 
15% of injuries caused by mine accidents do not enter 
these categories.
Whatever the type of ordnance, there are often lesions 
due to the “blast effect”: a pathologic process causing 
lesions in a body exposed to a shock wave during an 
explosion.
Compensation should at least cover medical expenses 
and rehabilitation and care over the long term and be 
assessed on the basis of the following criteria: 
• Pre-hospitalisation assistance and care (evaluation, first 
aid, and transportation);
• Hospital care (medical care, surgery, post-operative care 
and pain management);
• Rehabilitation (physiotherapy, occupational therapy, 
prosthetic appliances and technical aids, and psychological 
support). 
The ICBL working group on victim assistance estimated 
the costs of rehabilitation at 9000 USD per mine accident 
survivor over their lifetime118. However, it is very difficult 
to assess the amount of compensation for each type of 
prejudice suffered. Indeed, according to where the victim 
lives, the costs of medical expenses differ substantially. 
The care and physical rehabilitation of victims also 
depend on the kind of orthosis and prosthesis offered, the 
materials used etc.
1.2. Injury to economic interest
Injury to economic interest results in financial loss if: 
- the survivor can no longer work because of a physical 
disabilities or mental trauma;
- a victim’s family is in dire need;
sence of mines in the area prevents the exercise of 
professional activities.
  
Compensation for economic loss is also difficult to 
assess and should be estimated on a case-by-case basis 
according to the victim’s family circumstances and his/her 
professional situation (income) before the accident. 
Compensation should allow the victim to reintegrate in the 
professional and social life: professional redeployment, 
skills and vocational training, and income generating 
projects. 
Funeral expenses for deceased victims should also be 
taken into account. 
The presence of mines in an area may force individuals 
or communities to relocate. The amount of compensation 
should cover the economic loss for the individuals and 
communities and the socio-economic consequences 
caused by the relocation. In these particular cases, 
collective compensation may be more appropriate.  
1.3. Psychological injury
Compensation for psychological injury is certainly the 
most difficult to estimate: by “psychological injury” we 
mean the trauma suffered by the survivors or the victim’s 
family. In the case of survivors, it is worth remembering 
that social exclusion of the victim due to the social burden 
of disability can constitute a cause of psychological 
vulnerability.
A compensation for the direct victims’ families should take 
into account the degree of relationship and the potential 
witnessing of the accident by a family member. As 
previously stated, the UNCC considers that the witnessing 
of an accident by a family member is a factor to be included 
in the calculation of compensation119. 
1.4. A subjective or an objective approach?
The issue of compensation is a complex and wide-ranging 
one. Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, the Northern Ireland Victims 
Commissioner, notes in his report following the Omagh 
bombing, that he has «overall, […] often come to the 
conclusion that schemes apparently well-matched to their 
purpose do not always deliver the goods»120. 
117 HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Landmine Victim Assistance World Report 2002, Lyon: HI, 2002, p. 458-459.
118 HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Les mines antipersonnel aujourd’hui! Synthèse du Rapport 1999, Paris: L’esprit frappeur, 1999, p. 89.
119 See part 2.1.2 of the first part of the study.
120 Sir Kenneth BLOOMFIELD, We will remember them: Report of the Northen Ireland Victims Commissioner, 1998, para. 5.10.
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In December 1987, Professor Desmond Greer of Queen’s 
University Belfast wrote a paper on ‘Compensation and 
support for victims of crime’, which included the following 
recommendation: «Consideration should be given to the 
overall effectiveness of the various provisions to ensure 
that the payment of compensation to the victims of crime 
- and particularly the victims of terrorist crime - was 
adequate»121. This basic principle must constitute the basis 
on which any victim compensation scheme is designed.
Where the underlying yardstick is the loss of maintenance 
to a family, the death of one person may be deemed worth 
less than that of another, which highlights the issue of 
whether the test for compensation should be a subjective 
or an objective one. For example, a distinction is made 
between compensation for what a successful individual in 
the prime of his life with realistic expectations of continuing 
high earnings would receive, and compensatory payments 
made available in the case of an ailing older man with a 
long history of unemployment and poor job prospects. 
As a consequence of adopting the subjective test, the 
perception may be that one life has been deemed to be 
worth less than that of another: the compensation is for 
what has been lost in the material sense, and does not 
attempt to achieve any social objective. 
The contrasting approach, the objective test, is where 
the awarding of compensation reflects ethical and social 
justice, and would therefore rule out discrimination, for 
the benefit is based on equal rights for every casualty, 
regardless of income at the time of injury. This illustrates the 
reality that there are different ways of developing a policy 
for the payment of compensation. The different schemes 
in operation in Great Britain and in Northern Ireland 
highlight these two possible approaches to compensation. 
No scheme will ever be universally acceptable: wherever 
the line is drawn, some applicants will find somehow 
themselves disadvantaged122. 
2. An Applicable Model? 
National Compensation Funds 
2.1. Introduction
Public enforcement of penal law focuses on the offender 
rather than on the victim. The general phenomenon of 
the irrelevance of the victim can be traced historically to 
the shift from private legal actions to public enforcement 
schemes.123 For a long time in England for example, the 
State had no role in enforcing criminal actions; interested 
parties, usually the victim, would prosecute the offender 
and collect the resulting fine or award. As the State 
assumed a more prominent role in enforcing sanctions, 
the victim progressively disappeared from the prosecution 
process. Eventually, victims lost both the discretion to 
bring an action and a pecuniary stake in the outcome of 
the trial124.
The victim has in recent years gradually re-entered the 
public enforcement forum of penal law.125 Previously, 
victims could only seek reparation from the offender through 
the initiation of a private tort action. Victims may now be 
compensated either at the criminal sentencing stage, 
receiving payments directly from the convicted offender, or 
through a State victim compensation programme. These 
two alternatives within the public enforcement forum 
correspond to the distinction between compensation 
and reparation. While compensation seeks from another 
agency recognition of the loss endured, reparation directly 
addresses the individual or organisation that wronged the 
victim126. In relation to landmine victims, the question of 
seeking reparation from the perpetrators is not dealt with 
in this part as it has been discussed in the first part of 
this study. The analysis will instead focus on the issue of 
compensation, and the possibility of payment from a State 
agency for loss and injury suffered by landmine and UXO 
victims. 
This analysis concentrates on existing schemes that 
compensate victims of terrorism. While much of the 
literature on the subject focuses on the separate issues of 
moral reparation and truth and reconciliation, for many, the 
identity of the perpetrator is not known. The payment of 
compensatory government Funds to victims of crime is thus 
the only means by which the inadequacies of the past may 
be redressed127. This chapter will describe the workings of 
two recent compensation schemes in place for victims of 
terrorism, the first of which includes Guarantee Funds for 
Victims of Acts of Terrorism and Other Violations of the 
Law, a Fund set up in France in 1990128 following terrorist 
attacks in the country. The second scheme is the existing 
system in Northern Ireland, whereby victims of terrorism 
have the right to claim compensation from the Secretary 
of State for injury or death caused by terrorist offences. 
Both models will be examined with a view of establishing 
an equitable system to compensate landmine victims. The 
underlying purpose of compensation schemes must also 
121 Professor Desmond GREER, Compensation and Support for Victims of Crime, Fourteenth Report of the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights (1987). Emphasis 
in original. See http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/victims1.htm
122 Ibid.
123 Omri BEN-SHAHAR and Alon HAREL, Compensation of Victims of Crime: An Economic Analysis, Mimeo, presented at the American Law and Economics Society Annual 
Meeting, New York (2000).
124 W. MCDONALD, Toward a Bicentennial Revolution in Criminal Justice: The Return of the Victim, 13th American Criminal Law Review, 649, (1976).
125 Omri BEN-SHAHAR and ALON HAREL, op.cit.
126 Sandra PEAKE, Director of Wave Trauma Centre, contribution to the report of Sir Kenneth Bloomfield, Compensation and Reparation, Northern Ireland Victims Commission 
(1998). 
127 Omri BEN-SHAHAR and ALON HAREL, op.cit.
128 Author’s translation for Fonds de Guarantie des Victimes des Actes de Terrorisme et d’autres Infractions [Hereinafter FGTI].  See Law of 8 July 1983 Relative to the 
Creation of a Compensation Commission for Victims of Violations of the Law Established in all County Courts (Author’s translation for Loi du 8 juillet 1983 relative à la création 






















be highlighted, for the nature of the scheme will depend on 
its aim: whether it seeks to compensate fully for loss in the 
material sense, or whether the awarding of compensation 
would be a reflection of ethical and social justice.
2.2. Compensation Schemes for the Victims 
of Terrorism
2.2.1. Guarantee Fund for Victims of Acts of 
Terrorism and Other Violations of the Law 
(FGTI)129
• Judicial Basis for the FGTI
A compensation Fund for victims of terrorism in France 
was set up under Article 9 of the 1986 Law relating to 
the Fight Against Terrorism and Attacks Against the 
Foundations of the State130. Victims of terrorism are 
afforded the status of civilian victims of war131. 
Created in 1990, the FGTI regulates the compensation of 
victims of terrorism, as well as victims of other types of 
attack, including assault and rape132. The compensation 
regime is rooted in the 1986 Law, and payments are fixed 
by the FGTI in accordance with the victims. The FGTI 
is financed by a tax deduction from insurance contracts 
for goods133; for every contract in 2001, this contribution 
amounted to 3.35 euros134. Financial resources are 
maximised by the reimbursements received from those 
responsible for the attacks. 
• Applying to the FGTI
The Administrative Council of the FGTI is competent to 
qualify the act of terrorism.
The FGTI compensates every victim regardless of his/her 
nationality, for acts of terrorism perpetrated in France 
after 1 January 1985. For acts of terrorism perpetrated 
abroad, the FGTI solely compensates victims of French 
nationality. The State Prosecutor of the French Republic 
or the relevant embassy and diplomatic representatives 
are to inform the FGTI of an attack and of the identity of 
any victims, in which case the FGTI will contact the victims 
directly. Those who consider themselves a victim of an act 
of terrorism may address the FGTI directly. The victim or 
the next of kin have a time period of ten years from the 
date of the terrorist act to apply for compensation.
If conditions are met, the FGTI will compensate for the 
physical injury suffered by a person victim of an attack, 
or if the victim is deceased, the economic loss incurred 
by the next of kin, however benefits already paid by the 
State will be taken into account. Damage to goods is not 
covered by the FGTI135. 
• Compensation
The procedure for the payment of compensation is 
governed by Article 9 of the 1986 Law Relative to the 
Fight Against Terrorism and Attacks Against the 
Foundations of the State136. 
- The compensation procedure
Payments to victims depend on the injury according to their 
permanent nature or not. This latter is determined by medical 
expertise. In both instances, the costs are to be reduced 
from social welfare bodies. In the case of death, the offer of 
compensation will be presented to the next of kin. 
Compensation will be made for mental trauma, funeral 
expenses, and economic losses, and will be paid by social 
welfare bodies. 
- Options for the victim
Once the victim receives the offer of compensation, he/
she can accept it, discuss it further, or refuse it; in the case 
of refusal, the amount of compensation paid will then be 
determined judicially and the FGTI will be subject to the 
ruling of the tribunal. 
- Other rights
Beneficiaries of victims of terrorist acts are exempted from 
legal succession. Victims of acts of terrorism committed 
after 1 January 1985 will benefit from the civilian victims of 
war statute. The rights and advantages that arise from this 
statute are contained in the Code of Military Pensions for 
disability and Victims of War137, including the granting 
of a pension that cannot be held concurrently with any 
other, and access to free medical care and equipment. 
129 The following information is for illustrative purposes.  The law governing the FGTI is contained in the insurance code in articles; L 126-1 and L 126-2 , L 422-1 to L 422-5 
for the legislative, R 422-1 to R 422-10 for the executive, A 422-1 for ministerial orders.  The relative articles in the penal code are; 706- 3 to 706- 14, R 50- 1 to R 50- 28.  See 
Law of 6 July 1990 Relative to the Creation of the Guarantee Funds for Victims of Acts of Terrorism and Other Violations of the Law responsible for compensating victims of 
acts of terrorism and victims of other violations (attacks, assault, rape) [hereinafter Law of 6 July 1990]. Author’s translation for Loi du 6 juillet 1990 relative à la création du 
Fonds de Garantie des Victimes des Actes de Terrorisme et d’autres infractions (FGTI) chargé de l’indemnisation des victimes d’actes de terrorisme ainsi que les victimes 
d’autres infractions (agressions, coups de blessures, viols).
130 Law of 9 September 1986 Relative to the Fight Against Terrorism and Attacks Against the Security of the State (Author’s translation for Loi du 9 septembre 1986, relative 
à la lutte contre le terrorisme aux atteintes à la sûreté de l’Etat [hereinafter Law of  9 September 1986].
131 Law of 23 January 1990 Granting Civilian Victim of War Status to Victims of Terrorism (Author’s translation for Loi du 23 janvier 1990 accordant aux victimes des actes 
de terrorisme le statut de victimes civiles de guerre).
132 Law of 6 July 1990, op. cit.
133 Guarantee Fund for Victims of Acts of Terrorism and Other Violations of the Law (FGTI), available at http://www.fgti.fr
134 This contribution amounted to 22 FRF per contract in 2001. Learning about the FGTI, available at http://www.fgti.fr/connaitre.htm
135 Conditions for Submitting a case to the Court, available at http://www.fgti.fr/condterro.htm
136 Law of 9 September 1986, op. cit.
137 Author’s translation for Code des pensions militaires d’invalidité et des victimes de guerre. See MINISTRY OF FORMER COMBATANTS AND VICTIMS OF WAR, Guide-Barème des 
invalidités applicable au titre du code des pensions militaires d’invalidité et des victimes de la guerre, Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, édition de 1956.
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Every victim of a terrorist act will become a member of the 
National Veteran’s Office (ONAC), which provides both a 
disability card if the victim is disabled, and significant help 
with all administrative and social aspects138. 
- Proof
In addition to all conditions required and in support of 
his/her application, the victim has to prove and provide all 
relevant documents and information139. 
2.2.2. Northern Ireland
The Criminal Injuries Compensation (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1988140, which came into operation on 1 August 
1988, provides a right to claim compensation from the 
Secretary of State for injury or death caused by violent, 
including terrorist offences in Northern Ireland. The 
Compensation Agency carries out the Secretary of State’s 
functions in relation to the provision of compensation for 
criminal injuries under the legislation141.
• When is compensation payable?
Compensation is payable if a person is injured or killed 
in Northern Ireland as a direct result of either a violent 
offence or attempting to arrest a suspected offender, or to 
prevent the commission of an offence.
• Who can apply?
The victim usually makes an application for compensation. 
An application may also be made by any person 
responsible for the maintenance of the victim, or any 
relative of the dead victim for pecuniary loss for example 
(loss of earnings), or for expenses reasonably incurred as 
a direct result of the victim’s injury or death.
• What compensation will be paid?
Where a person has sustained a criminal injury, 
compensation may be paid for the following: expenses 
actually and reasonably incurred as a result of the injury 
- pecuniary loss resulting from the injury, including loss 
of earnings arising from incapacity to work, and for pain, 
suffering, and loss of amenities caused by the injury. In the 
case of the death of the victim, compensation may be paid 
for funeral expenses. 
There are significant respects in which compensatory 
arrangements in Northern Ireland differ from those in 
Great Britain. In brief, compensation from the State for 
victims of crime in Great Britain is now made by virtue of 
the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995142 under 
a tariff scheme, under which a special tariff is laid down 
for each kind of personal injury and for death. In Northern 
Ireland on the other hand, State compensation is governed 
by common law principles that seek to compensate the 
particular loss suffered by each individual victim. These 
principles are subject to interpretation and application by 
the courts accustomed to assessing the damages payable 
to ordinary accident victims in the common law context. 
Academics and other observers note that the Northern 
Ireland scheme is taken as a whole, generous because 
awards are not, as they are now in Great Britain, subject 
to a cap of £500,000. Considering the total amount given 
to the victims, an estimated £186 millions were paid: £26 
millions for the death of victims, £160 millions granted 
for non lethal arms. In assessing these figures, account 
must be taken of the fact that much of this compensation 
was paid a considerable time ago143. The Northern Ireland 
scheme of State compensation is the only European 
scheme that seeks to provide full compensation to all 
victims of violent crime, and is understood in civil action as 
damages involving personal injury and death144.
As a result, the system in Northern Ireland differs from 
that in Great Britain in that the former is implemented 
on a common law basis, and in that full awards can be 
made without the constraints of a statutory tariff, which 
fixes the amount of the award according to the category 
of the victim applying. In essence, the scheme in place 
in Northern Ireland corresponds to a subjective approach 
to compensation, while in Great Britain, an objective 
approach is employed.
2.3. Review of criminal injuries compensation
In response to the problems associated with State victim 
compensation schemes, a review of measures was proposed 
in 1998 by the Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner. The 
Review sought to advise the government on the adequacy 
of compensation arrangements in Northern Ireland in the 
light of the experiences of victims of terrorist violence145. 
It was also concerned with rectifying any identified 
shortcomings in a new statutory framework that provided 
for a system of criminal injury compensation in Northern 
Ireland. The Review took into account the ways in which 
other jurisdictions compensate victims of violent crime, and 
the need for fairness, equity, openness, and affordability. 
Marion Gibson and Professor Desmond Greer, a leading 
authority on the issue of victim compensation, conducted 
the Review. The recommendations of the Review could 
afford an interesting basis for a scheme to compensate 
landmine victims. 
138 Compensation, available at http://www.fgti.fr/indterro.htm.
139 Information Required, available at http://www.fgti.fr/piecterro.htm
140 Statutory Instrument 1988 No. 793 (N.I. 4). 
141 The Compensation Agency, Charter Statement, available at http://www2.nio.gov.uk/comp98.htm  See also The Compensation Agency, A Guide to Criminal Injuries 
Compensation in Northern Ireland, Northern Ireland Office. 
142 Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995 (c. 53). 
143 Sir Kenneth BLOOMFIELD, We Will Remember Them, Report of the Northern Ireland Victims Commissioner, para. 5.6, (1998).
144 Desmond GREER, Compensating Crime Victims – A European Survey, Freiburg: Max-Planck-Institut (1996).






















Report of the Review: main recommendations
The Review recommends a merging of the two systems 
applied in Northern Ireland and in Great Britain, and 
proposes a hybrid scheme where a new tariff approach 
is adopted for claims for less serious injuries146. There 
should be no payment for legal support in making a claim, 
according to the Review. Rather, assistance for applicants 
should be provided by Victim Support, and no deductions 
should be made from the award with respect to social 
security benefits or pensions147. 
However, claims resulting from serious injury and death 
should continue to be dealt with on the existing common 
law basis, with expenses paid directly to the applicant in 
successful cases. This means that in such cases, there is 
no fixed limit to the amount that can be awarded. 
The system should incorporate a new fast track 
and relatively informal review procedure within the 
Compensation Agency. This would allow people to have 
differences over their claims resolved without the need 
to appeal to the courts, and would offer other benefits, 
including speed, informality, and confidentiality. 
The Review also recommends that the scope of the 
scheme would be expanded to allow compensation to be 
paid to those who suffer a recognised psychiatric illness 
as a result of:
1. The death or injury of someone with whom they have a 
close tie of love and affection whether or not they where 
present at the scene of the incident; 
2. Fear of immediate physical harm; 
3. Assisting with rescue efforts at the time of the incident 
or in its immediate aftermath when these are not part of 
their professional duties; and
4. Assisting with rescue efforts in the course of their 
professional duties if they feared that someone with whom 
they had a close tie of love and affection had been injured 
or killed in the incident148.
According to the Review, a spouse, cohabitant, parent, and 
child of the deceased should be awarded a bereavement 
payment “[…] to acknowledge the grief and sorrow caused 
by the death, and the loss of non-pecuniary benefit (i.e. loss 
of care and guidance). An amount of £10,000 should be 
paid to a spouse or partner, and £5,000 to a parent or child, 
subject to an overall limit in each case of £50,000. 149” 
Again, the amount of the award should be fixed by statute 
and should not be at the discretion of the courts.
The Compensation Agency should, according to the 
Review, be given the authority to reopen a case where as 
a result of the injury there has been a material change in 
the victim’s medical condition or in his earning capacity, 
when compared to the basis on which compensation was 
originally assessed. 
Following the publication of the Review’s findings, the 
Victims Commissioner stated that “[t]he Review team was 
not at all persuaded that the wider support of victims yet 
enjoys an appropriate public expenditure priority. Society, 
in a troubled community, may need to think less about 
expensive capital projects and more about the restoration 
and development of its human capital150.” The following 
compensation for landmine victims proposals build on this 
invaluable development of human capital.
2.4. Application of National Compensation 
Scheme: Compensation Mechanism to Land-
mine Victims
A national compensation scheme for antipersonnel mine 
and UXO victims should enact the measures common to 
both the FGTI and to the victim compensation regime in 
Northern Ireland. The requirements regarding the time 
limit, proof, the right to appeal, and who can apply are 
broadly similar in Northern Ireland and in France. Both 
regimes have a fixed time limit between the event and 
the application for compensation, have strict requirements 
regarding proof, incorporate a right to appeal any offer of 
compensation, and operate under a similar definition of a 
‘victim.’ The schemes differ with regards to the amount of 
compensation paid, and the amount may be determined 
either subjectively or objectively. 
If we consider a compensatory scheme concerning 
landmine victims, referring to the latter, such a scheme 
should compensate therefore every landmine victim 
regardless of nationality for landmine accidents on 
national territory, and should also extend to nationals who 
are injured abroad. The relevant embassy or diplomatic 
representative should inform the scheme of the accident 
and of the identity of the victims, in which case the victims 
should be contacted directly. Also, the scheme should be 
subject to a limitation clause, whereby a maximum period 
would be allocated between the date of the accident and 
the application for compensation. The scheme should pay 
146 Professor Desmond GREER and Marion GIBSON, Review of Criminal Injuries Compensation (Northern Ireland), (1999), available at http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreelinks/
implemgov/990702b-nio.htm [hereinafter Review]. The Review recommends drawing up a Northern Ireland tariff based on levels of awards in Great Britain, for injuries up to 
level 10 of the British tariff (awards of up to £5,000 for example, scarring of lower limbs causing serious disfigurement, and dislocated shoulder with continuing disability).
147 Ibid.
148 Ibid., Recommendation Number 4, ‘Compensation for Psychiatric Injury.’  The Review does not specify whether the Recommendation would be enacted under a tariff 
scheme or under the common law. The concept of nervous shock was developed by the courts in Great Britain and due to the significant amount of caselaw in the area, 
it is suggested that a common law approach would be followed in Northern Ireland. Indeed, the test for the four categories of victim found in the Review derives from the 
judgements of Lord Lloyd in Page v. Smith [1995] 2 ALL ER 736, and Lord Wilberforce in McLoughlin v. O’Brien [1983] 1 AC 410. In Alcock v. Chief Constable of South 
Yorkshire Police [1991] 4 ALL ER 907, the concept of nervous shock was extended to incorporate ‘secondary victims’, including bystanders, who are not participants in the 
events that give rise to the claims, or may not have even been present.   
149 GREER and GIBSON, op. cit.
150 Sir Kenneth BLOOMFIELD, Press Release, 2 July 1999.
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a first instalment, at the latest one month after the request 
for compensation to aid the victim with initial costs. The 
scheme should then present the victim in writing with a 
definitive offer of compensation, at the latest three months 
after the receipt of proof of loss or injury from the victim. 
The victim would then be given fifteen days in which to 
consider the offer, and if he/she accepts, the scheme 
should pay the remainder of the compensation. If he/she 
rejects the offer, he/she ought to be able to bring his/her 
claim to a competent court151. 
The scheme should compensate for the physical, 
psychological, or sensorial injury suffered by the person, 
or if the person is deceased, the economic loss incurred 
by the next of kin. Those prevented from pursuing their 
normal activities as a result of social prejudice or any 
other human right violation should also be compensated. 
In the case of injury with no permanent after-effects, the 
scheme should compensate on the basis of medical 
certificates submitted, as well as on proof of costs and 
loss of earnings. In the case of injury with permanent after-
effects, the scheme should offer one or more provisional 
payments. Once the victim’s state of health has been 
stabilised, the scheme should give the victim a detailed 
breakdown of the proposed payments on the basis of the 
medical reports, and costs should be deducted from social 
welfare bodies. 
The scheme should be a hybrid one, combining a system 
of fixed awards for less serious injury with a more flexible 
approach for more serious injury, which is reflective of the 
Northern Ireland model. A fixed bereavement award should 
also be set, which would include a lump sum payment for 
the spouse and each child, subject to an overall limit152. 
Conclusion
The hypothetical model outlined above illustrates the 
workings of a hypothetical compensation fund for mines 
victims; it would provide the necessary support to those 
who mourn and to those who face the continuing effects of 
serious injury, both the injured themselves and those who 
care for them.
Existing victims of terrorism compensation mechanisms 
are useful in both identifying and developing 
compensation mechanisms for landmine victims. The 
simple transposition however, of the victims of terrorism 
compensation model to one for landmine victims does 
not address a number of problems, including the lack for 
example, of national infrastructure capable of providing 
medical reports and certificates, proof of costs, and 
loss of earnings. Lack of infrastructure may itself be 
problematic in countries most affected by landmines and 
their after-effects. Also, international aid will have to be 
solicited in order to supplement national Funds. Indeed, 
the countries most affected by antipersonnel mines and 
UXO are often classified among the poorest. Although 
this type of mechanism has been introduced in certain 
zones such as in Taiwan where the Ministry of Defence’s 
Compensation Committee for damages caused to civilians 
awards compensation to civilian mine victims153, not all 
countries are in a position to do so. Regarding this issue 
of funding, international compensation fund can appear 
more relevant.
3. An applicable model? the International 
Oil Pollution Compensation Funds
Although there is at present no specific international fund 
to compensate victims of antipersonnel mines, there 
are such funds to compensate victims of another type 
of pollution: pollution by persistent oil. In 1969, special 
rules were drawn up at international level to guarantee 
compensation for loss or damage suffered by victims of oil 
slicks. Two international Funds were created in 1971, then 
in 1992, to obtain compensation for the victims, even if the 
person responsible for the pollution could not be identified. 
The two Funds, the IOPC (International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Funds), are based on the principle of no-
fault liability. They are financed by the oil industries and 
run by the Member States. A protocol, not yet entered into 
force, has been adopted in London on May the 16th 2003, 
by the diplomatic conference of the IMO (International 
Maritime Organisation). It aims to institute a third degree 
of complementary compensation154. 
The comparison with the IOPC seems even more 
interesting in view of the fact that the oil industries, like 
the arms industries, are highly strategic sectors for States. 
The States’ interests, even if they are no longer the only 
producers and users of mines, and the firms’ interests 
are, in both cases, closely linked. In the same way, the 
non-pecuniary liability for the loss or damage caused by 
these two types of pollution could be shared by the firms 
and the producing and importing States, where it is not 
possible to associate other actors involved in the use of 
mines who are beyond any control owing to their lack of 
legal personality in the international context.
Taking this observation as our starting point, could it be 
possible to create an international compensation fund 
for victims of antipersonnel mines, funded by the arms 
industries? In other words, could the IOPC model be used 
to compensate victims of mines?
To reply to this question, it would seem necessary to take 
into account for each type of pollution (by antipersonnel 
mines or fuel oil), the legal and practical context, the different 
actors involved and the risks and potential advantages they 
151 Adapted from Conditions for Submitting a case to the Court, FGTI, available at www.fgti.fr/indterro.htm.
152 Adapted from GREER and GIBSON, op. cit. 
153 In February 2003, a total of 53  mine victims (families and survivors) are said to have received compensation by this means, and 57 requests for compensation are still 
being processed. Landmine Monitor report 2004, Washington : Human Rights Watch, 2004, p 1239.






















are seeking, as well as the logic underlying the creation of 
an international compensation fund.
3.1. Presentation of the IOPC: international 
compensation mechanism to deal with the 
risk of oil pollution.
Following the Torrey-Canyon oil slick problem, the first 
major example of pollution that affected Brittany in 
1967, the international community decided to set up an 
international compensation mechanism based on the 
principle of strict liability (no-fault liability) together with a 
compulsory insurance system. 
In international law, the principle of no-fault liability (strict 
liability or else risk liability) describes rules governing 
compensation for loss or damage when liability can be 
evoked in the absence of fault.
The main objective of the new international rules governing 
compensation for oil pollution is to ensure the “reasonable 
and prompt” settlement of claims for damages owing to 
pollution. According to the new rules, the no-fault liability is 
incumbent upon owners of oil tankers, up to a certain limit. 
When this limit is exceeded, the oil recipients (primarily 
oil companies) pay the difference, up to a higher limit, 
through the intermediary of an international Fund to which 
they contribute. The new rules are therefore based on 
the established principle of liability shared between the 
owners of oil tankers and oil interests. 
3.1.1. The legal framework: a system of 
shared liability in an international legal fra-
mework
According to the official definition, “The International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Funds 1971 and 1992 (IOPC 
Funds) are two intergovernmental organisations which 
provide compensation for oil pollution damage resulting 
from spills of persistent oil from tankers155.”
They have been created in the framework of international 
conventions156. As the 1971 Convention was terminated 
on 24th May 2002, and the 1971 Fund has to be liquidated 
in the coming months, we will limit our analysis to the 1992 
Fund.
The 1969 and 1992 Conventions on Civil Liability 
govern the liability of ship-owners for oil pollution damage. 
They lay down the principle of their strict liability (i.e. their 
no-fault liability). Consequently, the IOPC’s main function 
is to offer additional compensation to victims of oil pollution 
in the Member States, when such victims cannot be totally 
compensated according to the terms of the Conventions 
on Civil Liability. Anyone who has suffered pollution 
damage (including clean-up costs) in a member State, 
for example individuals, companies, local authorities or 
States can claim compensation.
• The provisions of the 1992 Civil Liability Convention
The Civil Liability Convention imposes strict liability on the 
ship-owner for pollution damage caused by the escape or 
discharge of persistent oil from his/her ship. The owner is 
thus liable even in the absence of fault on his or her part, 
except if he/she proves that the damage resulted from an 
act of war, a grave natural disaster, an act of sabotage 
committed by a third party or negligence on the part of the 
public authorities responsible for maintaining lights and 
other navigational aids.
This provision was designed to provide better 
compensation for victims, who can bring an action against 
the person who is in theory the most solvent. If the ship-
owner is not responsible for the accident, he/she can then 
take action against those he/she deems responsible.
A ship-owner can nonetheless limit his/her liability 
according to the ship’s tonnage157. 
The ship-owner is deprived of the right to limit his/her liability 
“only if it is proved that the pollution damage resulted from 
the ship-owner’s personal act or omission, committed with 
the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such damage would probably result”158.
Finally, under the 1992 Convention, claims for 
compensation can only be made against the official owner 
of the tanker concerned. The Convention prohibits claims 
for compensation against the owner’s agents, the pilot, 
the charterer, the ship’s manager or operator, or against 
any person carrying out salvage operations or taking 
preventive measures.
• The IOPC’s complementary role
The IOPC compensates the victims of oil pollution damage 
when they do not obtain full compensation under the Civil 
Liability Convention, either because the ship-owner is 
exempt from liability (see previous item); or because he/
she is financially incapable of meeting his/her obligations 
and his/her insurance is insufficient to satisfy the claims 
for compensation; or else because the damage exceeds 
155 IOPC, Annual Report 2002, International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, Report on the Activities of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds in 2002, 
London, United Kingdom, (2003), 182 pages, p.14.
156 The first Fund, called the ‘1971 Fund’, was created in 1978, in the framework of two international Conventions: the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil 
Pollution Damage and the 1971 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage. These two Conventions 
were modified in 1992 by two protocols, which led to the creation of a second compensation Fund, called the ‘1992 Fund’. The modified Conventions, i.e. the 1992 
Convention on Civil Liability and the Convention on the Establishment of the 1992 Fund, came into force on 30 May 1986.
157 The amount of compensation due by an owner is limited to 3 million SDR (Special Drawing Rights. 1 SDR represents about 1.42 euros) for a ship not exceeding 5 000 
units of gross tonnage. To this are added 420 SDR for each additional unit of tonnage for ships with a tonnage between 5 000 and 140 000 units of tonnage. For ships with 
a tonnage equal to or higher than 140 000 units of tonnage, the limit is 59.7 million SDR. So that the owner is constantly able to take on his/her liability, he/she is obliged by 
the 1992 Convention to be insured by the “Protection and Indemnity Club” or another specialized insurance company.
158 IOPC, Annual Report 2002, International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, Report on the Activities of the International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds in 2002, 
London, United Kingdom, (2003), 182 pages, page 16.
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the limit of the ship-owner’s liability under the Civil Liability 
Convention.
The Convention does not provide for total compensation 
for the damage suffered, but for fair and reasonable 
compensation, because of the amounts of money at 
stake. It thus sets a maximum amount for each incident.
The compensation paid by the 1971 Fund for a given 
incident was limited to an overall amount of 60 million 
SDR, which included the sum paid by the ship-owner. The 
1992 Fund was created partly to satisfy the need to raise 
compensation limits. At present, the maximum amount 
paid by the 1992 Fund for a given incident is 135 million 
SDR. This limit has been raised of 50,37% to 203 million 
SDR (302 million USD) as from 1 November 2003159.
If the total amount of claims approved by the Fund for a 
given incident exceeds the total amount of compensation 
available, then the compensation given to each claimant 
is reduced proportionally, so as to treat all claimants in the 
same way (principle of equality of the victims).
This compensation system applies to pollution damage 
suffered in the waters of the countries parties to the 
Conventions, wherever the accident occurred, wherever 
the oil tanker comes from and whoever owns the oil. Any 
individual, association, firm, public or private body, local 
authority or State having suffered damage by pollution in a 
Member State can claim compensation. The costs actually 
incurred and the damage actually suffered because of oil 
pollution may give rise to compensation. 
• The concept of ‘pollution damage’
‘Pollution damage’ is defined, in the 1992 Convention, as 
being any loss or damage caused by contamination. As 
regards damage to the environment, other than the loss of 
income resulting from the modification of the environment, 
it is specified that compensation is limited to the cost of 
“reasonable measures actually taken or to be taken to 
improve the state of the contaminated environment”. 
Pollution damage also includes the cost of “reasonable” 
preventive measures, that is measures taken to avoid or 
minimise pollution damage. 
As regards ecological damage, the IOPC statutes are 
clear: the Fund compensates costs incurred, and not the 
damage established by a statistical model. Claims for 
compensation regarding changes to the environment are 
only accepted “if the claimant has sustained an economic 
loss that can be quantified in monetary terms”. Ecological 
damage is therefore not taken into account as such. 
Only “reasonable measures of reinstatement” can be 
compensated, and provided that their cost is “reasonable” 
and proportional to the results “likely to be achieved”.
3.1.2. Structure and financing system: a 
Fund run by the Member States and financed 
by the oil industries 
• A Fund run by Member States’ representatives…
The 1992 IOPC is an intergovernmental organisation 
with a legal personality under international law. The 
Administrator of the Fund is its legal representative. This 
has been Måns Jacobsson’s function since the creation 
of the Fund. It is also composed of an Assembly made 
up of representatives of member states and an executive 
committee.
The IOPC cooperates with numerous intergovernmental 
organisations and international non-governmental 
organisations, as well as bodies created by private interests 
involved in maritime oil transport (owners of oil tankers, oil 
companies, specialized insurance companies, etc.). 
In April 2004, the 1992 Fund was composed of 85 states 
members.
This number should increase in the coming months 
because of the forthcoming liquidation of the 1971 Fund. It 
should be pointed out that the Member States, though they 
are from both ‘industrialized’ countries and ‘developing’ 
countries, are all coastal States, and therefore they are all 
possible victims of an oil slick. 
• … and financed by the oil industries
The IOPC is financed by the annual contributions paid by 
any person (government authority or company) having 
received more than 150 000 tons of crude oil or heavy fuel 
oil in the ports or terminals of a Member State during the 
calendar year in question, following its maritime transport. 
The contributions are calculated by the Secretariat of the 
Fund on the basis of oil reports drawn up by the States, 
according to the estimated compensation payments and 
administrative costs for the coming year, and voted by 
the Assembly. They are paid directly to the IOPC by the 
contributors. As the payments made by the 1992 Fund for 
compensation claims vary considerably from one year to 
the next, the level of the annual contributions to be paid is 
also very variable. 
The main contributors are the oil companies in 
industrialized nations. In 1999, 86% of total contributions 
came from 10 countries. In 2001, 79% came from 9 
countries: Japan, Italy, Korean Republic, the Netherlands, 
France, United Kingdom, Singapore, Spain and Canada.
159 Moreover, the future protocol intends to multiply by five the compensation ceiling for victims to 1 billion Euro (1.115 billion USD), or 750 million DTS. The approval of the 
complementary Fund is not obligatory but opened to each state party to the 1992 Fund. The protocol would enter into force three months after having been ratified by at least 
eight states that have received 450 million hydrocarbon tons submitted to contribution during one civil year. Finally, the Fund would only compensate for damages from pollution 























The IOPC’s procedure is based on an amiable settlement 
of the damage sustained by victims. However, if the 
claimants are not satisfied with the amount they have 
been granted, they may refer the case to the competent 
national court where the accident took place so as to 
obtain fairer compensation. An action must be brought 
against the defendant within three years of the date of 
pollution damage, or within six years of the date of the 
incident having caused the pollution.
Outside this timeframe, claimants lose definitively their 
right to bring an action. 
Claims for compensation must be submitted to the 
IOPC or to the ship-owner’s insurance company, with 
documentary evidence. The claimants are responsible for 
quantifying and proving their loss. The Fund cooperates 
closely with the insurance companies to settle claims, and 
generally carries out an investigation into the event and 
an assessment of the damage. The claims’ merits from a 
technical viewpoint are studied by experts appointed by 
the IOPC.
The general criteria for admissibility of claims are the 
following160:
- any expense or loss must actually have been incurred;
- any expense must relate to measures which are deemed 
reasonable and justifiable;
- there must be a link of causation between the 
expense/loss or damage covered by the claim and the 
contamination caused by the spill;
- the economic loss must be quantifiable.
Claims for compensation for pure economic loss (i.e. loss 
of income suffered by people whose property has not 
been contaminated) are only admissible if they refer to 
loss or damage caused by contamination: the cause must 
be pollution, and not the incident itself. Moreover, there 
must be a “reasonable degree of proximity”161 between the 
contamination and the loss suffered by the claimant.
 
Finally, to be admissible, measures aimed at preventing 
pure economic loss (a publicity campaign for example) 
must have a “reasonable” cost that is not “disproportionate” 
to the damage or loss which they intend to mitigate. The 
measures must be “appropriate” and offer “a reasonable 
prospect of being successful”. 
The IOPC thus lays great stress on the concept of 
“reasonable measure”, so as to avoid abuse.
According to its statutes, responses must be adapted and 
proportionate to the loss. 
As regards preventive measures and clean-up operations, for 
example, the Claims Manual edited by the IOPC specifies: 
“The 1992 Fund compensates the cost of reasonable 
measures taken to combat the oil at sea, to defend sensitive 
resources and to clean shorelines and coastal installations. 
The relationship between these costs and the benefits derived 
or expected, should be reasonable162”.
• a system that removes liability
In fact the IOPC acts as a mutual risk system, inasmuch 
as it relieves the operators of vehicles transporting oil 
of direct liability. These operators contribute in exactly 
the same way to the Fund, whether they have had any 
accidents or not, and whatever state their ships are in. 
Besides the advantage, for the potential persons 
responsible for an oil slick, of knowing their legal 
obligations and exemption from liability in advance, this 
system is interesting in that the two circles that create the 
risk (the oil transport industry and the industry that refines 
and treats the product) suffer the consequences of the 
pollution. The “polluter pays” principle is thus respected. 
Moreover, the channelling of liability to the ship-owner has 
the advantage of encouraging the designated responsible 
person to take the necessary precautions and to take out 
the necessary insurance contracts.
 
Finally, it should be recalled that the IOPC is the product 
of States, and not an insurance system set up by oil 
companies. The rules of the game are set by the States. 
In principle, it is up to them to change the rules so as to 
make good the imperfections of the system. We should 
however qualify this remark: the States, which are both 
taxpayers and tax collectors, have an ambiguous role in 
the mechanism. Thus, it sometimes happens that far from 
just making sure that the contributing industries pay levies 
to the IOPC, the States fight for these industries’ interests 
(which are also indirectly their own). 
3.2. Application of model: Compensation Me-
chanism to Landmine Victims 
The IOPC was set up in the framework of a strategy 
for supervising a thriving trade, the oil trade, to provide 
protection from the risk of oil slicks, which is an accepted 
risk though evidently not sought-after.
It now constitutes international regulation governing 
compensation and intended to provide protection from the 
risks inherent in the maritime transport of oil, a pacific and 
legally recognized economic activity. 
On the contrary, antipersonnel mines are placed 
voluntarily by actors who are totally aware of what they 
are doing and who use risk in their military strategies. The 
160 IOPC 92, Claims Manual, op. cit., June 1998, p. 17-18.
161 Ibid, p. 25. The criterion of reasonable proximity includes the geographic proximity between a claimant’s activity and the contamination, the degree to which a claimant 
was economically dependent on an affected resource, the extent to which a claimant had alternative sources of supply or business opportunities, and the extent to which a 
claimant’s business formed an integral part of the economic activity within the area affected by the pollution.
162 Ibid, pp 18-19.
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causes of mine pollution are thus very different from those 
of oil pollution. We cannot therefore make an immediate 
comparison between the IOPC and a possible international 
compensation Fund for damage by antipersonnel mines. 
Nonetheless, from this viewpoint the system is rather 
interesting.
3.2.1. Pollution damage: damage linked to 
the use of mines
In the framework of the IOPC, the system aimed at 
compensating for damage caused to the environment.
Anti-personnel mines can also have serious consequences 
for the environment. Consequently, one could imagine a 
State whose territory had been mined by another State 
availing itself of a violation of international environmental 
law before an international court so as to obtain 
compensation163. 
In fact, international environmental law constitutes a 
major legal base in the framework of the fight against 
mines. However, though the damage caused by maritime 
pollution affects mainly the environment and indirectly man 
via a loss of earnings that may have been occasioned by 
the damage, mines on the other hand affect man directly. 
That being the case, using environment law to obtain 
compensation for victims of mines would amount to 
leaving aside compensation for the physical harm suffered 
by victims of mines, without totally excluding it. 
In the sphere of mines, environmental law must go hand in 
hand with human rights and humanitarian law.
 
3.2.2. The transposition of a system based 
on no-fault liability
The system of no-fault liability seems very appropriate 
when dealing with mines. Though accepting the principle 
of no-fault liability in this domain may seem shocking from 
a moral point of view, it nonetheless offers the advantage 
of avoiding situations of conflict (in the search for liability 
or fault) which would only result in harming the victim 
even more or reducing his/her chances of obtaining 
compensation. 
The search for liability poses a number of problems:
• In the framework of the IOPC, the actors involved can 
be clearly identified: ship-owners and oil companies, and 
possibly States.
In the framework of mines, the actors cannot always be 
identified. Apart from the States and arms firms, there are 
actors difficult to identify (such as rebel groups, opposition 
governments etc.) and this makes action to obtain 
damages more difficult.
• The IOPC is based on a system of shared liability164, on 
Conventions establishing the civil liability of the owners. 
The compensation Fund is only used to supplement 
compensation.
On the other hand, those responsible for accidents caused 
by mines are not legally responsible as are the ship-
owners in the case of an oil slick. There are no legal rules 
governing the liability of users of mines other than the 
Ottawa Treaty and, in certain circumstances, the Geneva 
Conventions and Additional Protocol I165. 
• If the victim cannot take court action against the person 
having used a mine, he/she would find it difficult to claim 
compensation from the producer, firstly because it is 
difficult to prove where a mine has come from (especially 
when it is handmade) and also because the victim is not 
often in a situation to be able to do so.
The possible involvement of firms which produce 
antipersonnel mines and UXO or which used to produce 
those weapons in the financing of an international 
compensation fund is even more problematic because the 
mine industry is made up of manufacturers of components 
rather than mine manufacturers as such. Moreover, some 
mine components (powder, lighters, release mechanisms 
etc.) are not specific to the military industry, they are also 
used by civil industry. The manufacturer of components’ 
share of political liability is therefore difficult to assess. 
• Moreover, the use of anti-personnel mines and their 
production have only been considered illicit under 
international law since the signature of the Ottawa treaty, 
and only as regards the signatory States. Consequently, 
what international legal basis may be used to claim 
compensation from a mine producer for the period 
preceding the treaty, or from a producer belonging to a 
non-signatory State? One could invoke the strict liability 
of States, which does not depend on the commission of 
an illicit act under international law. However, according to 
the general international law, strict liability is almost never 
applied at international level166. 
It thus seems difficult to set up a compensation fund 
for victims of mines, to be used in addition to prior 
proceedings that establish the offender’s liability. On 
the other hand, we could envisage a compensation 
fund to be used after exhaustion of domestic remedies 
(for example to compensate victims of crimes in those 
countries having established such remedies) or else in 
addition to compensation already received but considered 
insufficient. 
163 See para. 1.5 of the first part of this study.
164 The risk liability of the ship owners is introduced by the 1992 Civil Liability Convention, which lays down the principle of strict liability for ship owners and creates a system 
of compulsory liability insurance. Regarding to landmines, one would have to think to a similar convention introducing the liability of mine manufactures.
165 See first part of this study.






















3.2.3. What legal foundation in the absence 
of international universally accepted rules 
governing the use of mines?
As we have seen, the IOPC fits into an elaborate set of 
international rules governing the oil trade. We should thus 
determine on what legal foundation a compensation Fund 
for victims of mines could be set up.
For the moment, the Convention on the prohibition of the 
use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel 
mines and on their destruction (the Ottawa Treaty) 
postulates a clear unequivocal ban on the production and 
use of anti-personnel mines. 
At first glance, it would seem logical to include a 
compensation Fund in the framework of the Treaty, 
especially since the States have committed themselves to 
providing assistance to victims of mines. 
Furthermore, the States Parties are also partly responsible 
for accidents that take place after they have ratified 
the Treaty, since they have neglected their duty to take 
precautions (delimiting mined zones, preventing accidents 
etc). Indeed, the Member States of the Convention have 
committed themselves to taking a number of measures 
to prevent anti-personnel mines from being a continual 
threat to the civil population. If these measures are 
not taken and an accident ensues, the State on whose 
territory the accident takes place could be accused of 
committing a fault.
Nevertheless, the limits of this postulate are easy to see. 
Insofar as the mine trade is only illegal for the signatory 
States of the Ottawa Convention, only these countries 
would be liable under its dispositions, and this could 
dissuade other States from joining the Treaty and thus 
limit the number of victims who have access to the Fund. 
Establishing such a Fund in the framework of the Ottawa 
Treaty would exclude the financial contribution of States 
not parties to the treaty and thus limit the available 
resources.
If the principle of no-fault liability is accepted in the sphere 
of mines, would it not be preferable to set up a Fund 
independent from the Ottawa procedure and based on 
international solidarity?
3.2.4. The contribution system or the difficulty 
of involving the arms industries in a Fund 
based on solidarity 
• A Fund created by the States, who join on a voluntary 
basis 
Would governments be ready to create a compensation 
Fund for victims of mines based on the IOPC model? 
In the case of oil pollution, governments, like the oil 
companies, are very interested in becoming members of 
the IOPC since, in the event of a catastrophe, the pressure 
of public opinion is such that they are obliged to intervene 
and spend money on repairing the damage caused and 
on compensating the victims. The IOPC system enables 
them to have these expenses reimbursed and to satisfy 
most of the victims’ claims for compensation. They are 
thus able to respond to the pressure of public opinion. 
In the case of mine pollution, however, the countries 
likely to finance a compensation Fund are not affected 
on their territory by the problem of anti-personnel mines. 
Consequently, the only advantage for these countries of 
creating and financing an international compensation 
Fund is to relieve the pressure of public opinion. 
The example of class action and particularly the out of 
court settlement-won by Kenyan victims of mines against 
the British Government in 2002 enables us to qualify this 
remark167. The UK Ministry of Defence agreed to grant 
compensation to the Kenyan nationals for the damage 
caused by mines used by the British army during military 
training and left behind in Kenya. This example constitutes 
an interesting legal precedent, but it remains a unique 
case for the moment. 
As for the countries most affected, who would benefit 
greatly from a compensation Fund, they are often 
in difficult economic situations, and do not have the 
necessary resources to finance such a Fund. 
The States’ contribution to the Fund should therefore be 
made on a voluntary basis in the name of international 
solidarity. 
• The arms industries’ contribution
The IOPC is of real benefit not only to victims and States 
but also to ship-owners and oil companies. The ship-
owners are better protected in the case of an oil slick since 
they have limited liability, the amount of compensation is 
limited and they are able to get insurances.
The IOPC also functions as an insurance system for which 
the oil industries accept to pay, because it rids them of any 
liability in the case of an accident. If such a system did not 
exist, the oil companies could be held responsible for the 
damage caused by an oil slick and would undergo the risk 
of having to pay the compensation set by law or by public 
opinion in the affected country.
First of all, in the case of mines, it must be underlined that it 
is essentially the States who buy the element responsible 
for the damage, and not the industries. Furthermore, the 
industries cannot be asked to finance a Fund because of a 
risk of pollution during transport. Therefore, in the case of 
anti-personnel mines it can be argued that the States have 
a much greater political responsibility than the industries 
167 See part one of the study concerning the right to reparation (2.3.2 Collective claims).
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that produce, or have produced, anti-personnel mines 
under the States’ authority. The exception is of course 
handmade mines, which are made privately. Even so, the 
mine-producing industries’ participation in an international 
compensation Fund can be justified insofar as these 
industries have benefited by the trade in anti-personnel 
mines. This is what the NGOs actively fighting mines 
express in article 37 of the Bad Honnef Declaration168: 
«For the provision of additional Funds, the principle that 
the polluter pays should be considered: companies that 
have profited from the development, production and sale 
of mines could pay into a reparation Fund»169. 
It will be noticed that the Bad Honnef Declaration refers 
to industries that used to produce anti-personnel mines. 
Indeed, as mentioned, mine production and trade in mines 
are now prohibited by the Ottawa Convention. 
The figures available do not relate to recognized trade in 
mines, but just suspicions of such trade. In the last few 
years, the Landmine Monitor has found no proof of the 
import or export of anti-personnel mines by States parties 
or signatory States, nor by any non-signatory State. It 
seems that trade in antipersonnel mines is now reduced 
to a limited amount of illicit trafficking170.
 
A possible compensation Fund cannot be financed on 
the basis of the present transfer of anti-personnel mines. 
Consequently, we should consider the transfer of mines 
retrospectively or else take into account the transfer of 
arms as a whole. Moreover, the latter solution can be 
justified if we consider the mines problem as part of 
the larger problem of unexploded munitions and other 
explosive remnants of war.
 
The Fund could be provisioned by a tax levied on the arms 
industries for their sale of arms. 
Assuming that a number of States agree to introduce a 
tax on arms production (or their sale) in order to finance 
an international compensation Fund, it is very likely 
that the arms industries would lobby against it. We can 
imagine a system in which the States are obliged to pay a 
contribution to the Fund proportional to their production of 
mines, their available stocks and more generally their arms 
production, while leaving them to choose the sources that 
are to finance the contribution. 
We are once again in a totally different context to that of the 
IOPC. The industries that finance this Fund are situated in 
countries liable to have an oil slick in their waters, and 
therefore likely to call on the IOPC. In the case of victims 
of mines, the situation is different. The industries likely to 
finance an international compensation Fund – that is, by 
hypothesis, arms industries situated mostly in western 
so-called ‘developed’ countries – are not affected on their 
territory by the problem of anti-personnel mines. 
Consequently, there is no direct advantage for the arms 
industries of financing a compensation Fund, since victims 
of mines are mostly citizens in far-off countries who have 
very limited means of threatening them with court action 
and cannot bring any public pressure to bear.
 
Thus, if the ‘developed’ countries were to envisage 
making the arms industries finance a Fund in the name 
of international solidarity, then they would come under 
pressure from these industries and their lobbies.
The arms industries are made up of organized active and 
powerful pressure groups.
Among these industries, the percentage of the annual 
turnover represented by arms sales varies considerably. 
For example, in 1998, among the 10 main international firms 
producing arms, the percentage of total sales represented 
by arms sales ranged from 14% to 77%. Insofar as a 
number of these industries also make products for the 
“civil” market, the pressure of public opinion (especially 
via boycotts) may prove effective. 
If an association of victims of mines were to institute 
legal action against producers of mines in the United 
States171 and won their case in the American courts, the 
compensation obtained could be paid into a Fund for 
victims of mines.
In short, three ways of financing a Fund could be 
envisaged: 
- a contribution from States and others to show their 
solidarity;
- the payment of a tax on arms sales;
- compensation paid by the arms industries following 
decisions by the courts. 
3.2.5. The victim’s compensation. What defi-
nition? And for what compensation?
Damage caused by mines is in no way comparable to that 
caused by maritime pollution.
Therefore, the harm suffered is more difficult to quantify 
than in the case of maritime pollution. 
If the Fund was situated outside the Ottawa procedure, 
it should ideally take into account all direct victims, 
past, present and future of anti-personnel mines or 
168 In June 1997, experts from all over the world gathered in Bad Honnef, Germany, with the aim of defining the principles to be followed in the action programmes against 
mines. Following the Conference, a Declaration was adopted by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines. 
169 GERMAN INITIATIVE TO BAN LANDMINES, Mine Action Programme from a development-oriented point of view (‘The Bad Honnef Framework’), 1999 [1997], p. 9.
170 We should emphasize however that, for the first time in its history, the Landmine Monitor received proof recently of the transfer of anti-personnel mines between Iran 
and Afghanistan (see ICBL, Toward a mine-free world,  Landmine Monitor Report 2002, NY: HRW, August 2002, p. 7-8). Iran had instituted a moratorium on the export of 
anti-personnel mines in 1997.






















unexploded ordnances. It should cover both material and 
economic damage. Depending on funding possibilities 
and negotiations between States, it could be extended to 
the indirect victims of mines and UXO, and compensates 
psychological harm. 
As a minimum, the Fund should compensate the direct 
civil victims of anti-personnel mines, at the present time 
and in the future. The amount of compensation should be 
set according to the physical “damage” sustained by the 
victim and the effects on the victim’s family situation and 
economic situation.
In the case of communities affected by the presence of 
mines, collective compensation could be granted. 
One can also wonder if there would be compensation for 
victims of mines who do not belong to the Member States of 
the Fund. States have some responsibility for the presence 
of mines on their territory. Opening up the Fund to the victims 
of States not parties would mean ridding these States of 
their responsibility for the problem. Nonetheless, the States’ 
contribution to the Fund should not be made to the detriment 
of national compensation mechanisms for victims of mines. 
The Fund should only be used as a last resort. In other 
terms, as far as possible, and in view of his/her country’s 
legal system, the victim (or his/her representative) will also 
have to provide proof that he/she has first exhausted all 
possible domestic remedies.
Could it be possible to allow only Member State nationals 
to refer cases to the Fund, whatever the amount of the 
State’s contribution? Could it be morally acceptable 
therefore that victims be treated differently according to 
the State to which they belong?
It would be advisable to ensure that the total amount of 
compensation claims did not exceed the total amount of 
available resources, in the same way as the IOPC. To 
avoid a first come first served situation, the Fund could set 
periods of eligibility for claims and allocate compensation 
on a yearly basis.
 
3.2.6. The Fund’s structure and how to refer 
cases to it
We can imagine the creation of a compensation Fund in 
the form of an intergovernmental organisation with a legal 
personality, like the IOPC. The Fund’s administrator would 
be designated by the Member States.
The Fund, like the IOPC, could have appeal procedures 
referred to it against decisions regarding compensation. 
Nonetheless, to ensure real efficiency it would be 
advisable to introduce cooperation mechanisms between 
the Fund and the different actors involved in assisting 
victims of antipersonnel mines and UXO. 
For example, to facilitate access to compensation for 
everyone, one could imagine a third party referring cases 
to the Fund or instituting proceedings (providing proof 
of the link between the victim and mines as well as the 
information needed to determine the total amount of 
compensation), an organisation empowered to do so and 
recognized in this field.
3.2.7. Analysis of the funding needs 
In the case of the IOPC, the contributions requested of 
oil companies to provision the Fund in the last four years 
were of between 40 and 50 million pounds sterling per 
year, that is about 62 to 78 million dollars. If we base our 
calculations on the price of 25 dollars per barrel of oil, we 
can estimate that the total yearly amount of contributions 
for all ‘contributing’ companies is about 2.5 to 3.1 
million barrels, or the equivalent of the daily production 
of a company such as Total Fina Elf. Under these 
circumstances, we can understand that the oil companies 
have accepted the system without complaining. It seems 
that even if these amounts were no longer sufficient to 
cover all the damage caused by oil slicks, the IOPC has a 
certain leeway for raising contributions.
If the amount of compensation for the damage caused 
by mines were of this order, it is possible that the arms 
industries would not be opposed to the setting-up of a 
Fund similar to the IOPC, when faced with the pressure of 
public opinion. But would it be morally acceptable? 
The working group for assistance to victims of the ICBL 
(International Campaign to Ban Landmines) estimates the 
costs associated with the rehabilitation of survivors of mine 
accidents for the whole of their lives at 9 000 dollars per 
survivor172. The number of survivors of mines throughout 
the world is calculated to be more than 300 000. The 
amount necessary to assist them with rehabilitation would 
thus be about 2.7 billion dollars173. This is a rather rough 
estimate that does not take into account the fact that a 
number of victims have already benefited from different 
forms of assistance. Compensation corresponding to 
loss of income of victims of mines is not included in this 
estimate.
Nevertheless, if we compare this with the amount of income 
from arms sales between 1996 and 2000, which amounts 
to 102 billion euros174, we can see that a tax on these sales 
would be largely sufficient to provision the Fund.
According to the Landmine Monitor 2003, 11 700 new 
victims of mines and UXO were recorded during 2002. 
Although this figure is probably lower than the real figure 
(there are an estimated 15 000 to 20 000 new victims 
every year), it nonetheless enables us to calculate the 
number of claims that the Fund might have to manage 
every year.
 
172 HANDICAP INTERNATIONAL, Anti-personnel mines today! Synthesis of the 1999 Report, Paris: L’esprit frappeur, (1999), p.89.
173 This estimate is based, inter alia, on the fact that amputated adults need new artificial limbs and orthopaedic equipment every three to five years, and children, every six 
months. Providing a survivor of a mine accident with an artificial limb costs between 100 and 3 000 dollars. 
174 Figures provided by the SIPRI in 2001 (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute).
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The total amount of compensation over one year could 
thus be around 105 300 000 dollars (just for rehabilitation). 
In 2002, arms sales throughout the world amounted to 
more than 16 billion euros (about 14.5 billion dollars). 
So contribution needs would be about 0.65% of income 
from arms sales. 
At the meeting of the G8 in May 2003, the Heads of State 
mentioned the possibility of introducing a tax on arms 
sales for the benefit of a world fund against hunger. This 
is a very positive initiative, but using these funds to benefit 
victims of mines would offer the advantage of confronting 
the arms producing industries with their responsibilities 
and of applying the principle that the polluter pays. 
The IOPC is an interesting model as regards 
compensation. The nature of the activity in question is 
fundamentally different to that of mines, and the model 
can therefore not be transposed immediately.  
Nonetheless, the application of the polluter pays principle 
is very relevant in these two domains. 
The importance of the needs in term of compensation 
constitute a significant limit to the applicability of a model 
based on the IOPC. Therefore, it is interesting to study an 
other model which would focus on assistance to landmines 
victims rather than compensation. 
This can be the case of a model offered by the United 
Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture.
4. An applicable model? the United Nations 
voluntary Funds for victims of torture
We underlined before that  responsibility and means are 
two major points in establishing a compensation fund. It 
is a long time process to make the idea of a victim’s right 
to reparation and compensation admitted. As the question 
of reparation raises a lot of problems, other models of 
victim assistance could give solutions. The United Nations 
Voluntary Fund for Victims of Torture is a model worth 
studying in this purpose.
In 1981, the United Nations General Assembly passed a 
resolution establishing the United Nations Voluntary Fund 
for Victims of Torture, which aims to provide humanitarian 
assistance to victims of torture and their families175.  
The objective of this study is to analyse how relevant it 
would be to transpose this model to the mines sector.
The comparison with the Fund for torture victims looks to 
be a particularly interesting one as in both cases we are 
dealing with civilians who, in violation of humanitarian law 
and human rights, have suffered physical, psychological 
and socio-economic harm, which often remains 
unpunished. In both cases, the use of torture and the use 
of landmines can form part of a strategy for creating a 
climate of terror amongst the civilian population.
On the basis of this observation, is it feasible to create an 
international Fund for the victims of landmines along the 
same lines as the Fund for victims of torture? What are 
the advantages and disadvantages of such a model when 
applied to the sector of antipersonnel mines?
To answer these questions, for each of these types of 
harms (antipersonnel mines / UXO and torture), one 
need to take into account the legal and practical context, 
the different stakeholders involved, their objectives and 
the reasoning behind the creation of an international 
compensation Fund. 
4.1. The United Nations Voluntary Fund for Vic-
tims of Torture: a model for landmines victims? 
Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against 
torture, adopted by the General Assembly in 1984 and in 
force since 1987, defines torture as an act carried out by a 
public official or at his instigation or with his consent: 
“…by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical 
or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for 
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person 
information or a confession, punishing him for an act 
he or a third person has committed or is suspected of 
having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination 
of any kind.”
This definition helps to identify victims of torture in 
international law. However the voluntary Fund on their 
behalf was established prior to the convention against 
torture.
4.1.1. Mandate and admissibility
The Fund was established by General Assembly resolution 
36/151 of 16th December 1981 to receive voluntary 
contributions from Governments, non-governmental 
organisations and individuals for distribution to non-
governmental organisations providing humanitarian 
assistance to victims of torture and their families. 
Applications for grants should aim at providing medical, 
psychological, social, economic, legal, humanitarian 
or other forms of assistance to victims of torture and 
members of their families. Subject to availability of 
funds, a limited number of grants could also be given 
for the training of professionals or for the organisations 
of conferences and seminars with a special focus on the 
treatment of victims of torture. The amount of the grant 
requested cannot exceed one third of the annual budget 
of the programme submitted.
Only non-governmental organisations can apply for grants 
from the Fund. Applications from Governments, national 
liberation movements or political parties are not admissible.
Consequently, although this Fund is for victims of torture, 
the victims themselves are not at the centre of the Fund’s 






















operational procedures. An individual victim cannot obtain 
assistance from the Fund, if he/she is not represented by 
an NGO.
  
As regard to the selection criteria, the staff of the project 
should have experience in direct assistance to victims of 
torture and the programme should be functioning. Projects 
aiming at campaigning against torture, preventing torture 
or providing financial assistance to other projects are 
not admissible. No new application for a grant can be 
considered until satisfactory narrative and financial reports 
on the use of previous grants are received.
One of the Fund’s criteria for awarding grants is the 
provision of information on the victim’s history and the 
type of assistance he/she receives.
• “The personal history of the victim:
In what context the victim was tortured;
The type of torture suffered;
The type of torturer involved;
The type of psychological and physical after-effects suffered.
• The assistance provided under the project:
How the victim came into contact with, or was referred to, 
the organisation;
What type of assistance was provided to the victim under 
the project;
What type of staff member carried out the assistance;
Where was the assistance provided.
• The results:
What results have been achieved through the assistance 
provided.
• Future assistance:
Will the victim continue to be assisted under this project;
What kind of assistance will be provided to the victim 
under this project;
For how long will the assistance be provided;
What results are expected”176.
4.1.2. Operating procedure
During its annual session in May, the Board reviews the 
narrative and financial reports on the use of previous 
grants, adopts recommendations on applications for 
new grants, hears project leaders, meets with donors, 
consults with the Special Rapporteur on Torture and the 
Committee against Torture and adopts other relevant 
recommendations to the Secretary-General on the 
activities of the Fund. This latter will report once a year 
both to the General assembly and to the Commission on 
Human rights on the activities of the Fund.
4.1.3. The Fund’s activities 
About 200 applications for funding for a total amount of 
more than 12 million United States dollars were received 
for consideration by the Board of Trustees at its 21st 
session (13-27 May 2002). The High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, on behalf of the Secretary-General, and 
on the basis of the recommendations made by the Board, 
allocated approximately 7 million dollars in new grants for 
2002-2003 to 169 projects submitted by non-governmental 
organisations from about 60 countries. 
From 1997 to 2001, the trend on priorities for assistance 
confirmed that focus was being placed on psychological 
assistance (from 61 to 82 %), medical assistance (from 
58 to79 %), social assistance (from 46 to 69 %), legal 
assistance (from 13 to 51 %) and economic assistance 
(from 0 to 20 %), highlighting a sharp increase in multi-
disciplinary projects (involving several types of assistance) 
and the growing need for legal assistance, essentially 
due to the number of victims who are now undertaking 
proceedings to put an end to their torturers’ impunity and 
obtain justice177. 
The 22nd session of the Board of trustees took place from 
12th to 28th May 2003.
By now, some contributions have been paid that would 
be taken into account during the 23rd session: 202 365 $ 
contributions already paid and 82 606 $ pledges. 
The United States delegation has emphasised its 
government’s support for the Fund, which, in 2002, took 
the form of a voluntary contribution of 5 million dollars. 
It has declared that its government is in favour of the 
Fund’s work and was hoping soon to be in a position to 
support it as it has done in the past.
4.2. Application to landmines victims
4.2.1. Victims of Mines and Victims of torture
Torture is a very political act in that often the victim is 
chosen intentionally because of his or her political or 
religious convictions or ethnic origins. The act of torture is 
used to achieve a result: obtaining information, intimidating 
an individual or a third party, a punishment.
For mine victims, the situation is different. Landmine 
casualties occur indiscriminatingly. People are not targeted 
as individuals; if they are targeted, it is as members of a 
community. 
Nonetheless, victims of torture and victims of mines are all 
victims of a violation of their most fundamental rights, the 
right to life and the right to health. 
They are faced with the same type of needs, medical 
and psychological care and sometimes socio-economic 
assistance, although methods for providing assistance 
may differ, as the type of trauma suffered is not comparable 
in the two cases. Nevertheless, a person having suffered 
the amputation of a limb at the hands of his or her torturers 
will receive the same type of treatment and assistance as 
a mine victim amputee. In the event of a lack of suitable 
structures, the assistance they need can in both cases be 
provided by non-governmental bodies. 
176 http://www.ohchr.org/french/about/funds/torture/apply_fr.htm
177 See UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, United Nations Voluntary Fund for victims of torture, NY: United Nations, 18 January 2001, E/CN.4/2001/59, 9 p. 
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After analysing the criteria given earlier for selecting and 
identifying victims, we can see that such criteria could 
easily be applied to other types of victim and particularly 
to victims of anti-personnel mines. Thus, the form and 
methods of the Fund for victims of torture could easily be 
transposed to victims of mines.
Similarly, many NGOs or local associations are involved in 
providing assistance to victims of mines. We could easily 
imagine a similar Fund being set up in the sector of mines 
to finance the activities of these organisations. However, 
inasmuch as this type of Fund is not based on the idea 
of indemnifying or individual compensation, one needs to 
analyse whether the application of this model in the mines 
sector is really appropriate.
4.2.2. What place for the victim? 
The voluntary Fund for victims of torture is not a 
jurisdictional body aiming to obtain reparation for torture 
victims, which would mean establishing responsibility.
It seams difficult to talk about complete compensation in 
this area as the victims are not the direct beneficiaries 
of the grants awarded by the Fund, but are indirect 
beneficiaries through the intermediary of an NGO. It is 
however a type of compensation.
In many mine-polluted countries, there are programmes 
of assistance to mine victims that are run either by the 
states directly, or by national or international NGOs. The 
victims remain dependant on these structures and on the 
type of assistance they receive from them. Their place 
in the decision-making structure is not central, and their 
only room for decision about the aid they wish to receive 
is limited to the assistance programmes accessible to 
them.
 
If we take the Fund for victims of torture as a model, it 
seems that only 30% of the total cost of the project can 
be financed by the Fund. It is therefore down to the 
organisation to find the additional funding. Thus, not only 
do the victims not have direct access to the funding, but 
also the assistance they may receive depends on the 
ability of the organisation representing them to find further 
funding.
Furthermore, the assistance that can be brought to victims 
is not enough in itself to make them feel that they have 
received complete reparation. For this, victims or their 
families would need to have also direct and individual 
access to the Fund to obtain compensation in case they 
have not been able to obtain reparation via a legal case. 
The intention here is not to invalidate the principle of 
assistance by claiming that the means available for victims 
of mines via NGOs are sufficient and that creating a Fund 
for this purpose would be superfluous, but rather to admit 
that these people can claim to receive compensation or 
indemnities personally in order to have free choice over 
how they attempt to reorganise their lives. 
The model provided by the voluntary Fund for victims of 
torture does not offer this possibility. It is true that in the 
case of victims of torture, legal assistance represents a 
first stage that may result in obtaining reparation before 
a jurisdictional body. For victims of mines, means of 
recourse against this type of harm are difficult to use as 
the responsible party is rarely identified. Consequently, 
granting legal aid in the current legal framework may not 
be sufficient.
4.2.3. The Fund’s legal foundation: an inde-
pendent Fund
As the Fund is not linked to the Convention against 
torture, contributions are not compulsory, nor are there 
any relation between the ratification of this convention and 
contributions to the Fund. 
Consequently, one can easily imagine a Fund for victims 
of mines being set up along similar lines, in other words 
independent from the convention prohibiting the use, 
stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel 
mines and on their destruction (Mine Ban Treaty), which 
would also mean being able to extend assistance to 
victims of explosive remnants of war.
There is a double advantage to such a system: on the 
one hand, as there is no obligation to contribute attached 
to signing the treaty, there is no danger of this dissuading 
potential signatories. On the other hand, the States which 
have not signed can contribute to the Fund, which means 
there are no restrictions on the source of the voluntary 
contributions.
Including such a Fund within the UN system is also 
a guarantee of its independence, impartiality and 
transparency. Their presence in many developing 
countries means that the United Nations would rapidly 
be able to identify the NGOs working in the field of 
assistance to mine victims and monitor the quality of the 
programmes funded. We can easily imagine that a Fund 
for victims of mines could be created within the United 
Nations, in the same way as for the victims of torture. 
However, we could also argue that the lack of dynamism 
and flexibility and the administrative red tape of the UN 
bodies could be an obstacle to the efficacy of such a 
Fund. 
4.2.4. Voluntary contributions: a risk of a shift 
in funding towards the voluntary Fund without 
any significant global increase  
At the moment, the funding of mines victims assistance 
projects comes from various different sources: UN 
agencies, institutional (State) funding bodies, private 
foundations, NGOs using their own capital. 
States could see the creation of a voluntary Fund for the 
victims of mines as a way of continuing to finance this 
type of project without having to carry out the monitoring 
and control. The risk would therefore be to see this state 
funding simply transferred to the newly created Fund 
without the global amount of funding for mine victims 






















more of a tendency to prefer bilateral aid, in other words, 
aid over which they retain control and visibility178. 
There could also be a certain reticence about creating 
a Fund that would deprive them of all control over how 
the funding is used. The risk then would be to have both 
a powerless Fund and parallel, uncoordinated bilateral 
initiatives.  
Only the states could answer these questions since 
they are the most involved in funding programmes of 
assistance to mine victims. 
On the basis of all this, we could ask whether setting up 
such a system is a significant step forward in terms of the 
rights of mine victims or offers any real advantages other 
than that of creating a system for monitoring the funding 
of assistance to mine victims, a possibility that does not 
exist at present179. 
One advantage would be to centralise the contributions 
from private individuals or foundations concerned by this 
cause. However, the example given by the Fund for victims 
of torture outlines that of the 551 548 dollars worth of 
contributions allocated to the Fund, only 400 dollars come 
from private individuals, and the rest comes from States.
This Fund would therefore continue to be dependent on the 
solidarity of the states. Inasmuch as it excludes any idea 
of compensation or reparation, it would be difficult to apply 
the «polluter-pays» principle, which would mean state and 
non-state actors involved in the production and use of anti-
personnel mines having to contribute to the Fund.  
It is very likely that the creation of a Fund for the 
victims of mines modelled on the Fund for the victims 
of torture would not suffice to cover real needs in terms 
of assistance. Indeed, the number of mine victims in the 
world is estimated at more than 300 000 and the number 
of new victims each year at 15 to 20 000 (not counting 
the families of victims)180. If the Fund were only destined 
for new victims of mines (the most minimalist hypothesis) 
and we estimate the number of victims at 15 000, and if 
the Fund received the same amount of contributions as 
the Fund for victims of torture, 7 million dollars, then the 
amount allocated per victim would be 466 Dollars. This 
amount does not take into consideration the operating 
costs of the organisation responsible for providing aid to 
the victim. 
This study of possibilities for creating a compensation/
indemnity Fund for victims of mines based on similar 
international Funds, is essentially an attempt to make 
some significant progress in the area of rights for mine 
victims. One of the ways of doing this is to provide victims 
of mines with an individual and personal method for 
obtaining reparation or compensation. Rights for mine 
victims also means allowing them free choice in the 
way they manage the situations they are faced with. The 
United Nations Voluntary Fund is therefore not an ideal 
model for promoting the rights of mine victims as it makes 
a third party of the victims. 
However, the problem of accidents due to landmines has 
consequences in public health terms that are much better 
covered at a collective level. Consequently, a balance 
should be found between the needs of the person that are 
linked to his or her life choices and that require individual 
procedure and care-management and his or her needs as 
part of a health issue that has to be dealt with on a broader 
scale than that of the individual. 
Not differentiating the victim from the group means 
denying his or her individual status and ensuing rights. 
However, considering each individual case without taking 
the collective aspect into account could lead to both 
inequalities and an increase in expenditure. 
5. Conclusion
What provisions should be envisaged for compensating 
mine victims : national measures, international funds ? In 
the spirit of the Ottawa process, assistance to landmine 
victims should be anchored in options taken on a national 
level. This is reiterated in the action plan adopted in Nairobi 
in December 2004.
If, however, insufficient funds were not raised at national 
level, a model of a fund based on international cooperation 
and guaranteeing the right to compensation for victims 
could emerge. The above comparative study sketches the 
outlines of this.This Fund should be an intergovernmental 
organisation covering the whole world and its philosophy 
should be based on that of the Ottawa Treaty.
Such a Fund should not only cover injuries due to 
landmines, but also those due to UXO, which have 
the same effects as landmines. The Fund’s operating 
procedures, described below, could also result in an 
improvement in services to disabled people generally: 
whilst acknowledging the specificity of the situation of 
landmine victims, the development of initiatives that could 
at the same time benefit other persons with disabilities 
should not be excluded. 
An international compensation fund should make 
both individual and collective compensation possible. 
It is therefore possible to envisage a combined system 
of claim. In other words, claims for compensation to the 
Fund would be open to individuals, or groups of persons 
and also to national or international organisations for 
victim assistance, whose activities and projects focus on 
landmine victims and their families. It is true that the Fund 
would then be faced with a major obstacle: the risk of 
double compensation. Depending on the character of the 
prejudice, individual or collective, people having already 
received compensation via funds allocated to assistance 
organisations would not be entitled to claim for individual 
compensation; the aim of such an international Fund being 
178 In a recent report, questions about the functioning and financing of the fund were raised. See UNITED NATIONS, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, United Nations Voluntary Fund 
for Victims of Torture, Report of the Secretary General, Addendum, NY: United Nations, E/CN.4/2004/53/Add.1, 22 March 2004, 6 p.
179 Via the mines observatory, member NGOs of the ICBL carry out monitoring that contributes towards developing the data collected by the United Nations, but which is 
still incomplete. 
180 ICBL, Toward a mine-free world, Landmine Monitor Report 2003, op. cit., p. 38-42.
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to compensate as many victims as possible. Thus, the 
Fund should be given real powers of control over methods 
for allocating funds.
In order not to intervene in the duties of the States, the 
Fund should have a subsidiary competence. Indeed, 
member States should be obliged to establish their own 
national compensation mechanisms181. The Compensation 
Fund should intervene as a last resort, after all regional 
and domestic remedies have been exhausted. This should 
encourage victims to first attempt to claim before courts or 
commissions at regional or national level. These courts 
and commissions should thus be empowered to provide 
reparation / compensation for landmine victims. 
A compensation fund should take into account the different 
types of prejudice from which landmine victims suffer. 
Demands from UXO victims should also be admissible to 
the Fund. Ideally, compensation should also be admissible 
for direct and indirect victims of physical, economic or 
psychological prejudices, suffering permanent and non-
permanent after- effects. 
Firstly, compensation for physical injuries would seem 
to be indisputable. It should be calculated on the basis of 
the cost of the victim’s medical care. Indeed, some people 
suffering from permanent injury require medical treatment 
over the long term, including a prosthesis and frequent 
replacements. However, the Fund should deduct all social 
security benefits and/or pensions already received from 
the amount awarded. 
Secondly, compensation should take into account 
economic prejudice. For example, compensation for the 
loss of financial resources of a victim of landmines or UXO 
with dependent children and forced to cease professional 
activity, should be calculated according to two criteria: 
prior income and the number of dependent children at the 
time in question. Moreover, deterioration of habitation or 
assets should be considered as economic loss suffered by 
victims. Compensation for victims of landmines and UXO 
should take into account damage due to the deterioration 
of the environment. Indeed, people can be seriously 
affected from living in a contaminated area. Their standard 
of living deteriorates and the environment in which they 
live may be polluted because of the presence/explosion of 
landmines/UXO.
As regards economic prejudice suffered by a child victim, 
compensation should take into account specific needs 
for accompaniment and for his/her individual life project. 
A certain degree of subjectivity in the evaluation of the 
economic prejudice may be unavoidable.
Thirdly, the compensation fund should take into account 
psychological injury, suffered both by direct and indirect 
victims. 
The funds collected should be shared among those 
victims who have made an admissible claim and allocated 
in accordance with the level of personal injury suffered. 
The funds should be allocated on an annual basis in order 
to ensure that they are shared fairly among all the victims 
making a claim to the Fund during a given period. The 
funds collected would also be distributed to organisations 
for assistance, when the prejudice is collective. 
Given the enormous cost of satisfying the needs, the 
Fund’s financial resources need to be wide-spread; 
this means participation from as many and varied 
actors as possible.
Landmine producers could be made to contribute to the 
fund through pressure from the courts (or credible threats 
of such).  If producers believe there is any chance a court 
would even hear a case brought by a landmine victim 
against a producer, they might consider making a donation 
to the fund as part of a settlement with the victims (which 
would mean no legal costs, no order to compensate from 
the court and no disturbance to the lucrative business 
of making and selling weapons). It would therefore be 
a business decision motivated by financial imperatives 
rather than a moral obligation. 
 
Secondly, an international Compensation Fund for 
landmine victims should be financed by States in the 
name of international solidarity, partly by means of 
voluntary state contributions and partly by means of 
obligatory contributions from States Parties. They may 
consider allocating part of their armaments/defence 
budget or levying taxes on arms companies to be paid 
directly into the Compensation Fund. 
Finally, civil society, aware of the necessity to provide 
compensation to victims, could contribute to the Fund. Thus 
it would be open to voluntary contributions from a variety 
of sources provided that these sources are consistent with 
the spirit of the fund and the Mine Ban  Treaty182.
Thus, any private person involved in the fight against the 
use of landmines could make voluntary contributions to 
the Fund.
181 As recommended by the Commission on Human Rights in principle 17 of its “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, (24th October 2003), doc. E/CN/2004/57. 
182 Contributions to the ICC trust fund are regulated according to a similar rule: “The Board shall refuse such voluntary contributions … that are not consistent with the goals 
and the activities of the Trust Fund  [ICC-ASP/1/Res.6 Annex, para. 9.].
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ORGANISATION OF A POTENTIAL COMPENSATION FUND
AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
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